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Chōshū: Heart and Soul of the Meiji Restoration

Sean O'REILLY

Abstract: There is excellent English-language work available on the years leading up to Japan's Meiji Restoration—and specifically how and why a certain domain, Chōshū (modern-day Yamaguchi Prefecture), played such a prominent role in the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Still, questions remain. What enabled the radical reformers of Chōshū to come to power, and allowed them to achieve victory over an enormous punitive force dispatched to chastise them? Why did Chōshū succeed when so many other domains stood on the sidelines or, like Mito, fell apart too early to play a revolutionary role? Part one of this article seeks to answer these questions. Part two, however, is devoted to a troubling historiographical issue: a single English-language work, namely Albert Craig's *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (published over fifty years ago), appears to have "won" the debates over Chōshū's exceptionalism. Worse yet, even mild challenge to Craig's interpretation was met with a blistering rebuke, effectively shutting down debate, or even questions, about Craig's admittedly quite persuasive position. But should scholarship rely so completely on a single book, to the point of rather harshly criticizing those who might disagree? This article seeks not only to answer these historiographical questions but also to provide a detailed yet accessible account of Chōshū in the years before the Meiji Restoration, intervening in the stalled historiographic debates to suggest a view that synthesizes the strengths of each. This is a critically important task, because understanding the root causes of Chōshū's strength is a vital step towards understanding how the Meiji Restoration unfolded in the way it did—and unlocking the secrets of the Meiji Restoration is fundamental to making sense of all subsequent Japanese history.

Keywords: Japan, Bakumatsu, Historiography, Choshu, Meiji Restoration

Most inquiries into the Bakumatsu ("end of the Bakufu") period in Japan are born out of one or both of the following two questions: "How and why was the Tokugawa Shogunate defeated?" and "Why were the loyalist rebels so successful in a handful of domains (especially Chōshū[1]), but not in the rest?" English-language works on the Bakumatsu period can be split, according to the way in which they attempt to answer the above questions, into two rough categories: 1) those that emphasize the broad theories behind actions and at work shaping circumstances, and 2) those that focus more on the circumstances and actions themselves. Each approach seeks of course to understand what motivated the various people who lived through the tumult of the Bakumatsu, and thereby grasp the causes of the events leading up to the military defeat of the Bakufu ("tent government", referring to the Tokugawa Shogunate) in 1868 and the beginning of the Meiji Restoration. Each approach must explain the enormous role of Chōshū domain (*han*) in furthering the imperial cause, out of all proportion to its measured agricultural/economic power even as a great domain, and must provide an explanation for the lack of participation by many other domain, some of which were larger than Chōshū, in the rebellion against the Shogunate.

The issue of Chōshū is of critical importance because Chōshū played such a leading role in the history of the Bakumatsu period. In the English-language historiography, much has been made over the famous Sat-Chō Alliance, the secret pact reached in 1866 with the help of Tosa native Sakamoto Ryōma between loyalists from the two great southwestern domains of Satsuma and Chōshū (and thus "Sat-Chō", though I have often thought that given who bore the brunt of the responsibilities later on, perhaps the order should be reversed). Yet even Satsuma's direct, positive contribution to the Imperial cause and the 'Topple the Shogunate' (*tōbaku*) movement was

[1] Chōshū is the colloquial name for Hagi domain, under the suzerainty of the Mōri clan, and referred to the province of Nagato (the short form of which is "chō", and thus the "chō" in Chōshū) but also, in practice, included Suō; this area corresponds to Yamaguchi Prefecture, the westernmost prefecture on Honshū, today.

comparatively minor until the weeks leading up to the battle of Toba-Fushimi in January, 1868. It is certainly true that getting such bitter rivals, who only two years before had been in armed conflict in Kyōto, to find any common ground at all was quite a diplomatic feat;[2] until late 1867, however, the agreement was kept a secret even from the majority of inhabitants of the two domains, and in practice resembled a non-aggression pact more than a genuine alliance.[3] Consequently, Chōshū was forced essentially to stand alone against the Bakufu, something they did—eventually—with such success that it proved the death knell of the Tokugawa government. How was it possible for a single domain to humble the mighty Tokugawa, and what circumstances enabled their rise to prominence in national politics and the ultimate success of their loyalist faction? Over the course of the last 60 years of historiography, many answers have been proposed, from both theoretical and circumstantial points of view, though none by itself—not even Albert Craig's 1961 book *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, whose very success has led to the stultification of debate and inquiry—is ultimately satisfying. Before turning to Craig's work, and the unfortunate and perhaps unintended negative consequences it has had on the field despite–or perhaps because of– its thorough persuasiveness, I will introduce some of the other works on the Bakumatsu period and Chōshū.

In the theoretical camp, Harry Harootunian and his student Victor Koschmann have offered an answer to the two main questions of the Bakumatsu period that emphasizes the role of the *Mitogaku* (Mito learning, a complex set of reform-minded principles, conceived of by thinkers in the Mito domain, which eventually culminated in the famous slogan of *sonnō jōi*, "revere the emperor, expel the barbarians"), and explains part of Chōshū's prominence by highlighting the influence of the *Mitogaku* on activists like Yoshida

[2] That said, the impression that Satsuma and Chōshū were irreconcilable enemies is overblown. Tanaka Akira has pointed out that the two domains began trading earlier in the Bakumatsu period (in year six of the Ansei period), suggesting a 'thaw' in relations was already in progress, one only temporarily halted by the Hamaguri gate incident. See Tanaka, *Bakumatsu no Chōshū*, p. 55.

[3] In that it did not demand that Satsuma come to Chōshū's aid militarily if the Bakufu mounted another expedition; instead, Satsuma merely agreed to intercede diplomatically on Chōshū's behalf. See W.G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford, 1972) pp. 255-6.

Shōin and Kusaka Genzui, both of whom visited Mito and were clearly influenced by what they learned there.[4]

Of course, if Mitogaku were the most important factor in direct and successful rebellion, one might logically assume that Mito itself would be at the vanguard of the loyalist movement, and indeed for many years this was the case; yet due to several important differences between Mito and Chōshū, the movement imploded in the former and flowered in the latter. Both domains experienced domain-wide civil war caused directly by conflict over domain policy regarding the issue of loyalism; why was the end result so dramatically different? Despite the promising early role the domain of Mito played in agitating for reform, Mito had dropped out of national politics by 1866 and was to play no significant role in the 'Topple the Shogunate' movement. Mito had been the center of the political reform movement for decades; how could their political clout vanish so suddenly, just when calls for reform were reaching their crescendo? In order to answer these questions, we must discover what circumstantial challenges Mito faced that led to failure, and what unique qualities, if any, Chōshū possessed that enabled its success.

Historians of the more circumstantial approach, in order to make sense of a topic of such enormous complexity as Bakumatsu Japan, often focus on single domains, and their works are thus useful when comparing domains. We turn to them, therefore, for inquiries about the handful of domains considered most vital to bringing about the downfall of the Shogunate and ushering in the Meiji Restoration, or in other words, Chōshū, Satsuma, (Mito) and Tosa. Such scholars as Albert Craig or Thomas Huber with Chōshū; Mark Ravina with Satsuma as well as several comparatively minor domains; Philip Brown with Kaga; Marius Jansen and Luke Roberts with Tosa; or more recently, Hiraku Shimoda with Aizu, might acknowledge the role of theories and ideologies such as the *Mitogaku* in forming part of the motivation for specific individuals or groups, but overall tend to argue that domain-specific economic and political conditions

[4] See Harry Harootunian, *Toward Restoration* (Berkeley, 1971) for a detailed account of the Mito learning, and its ideological influence on Yoshida Shōin and other loyalists; see also J. Victor Koschmann, *The Mito Ideology: Discourse, Reform, and Insurrection in Late Tokugawa Japan, 1790-1864* (Berkeley, 1987) p. 3.

provide a better answer to the question of how and why the Bakufu was defeated, and especially why the loyalists succeeded in certain domains, but failed to take root elsewhere.[5]

I find the arguments of the Chōshū specialists like Craig compelling, and argue that the reason Chōshū was so much more prominent than the other domains is to be found in a triumvirate of special socioeconomic, political, and ideological qualities present in Chōshū that were not possessed by any other domain. But as I will explain in part two, Craig's persuasive work, which lays out the conditions he sees as fundamental to Chōshū's success, had a chilling effect on alternate explanations, exposing a troubling historiographical weakness in English-language scholarship on Chōshū and Japan.

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[5] There is also a trend for domain scholars to choose, roughly, either an economic or a biographical approach. For a primarily economic view of Chōshū, see Albert Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration* (Harvard, 1961) or Thomas Huber's more biographical *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1981); Mark Ravina offers an economic survey of three minor domains in *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1999) as well as a more general-audience biographical approach to Satsuma and Saigo Takamori in *The Last Samurai* (Hoboken, 2004) while Masakazu Iwata's detailed *Ōkubo Toshimichi: the Bismarck of Japan* (Berkeley, 1964) provides the same for Ōkubo; for a biographical look at Tosa, see Marius Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration* (Princeton, 1961), or consult Luke Roberts, *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain* (Cambridge, 1998) for an economic view. Philip Brown's book *Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan: the Case of Kaga Domain* (Stanford, 1993) goes into detail on the processes by which a stable domain governed in the unique million-koku Kaga, thus helping to illuminate some of the key features common to all the successful domains. And Hiraku Shimoda, in his book *Lost and Found: Recovering Regional Identity in Imperial Japan* (HUP, 2014) explores the repercussions of local as opposed to "national" identities for post-1868 Aizu retainers and non-samurai alike, while also covering the reasons Aizu acted as it did in the Bakumatsu period. Shimoda is part of a recent trend focusing on the "losers" of the Meiji Restoration, the other key member of which is Michael Wert, whose book *Meiji Restoration Losers: Memory and Tokugawa Supporters in Modern Japan* (HUP, 2013), like Shimoda's, explores how those vilified for their opposition to the Meiji regime have come to be remembered, though he does not focus on a single domain but rather certain key historical figures such as Ii Naosuke and especially Oguri Tadamasa.

1. Part I: Why Was Chōshū So Prominent in Bakumatsu Japan?

2.1 Factor One: The *Buikukyoku,* or "The Means to Fund Revolution"

It is a well-known fact that over the course of the long *pax Tokugawa,* due to many factors but especially the Versailles-like system of alternate attendance (*sankin kōtai*[6]) whereby domain finances were bled away keeping the daimyo in competitive comfort in (and traveling in style to and from) Edo, a great many of the domains found themselves in a vicious downward spiral of debt from which there seemed to be no escape. Few domains were economically solvent by the mid 1800s, meaning that few possessed the resources to purchase state-of-the-art rifles, cannon, or ships from abroad. On the surface, Chōshū appears to have been no exception—about half their considerable expenses originated outside the domain, in Edo or on the road to or from it, and despite borrowing up to half of the stipends owed their samurai retainers, their domain debt was staggering—but Chōshū had developed a special solution: the *buikukyoku*.[7]

The *buikukyoku* functioned as a sort of savings/investment office of the government. Established in 1762, it taxed previously undiscovered production in the range of 50,000 *koku* (a measure of rice, equal to about 5 bushels, that came to acquire monetary value according to the fickle conditions of the rice futures market and was vulnerable to agricultural conditions like droughts, etc.) yielding about 1000 *kan* of silver each year, which was then put away for use

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[6] The *sankin kōtai* system required daimyo, with very few exceptions, to live alternate years in Edo and in their own domains, and more importantly, to leave their families as de facto hostages in Edo when absent from it; the economic cost of the more and more elaborate processions of the daimyo to and from Edo, as well as the cost of maintaining lavish residences in Edo, were a severe drain on domain finances. For details, see W.B. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 17-18 and 42-43.

[7] Albert Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration* (Harvard, 1961), p. 38. Incidentally, the yearly domain deficit is about the same size as the Edo expenses, furthering Craig's assertion that the *sankin kōtai* system was the main cause of domain debts growing so large.

only in dire emergencies.[8] Later on, during the Second Punitive Expedition launched by the Bakufu against Chōshū in 1866, the domain was able to purchase 7000 rifles—3600 of them state-of-the-art Minié rifles used in the just-ended American Civil War—almost entirely with *buikukyoku* funds.[9] If Chōshū's success in repulsing the Second Punitive Expedition was due in large part to their technological superiority over the much larger but ill-equipped Bakufu force, that technological edge was bought by their economic solvency thanks to the *buikukyoku*, and thus the existence of the *buikukyoku* is one of the key factors enabling Chōshū's prominence (and perhaps very survival) in Bakumatsu events. Domain finances also received a boost by Chōshū's sporadic policy of encouraging vassals to return temporarily to the countryside and their landed fiefs—something only the largest domains still retained, all the smaller domains having already shifted entirely to a stipend system—allowing such samurai to be "paid" whatever their actual agricultural output might be and thus removing the necessity of providing a fixed stipend in specie.[10]

Furthermore, other domains did not have such a golden opportunity as did Chōshū to create their own *buikukyoku*, because it was only able to be created in Chōshū thanks to the presence of large swaths of land that had escaped official Bakufu notice, or in other words, it was made possible by the huge discrepancy between official versus actual agricultural output in Chōshū. The official reported production was 369,000 *koku*, but the actual product more like 800,000; compare this to Mito, which was almost one of the ten largest domains according to the official estimate of 350,000 *koku*, but whose real production was actually less than this total.[11]

There is also an important geographical difference when comparing the two domains of Chōshū (Suō/Nagato provinces) and Mito (Hitachi province); the former was almost as far away from the centralized authority of Edo as it is possible to be and still remain in Japan, while from the latter it was such a short journey to Edo that the

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[8] *Ibid*., pp. 45-6.
[9] Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration,* p. 316.
[10] Mark Ravina, *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1999), p. 66.
[11] Craig, p. 10.

Mito daimyo received special shogunal dispensation to live in Edo permanently.[12] At such close proximity to the Shogunate, it is hardly surprising that Mito was not able to underreport its agricultural production, nor escape the Shogunate's notice when gathering a revolutionary army later on (in 1864, during the Tengu insurrection). In other words, part of Chōshū's success was due to its geographical position; the distance between Edo and Chōshū gave the domain much more economic and political autonomy than was usually enjoyed even by *tozama* ("outer"—which can be taken literally here) domains.



Figure 1: Map of Japan showing Chōshū, Mito and their relative distance from Edo[13]

[12] Koschmann, p. 2.
[13] Map drawn by author.

Geographical factors were also at play in, for example, the difficulty the government of Hirosaki (modern-day Aomori, at the northern tip of Honshū) had in deciding whether to support the Court or the Bakufu in 1868; they were much closer geographically to the pro-Bakufu northern alliance, and it was only after great difficulty that a loyalist friend convinced the Hirosaki daimyo to support the imperial cause.[14] Nearby Kubota domain, in modern-day Akita, went through a similarly protracted process before finally agreeing to join the imperial forces. Many other domains throughout the country, especially those closer to Edo, the Shogunate's seat of power, remained firmly on the fence, while some actively committed to a pro-Shogunate alliance centered on Aizu and northeast Japan.

2.2 Factor Two: *Sekigahara*, or "A Motive for Revolution"

One common argument for Chōshū's prominence during the Bakumatsu centers around the idea that political strength flows from economic might; it was one of the top ten major domains even measured by the understated official agricultural (and thus economic) production, so it had much greater chances of political prominence than most other domains.[15] The vast majority of the domains, perhaps 240 out of the 260 or so which existed at that time, could be excluded from consideration, since serious rebellion against the government could only start in a large, wealthy domain, a description Chōshū fits well. However, such reasoning cannot explain why other rich, powerful domains, like Kaga for example, the only domain to have achieved the 1,000,000 *koku* mark in agricultural/economic strength during the Edo period, had only a minor role to play in the events leading up to the Meiji Restoration.[16]

Mito had a role of enormous importance despite not making the top ten list, yet Mito was a *shimpan* (Tokugawa branch house) and thus, at no point did even the most radical of the loyalists, much less the domain government or daimyo (himself a Tokugawa), suggest

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[14] Ravina, pp. 152-3.
[15] Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration*, p. 11.
[16] For why Kaga was relegated to the sidelines in the Bakumatsu, see Brown, *Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan: the Case of Kaga Domain*, passim.

dismantling the Bakufu; the assassination of Ii Naosuke in 1860, the Tengu insurrection of 1864, and the subsequent civil war were all characterized by startlingly careful, moderate rhetoric on the part of the loyalists, in contrast to the often virulent anti-Bakufu rhetoric during the same period in Chōshū.[17] In addition to the obvious geographical danger of calling for the downfall of the Bakufu on Edo's doorstep, however, the fact that the house of Mito was a Tokugawa branch house (*shimpan*) is also significant—this fact ensured that the domain government was never truly willing to support the insurrectionists.

Table 1: The Ten Largest Domains in the Tokugawa Period

Domain Name	Daimyo Name	Official productive capacity (in *koku*)	Type of domain
Kaga	Maeda	1,022,700	*tozama* (pro-Ieyasu)
Satsuma	Shimazu	770,000	*tozama* (ANTI-Ieyasu)
Mutsu	Date	625,600	*tozama* (pro-Ieyasu)
Owari	Tokugawa	619,500	*Shimpan*
Kii	Tokugawa	555,000	*Shimpan*
Higo	Hosokawa	540,000	*tozama* (pro-Ieyasu)
Chikuzen	Kuroda	520,000	*tozama* (pro-Ieyasu)
Aki	Asano	426,000	*tozama* (pro-Ieyasu)
Chōshū	Mōri	369,000	*tozama* (ANTI-Ieyasu)
Hizen (Saga)	Nabeshima	357,000	*tozama* (ANTI-Ieyasu)

* Note: "pro-Ieyasu" and "anti-Ieyasu" refer to the alignment of the respective combatants in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600.[18]

[17] For rhetoric on the assassination of Ii, see Koschmann, p. 150, and for the rhetoric of the Tengu insurrectionists and later rebels, see pp. 170-171. Michael Wert covers this topic extensively in *Meiji Restoration Losers*, especially chapter three, pp. 77-79 and passim.

[18] Figures for this table were taken primarily from the very helpful table in Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration* (Harvard, 1961), p. 11; as Craig points out, *jitsudaka* (actual production) was often much higher than *omotedaka* (officially listed production), so for example Chōshū, despite being ninth in the table above, was probably about fourth in actuality, possessing a *jitsudaka* of from 713,000 to 900,000 or even in excess of 1,000,000 depending on the extent to which production from branch houses is included.

Consequently, we can dismiss two of the top ten great domains, Owari and Kii, because they were also *shimpan* that moreover lacked Mito's long tradition of calling for reform, and were thus exceedingly unlikely to support overt resistance to Bakufu policies, much less armed rebellion. Of the remaining eight *tozama* domains, only the governments (united to some degree with the radicals) of Chōshū and of Satsuma chose to involve themselves proactively, if in somewhat contradictory ways, in loyalist machinations in the early and mid 1860s.[19] Did Chōshū have special reason to be resentful of Tokugawa hegemony, over and above the natural resentment surely experienced by all *tozama* houses at being excluded from positions of power within the Bakufu government?

The answer is 'yes'. Chōshū, and the house of Mōri, had more reason to resent the Bakufu than any other domain. The reasons can be found 260 years earlier, at the battle of Sekigahara, at which the Mōri fought on the Toyotomi side. After the defeat, their domain, which had been the second-greatest in all Japan at 1,200,000 *koku*, was cut by the victorious Ieyasu to just two provinces, Suō and Nagato, with an assessed production of only around 300,000 *koku*. By contrast, the holdings of the other two great *tozama* domain that fought against the Tokugawa at Sekigahara, Satsuma and Saga, were left untouched after the defeat. Furthermore, of the remaining five *tozama* houses in the top ten, all five supported Ieyasu in 1600, and were richly rewarded. The holdings of the Maeda, Date, Hosokawa, Asano, and Kuroda houses were all generously expanded after the battle, and several were moved to strategic locations to hem in the great anti-Tokugawa western powers, as when the houses of Hosokawa and Kuroda were repositioned to Kumamoto and Fukuoka, respectively, to check both Satsuma and Chōshū. The Asano were also sent to Hiroshima to serve as an eastern bulwark against Chōshū.[20] When examining all these factors, we discover that few indeed suffered more from the transition to Tokugawa rule than Chōshū, and that both

[19] That is, in Chōshū loyalists like Kido Kōin eventually came to control the government and used this base to make truly revolutionary decisions: to flout the authority of the Bakufu by shelling foreign ships in Shimonoseki and eventually to call for 'Topple the Shogunate', "down with the Bakufu". By contrast, until 1866 or so, Satsuma's government, led indirectly by the capable Shimazu Hisamitsu, was firmly committed to a perpendicular program of reforms: *kōbu gattai*, discussed in greater detail below.
[20] Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration*, pp. 20-21.

of the other two anti-Ieyasu domains, only one of which was to play an active role in the downfall of the Bakufu and that only several years after Chōshū took the lead, lacked Chōshū's powerful historical reason to resent the Tokugawa.

This animosity might however have withered away in the decades after 1600, had there not been certain customs in place in Chōshū during the Tokugawa period that were designed to nurse this grudge through the years. For example, early in the morning every New Year's Day, the Elders and other officials would apparently ask the daimyo in secret, "Has the time come to begin the subjugation of the Bakufu?" to which he would reply "It is still too early; the time is not yet come." One wonders what the daimyo replied in 1868! In the same vein, mothers in Chōshū would supposedly have their sons sleep with their feet pointing east, toward the Kantō, and tell them "never to forget the defeat at Sekigahara even in their dreams."[21] Craig summed it up best: "The history of Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration can be said to begin from the time of its defeat at Sekigahara."[22]

Tokugawa Japan, ideologically speaking, stressed nothing so much as loyalty and obligation, and so it is easy to imagine why *tozama* domains (much less *shimpan* or *fudai*, "hereditary", domains) rewarded for their support in the battle of Sekigahara would find it difficult, even so many years later, to turn on their benefactors. Tosa and the house of Yamauchi is perhaps the best example of this; there is evidence that the daimyo of Tosa, Yamauchi Yōdō, was still expressing gratitude to the Bakufu as late as 1862.[23] Clearly, of the ten great domains of the Tokugawa period, only Saga, Satsuma, and Chōshū had extra incentive, over and above their *tozama*-based exclusion from positions of power within the government, to resent the Bakufu, but Chōshū, owing to its especially humiliating fate after Sekigahara, had the strongest incentive of all to bring about the downfall of the Bakufu.

2.3 Factor Three: Numerous Impoverished Samurai—and a Weak Daimyo

[21] Craig, *Choshu in the Meiji Restoration,* p. 22.
[22] *Ibid*., p. 21.
[23] *Ibid*., p. 23.

Moreover, both Chōshū and Satsuma, and to a lesser extent Tosa, had a far higher proportion of samurai to commoner than the overall average, a difference that was only increased when compared with the Bakufu itself, which had far fewer samurai than the size of its holdings would suggest according to the officially established ratio. However, if political agitation were directly related to the proportion of samurai to commoners in a domain, one would have expected Satsuma and not Chōshū to have taken the lead, as they had the greatest ratio of samurai to commoners, as high as 1 to 3; clearly, there must have been other factors distinguishing Chōshū from other exceedingly militant domains.

Just as the domain government of Chōshū had the motive and opportunity to act in the early 1860s, the governments of other powerful *tozama* domains like Satsuma lacked the opportunity, while those of Mito and Tosa lacked both opportunity and motive (though there were plenty of motivated loyalists among those too low in the hierarchy to participate in the domain governments). The political situation in Chōshū in the early 1860s was such that, unlike in Mito, Tosa and Satsuma, where conditions emerged to interfere with the *sonnō jōi* movement, the loyalists often enjoyed quite a bit of support from the moderate bureaucracy (led by Sufu, who is discussed below) that controlled the domain government.

Contrast the circumstances in Chōshū with those of Tosa, where because of the hereditary obligation of the Yamauchi house to the Tokugawa, the reward they received being out of all proportion to their underwhelming service during Sekigahara, it was extremely unlikely that the daimyo, Yōdō, would ever sanction open resistance to Bakufu policies.[24] Indeed, he actively opposed disgruntled loyalist samurai like the so-called "Yoshida Shōin of Tosa", Takechi Zuizan (whom he eventually forced to commit *seppuku*) whenever politically possible.[25] Mito, also, was hardly a poster child for government-loyalist cooperation—during the Tengu march, the insurrectionists made the fatal mistake of appealing to Hitotsubashi Keiki Yoshinobu (who later became the last Shogun of Japan), seventh son of Mito's

[24] Marius B. Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration* (Princeton, 1961), p. 149.
[25] *Ibid*., p. 22.

famous reformist daimyo Nariaki, who, far from being sympathetic, was instrumental in their eventual defeat.[26]

The situation in Satsuma also forms a strong contrast with that of Chōshū, primarily because Shimazu Hisamitsu, the regent who actually held the reins of power during the latter part of the Bakumatsu, was a strong, able leader who had everything to lose personally from a radical movement and much to gain from the cause he actually did champion: *kōbu gattai*, which technically means "a union of Court and Bakufu" but in this context refers to a sort of assembly of major daimyo (including, one might add, the Shogun as the first among equals—Hisamitsu was late indeed in coming to the idea that the Bakufu and the office of the Shogun itself must be eliminated altogether) that would be given decision-making powers in the government, not unlike a House of Lords and perhaps consciously modeled thereon. In Satsuma, the death of their benefactor Shimazu Nariakira in 1858 was a tremendous blow to the loyalist movement, as championed by Saigō Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi, and so just as in Tosa, the presence of a daimyo/regent who took an active role in domain and national politics proved to be a massive obstacle to the nascent loyalist movement.[27]

Because Hisamitsu, the de facto ruler, was a strong-willed, capable leader, Satsuma rejected any early embrace of the extremist loyal cause and walked instead a much more moderate path; the house of Mōri, however, had no such strong-willed character as Hisamitsu to lead them, and consequently power was concentrated in the hands of career bureaucrats who were split into two cliques, almost like two political parties: the *zokurontō* ("Vulgar View Party"), the status-quo conservatives, and the *kaimeitō* (the "Enlightened View Party"), the moderate reformists (who later would form a coalition of sorts with the true extremists trained by Yoshida Shōin).[28]

Which party was in power at a given moment depended a great deal on public opinion in the domain and on the political climate in Japan at large. The main leader of the *kaimeitō* for much of the 1850s and

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[26] Koschmann, pp. 168-9.
[27] W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford, 1972), pp. 155-6.
[28] E. H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), p. 64.

early 60s was Sufu Masanosuke, an able politician who supported the extremists when it was politically feasible to do so; events, particularly the bombardment of Shimonoseki and the Forbidden Gate incident,[29] unfolded in such a way that in 1864 the moderates like Sufu were disgraced (he committed suicide) and the conservatives swept back into power, yet because they lacked a strong base of public support they fared poorly during the Chōshū civil war. In that sense, the destruction of moderates like Sufu may actually have helped the progressive, loyalist cause by bringing them into direct conflict with reactionary conservative elements and removing the restraints exerted by the Sufu group on extremism (as for example in late 1858 when Sufu sanctioned that Yoshida Shōin be re-imprisoned because he judged the political climate was not ripe for the kind of action—assassination—Yoshida was advocating).[30]

The almost complete destruction of the moderate clique in late 1864, followed by the subsequent ousting of the conservatives—whose victory proved to be quite short-lived—made it possible for true progressives like Yoshida-trained Kido Kōin (who among other innovative acts appears to have funded the Tengu insurrection in Mito) and others to fill the vacuum and begin holding positions of real power within the domain bureaucracy, and gradually to steer the course of the domain in a more extreme direction.[31] At no time, however, was even this progressive domain government (much less the conservative government) in firm control of the entire domain or its more radical forces, the *shotai*. This incomplete control is in contrast, for example, with the more pervasive control enjoyed by the

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[29] Since Chōshū had no foreigner population, when the *sonnō jōi* radicals decided in late 1863 to ignore—and insult—the vacillating Bakufu and try to carry out the anti-foreigner edict promulgated by Emperor Kōmei and the Court, their only viable targets were the ships sailing past the straits of Shimonoseki; the resulting reprisals by foreign warships convinced many in Chōshū that the *jōi* doctrine was untenable. For more details on the Four-Nation Fleet that came in revenge to Chōshū in 1864, and how this was one reason *jōi* as a practical doctrine was abandoned and 'Topple the Shogunate' became the new rallying cry, see Craig, pp. 231-5. For more on the Forbidden Gate incident, see Craig, pp. 223-31.

[30] Thomas Huber, *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1981), pp. 80-81.

[31] Kido Kōin's extra-domainal financial activities are mentioned in Koschmann, p. 153.

domain government in Satsuma, thanks to the prevalence of *gōshi* (rural samurai) and the hierarchy of control over the rural population that extended throughout the domain.[32]

2.4 Factor Four: The Court Connection, or a Foot in the Door of National Politics

We have seen that Chōshū had ample motive to seek the Shogunate's destruction. As it turns out, the house of Mōri also possessed something that could serve as the partial means: a political connection to the Court, unique among all the daimyo, which gave their interventions and machinations at Court a greater air of legitimacy. During the Tokugawa period it was strictly forbidden for military houses to have direct relations with the Court or its noble houses; yet because of their ancestry (they were descended from a noble house and even, possibly, from the Imperial line itself) and their monetary kindness to the Court during times of trouble, the house of Mōri alone among all the daimyo was allowed to visit the noble houses while traveling to and from Edo. More important still, this unique connection to the Court was used to justify a more active role in national politics, as in 1862 when Kusaka Genzui, a prominent loyalist, utilized this connection to argue that Mōri had great historical precedent for supporting the Imperial cause.[33]

Thus, differences in the political structure of the two most powerful domains that had both motive and opportunity to oppose the Bakufu may have allowed extremists in Chōshū to push the somewhat weaker domain government in a more radical direction, a situation that was unlikely in tightly controlled Satsuma (and impossible in Mito, given the domain's familial and geographical proximity to the Bakufu). So in Chōshū more extreme groups like Takasugi's *Kiheitai*, which in late 1864 he led in an attack on a conservative domain outpost in Shimonoseki before the ink was even dry on the agreement with the Bakufu after the First Punitive Expedition, enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy from official domain policy, whereas in Satsuma the official domain policy, embodied in the able regent Hisamitsu, carried a great deal more weight and could not easily be opposed. The

[32] Robert K. Sakai et al, *The Status System and Social Organization of Satsuma* (Tokyo, 1975), p.16-7.
[33] Craig, p. 24-5.

looser situation in Chōshū was also compounded by the weakness of the Mōri daimyo; had a leader of Hisamitsu's stature and rank lived in Chōshū during this period, could Chōshū ever have become as radical and progressive as it did following the victory of the extremists and the *shotai* (auxiliary militia) in the civil war? It seems unlikely.

Chōshū was also rather unusual in that its own Tenpō reforms, carried out in the early 1840's and intended, like the Shogunate's Tenpō reforms, primarily to relieve the debts of vassals and retainers, enjoyed a measure of success completely absent from the Bakufu efforts.[34] Another legacy of the wave of Tenpō reforms that swept individual domains and the Shogunate was an "arms race, begun during the Tenpō era, in which domains scrambled pell-mell for new weapons and new techniques, shattering the fragile balance of power that had kept Japan at peace since 1615."[35] As we have already seen, Chōshū had the financial resources necessary to compete successfully in such an arms race, unlike many other domains that might have harbored resentment towards the Shogunate but lacked the economic means to act on it.[36] Indeed, Chōshū was far more able to keep up in this arms race than even the Shogunate itself, which fell further and further behind in the quest for military modernization of arms, formations, and tactics, a factor that was to prove decisive in their humiliating, bell-tolling defeat in the Second Punitive Expedition against Chōshū in 1866.

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[34] Marius B. Jansen, "Meiji Ishin: the Political Context", in *Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution*, ed. Nagai Michio et al (UNU, 1985), p. 4.
[35] Harold Bolitho, "The Tempō Crisis", in *The Emergence of Meiji Japan*, ed. Marius Jansen (Cambridge, 1995), p. 24.
[36] Mito had its own Western-style cannon factories and shipyards, and had a long history of adopting new military innovations, while Chōshū had tried and failed at producing weapons themselves; thus, in Chōshū it was necessary to purchase Western arms from abroad, whereas in Mito arms could be produced. But Mito and the Bakufu both had similar arms manufacturing capabilities, whereas the new Minié rifles purchased by Chōshū represented an important technological quantum leap from earlier muskets and firearms. For details of Western arms manufacture programs in Mito, Chōshū, and the Bakufu, see Beasley, pp. 123-4.

2. Part II: The End of Historiography?

3.1 Ideology and the Service Intelligentsia

Thus far, in discussing economic and political considerations I have largely been in agreement with the arguments of Albert Craig concerning the role of Chōshū; where I must depart from his characterization of Bakumatsu Chōshū, however, is in the area of ideology. Specifically, there are two ideological aspects to Chōshū that his characterization, while persuasive in other respects, cannot satisfy: 1) his argument against the presence of any significant class-based elements within the reformist movement in Chōshū, and 2) his somewhat lukewarm assessment of Yoshida Shōin.
Discussion of the fascinating institution of the petition box is also absent from his account, despite the fact that Hagi is reported by Luke Roberts as having possessed one from 1721, the age of Tokugawa Yoshimune, who popularized the petition box system.[37] Since the existence of the petition box in Tosa, as the best way for those excluded by rank or heredity from participating directly in the government to influence domain policy, clearly helped to diffuse reformist tensions (and the system was suggested and implemented with that in mind), and furthermore since many of the petitions in Tosa were actually adopted by the government and the petitioners thanked or even rewarded, one wonders what the effects of the petition box were on Chōshū.[38]

Craig has challenged the widespread use of the term "lower samurai" to describe a cohesive group or class, and many of his objections are merited.[39] It is often far from clear what historians such as E.H. Norman meant when they refer to the alliance of lower samurai and merchants; who could gain entry into this "lower" samurai class, and who was excluded? Yet while his call for linguistic clarification of the term is well taken, even a cursory look at the relative political/hereditary and economic status of the major loyalists in the

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[37] Luke Roberts, *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain* (Cambridge, 1998) p. 108.
[38] Ibid., p. 115.
[39] His objections can be found in Craig, *Chōshū and the Meiji Restoration*, pp. 350-1, but especially in his "The Restoration Movement in Chōshū", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Feb. 1959), pp. 187-197.

sonnō jōi and, later, the 'Topple the Shogunate' movements reveals significant similarities in income and hereditary exclusion from high-ranking posts within domain governments.

Many of the lower-ranking samurai—or commoners!—participating in the loyalist movement were simply unable, according to the laws of their respective domains, to hold any significant posts and thus to participate in any direct, meaningful manner in the government. Furthermore, several middle samurai that could be used as counterexamples, like Kido or Takasugi, who were (barely) of sufficient rank to hold high office, were only chosen because of the elimination of more moderate bureaucrats like Sufu in the aftermath of the Forbidden Gate incident, and due to their relatively low economic standing and their widespread connections to even lower-ranking comrades, it is not so surprising that, instead of using their newfound power to benefit only themselves, they used it for progressive reform. In other words, even when members of the loyalist group were of middle rank, they had more in common with a roughly defined class of "lower" samurai than with the "upper" samurai they were, in most cases, replacing in the domain government. What can we call such a sense of solidarity, except a class?

Furthermore, this class cannot be limited to samurai; priests, the sons of *shōya* (village heads/administrators), and other highly educated commoners also frequently participated in the loyalist movement, and formed new bonds of camaraderie with their brothers in arms, samurai of lower rank, in organizations such as the Kiheitai. At the time Craig was writing, there was still a very strong Marxist undercurrent in contemporary Japanese historiography, and a massive effort was underway to decide to what extent the Meiji Restoration had been a partial bourgeois revolution or even a proletarian revolt; accordingly, he perhaps found it necessary to emphasize the fact that traditional Marxist elements of class struggle did not, in fact, play a significant role in the Restoration.

But now in the 21st Century, our perspective freed from any attempts to force a Marxist model onto the Restoration, we can instead look at the group of loyalists that formed the bulwark of the 'Topple the Shogunate' movement and find a great deal of evidence for a non-traditional class—the dispossessed, those who were effectively

excluded by the structure of Tokugawa society from participation in politics. Thomas Huber has called this group the "service intelligentsia" class, after Weber, and stresses that its members had a high level of education and, due to the accident of birth, a low to non-existent chance of achieving an upper-level post in the government.[40] Since this group was not limited to samurai, it certainly isn't identical with the term "lower samurai" criticized by Craig; yet there is definitely an element of lowness at work. As Beasley writes,

> There is, therefore, a valid connection between low rank—rank below that of *hirazamurai*, which qualified a man for domain offices of some responsibility—and rebellion, terrorism, or the threat of violence…this argument applies also to those whose claim to samurai status was tenuous or even nonexistent: the village headsmen, rich farmers, and merchants who had perhaps bought the right to use a family name and wear a sword. Given that these were men of influence in the community, well enough educated and informed to have opinions about the political issues of the day, the fact remains that Tokugawa society provided no channel through which their concern could legitimately be expressed.[41]

Craig stressed the importance of the bureaucratic cliques in Chōshū, like the Sufu faction, and deemphasized the direct contribution of the lower-ranking loyalists, instead focusing on when men like Kido were assigned high-level posts as the beginning of genuine loyalist gains; such developments, however, are consistent with the low rank theory described above by Beasley and elucidated in greater detail by Huber. Unfortunately for Huber, his 1981 book, published as part of his effort to win tenure in a difficult academic climate, was the target of an unusually long and pointedly combative review by none other than Craig himself.[42] In this review, Craig focused on Huber's perhaps unfortunate remark that the economic cutoff for his proposed 'service intelligentsia' class seemed to be stipends of less than 200 koku (in Huber's own words, if more than 400 koku, they would ipso facto be members of the elite, while those between 200-400 koku

[40] Huber, *Revolutionary Origins*, pp. 185-6.
[41] Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, p. 171.
[42] Craig's review was published in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Winter, 1983), pp. 139-149.

could go either way), and subjects Huber to a stern rebuttal for what he sees as a sort of economic determinism. Needless to say, there is merit in Craig's response: it does seem oddly deterministic to suggest, as Huber did, that support for the revolution happening within Chōshū could be quantified so neatly. And Craig went on to point out quite a number of ways Huber's work could have been improved, for example by incorporating the results of ongoing Japanese-language research into Chōshū. But whatever Huber's missteps, does the punishment, so to speak, fit the crime?

Huber replied to Craig's review, maintaining a respectful but principled opposition to some of Craig's key charges.[43] This step moved him from the proverbial frying pan into the fire, however, as a newly tenured colleague of Craig's, the late Hal Bolitho (who had joined Craig as a full professor at Harvard by that point) entered the fray, penning a response to the response in which he emphatically chose Craig's side and, by doing so, possibly impacted Huber's subsequent career in mainstream academia and certainly hurt reception of his service intelligentsia theory.[44] When senior academics intervene in historiographical debates, their words carry tremendous weight, and it is all too easy for them, unintentionally and without any trace of malice on their part, to crush fledgling ideas in their infancy.

Needless to say, the difficulty and potential dangers of publishing dissenting views of canonical works such as Craig's book is surely part of the reason very little English-language research on Bakumatsu Japan over the last 30 years has focused on Chōshū. It suggests, in fact, that there might be a systemic problem in academia: junior scholars, in such a climate, might well be self-censoring their research topics so as to avoid touching too closely upon any senior scholars' areas of expertise. At any rate, as a result of this interesting but unfortunate exchange, the merits of his concept of a service intelligentsia class, after the condemnation of such leading scholars as Craig and Bolitho, have never been fully explored. It is troubling

[43] Huber, "Reply to Albert M. Craig's Review of Thomas M. Huber, *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan"*, in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer, 1983), pp. 449-460.

[44] Bolitho wrote his response to Huber's response to Craig's original review later that year, in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Dec., 1985), pp. 667-684.

when the hierarchies of academia function not to nurture but to stifle alternative explanations, and so in an attempt to address this issue, however belatedly, I will reevaluate the service intelligentsia idea below.[45] I do so because, while still ignorant of Huber's fate and the political risks, I felt in my ignorance that there was merit to the idea of the service intelligentsia class.

One of the fundamental aims of such a trans-status class as the service intelligentsia was without a doubt a restructuring of domain and national societal structure. There were two avenues to accomplish this: to try to work with sympathetic high-ranking bureaucrats within the domain government to affect changes in domain structure and policy, or to take up arms and fight against the conservative domain and (later) Bakufu governments, communicating the message of reform by force. The ousting of the *zokurontō* as a result of the civil war in 1864 is an example of the latter course, where the measure of popular support enjoyed by the loyalist reformers in the countryside was clearly greater than that of the conservative domain government.[46] But the Sufu clique had already been annihilated, so who was to step in to fill the power vacuum? Naturally, the highest-ranking from among the extremists would be chosen to take the reins of power, men like Kido, but having been taught by Yoshida Shōin, Kido, as well as many other former students of Yoshida, never forgot their earlier commitment to reform society and went on to introduce comprehensive, egalitarian changes during the early Meiji period that completely transformed Japanese society.

Craig was right to object to any characterization that tried to paint the Bakumatsu period and its aftermath with a Marxist brush, because the evidence for such class consciousness was far from conclusive. But ironically, Craig himself made a strong if indirect case for the

[45] This situation helps to illustrate the potentially problematic nature of the academic system of book reviews itself: junior scholars dare not register frank criticism for fear of offending senior scholars. Meanwhile, senior scholars can say whatever they like, and when they speak, all must listen; if their words are intended constructively, the result is undoubtedly stronger research, but they can also have the unintended effect of reducing scholars' willingness to stray too closely into the areas of senior scholars' expertise, thus perhaps leading to a situation in which senior scholars' work remains largely unchallenged.

[46] Craig, *Choshu*, p. 281.

existence of trans-status solidarity when he argued that late Tokugawa society was vertically rather than horizontally organized, or in other words society was split more decisively into distinct domains than into four parallel layers of shared social status. Thus, samurai soldiers in the Kiheitai would find it easier to fight alongside *shōya* or other peasants from Chōshū than with samurai of similar station from some other domain.[47] But whereas he sees this as evidence only of the weakness of inter-domain cooperation, it is possible to view this solidarity as the beginnings of a genuine class, of well-educated, disenfranchised individuals who banded together to defend their domain and topple the Bakufu, both goals vital to their nascent dream of altering the structure of society itself.

Yet, so far, nothing in this discussion of a disenfranchised service intelligentsia class can explain the unique success enjoyed by its members in Chōshū. To understand why such figures in Chōshū, more than anywhere else, were able to adapt to the changing circumstances, gain at least partial control over domain government and policy, and survive to carry out the drastic reforms of the Meiji period, there are two crucial factors to be understood:

1) The political circumstances, specifically the bombardment of Shimonoseki and subsequent reprisals by the Four-Nation Fleet, the destruction of the Sufu clique after the Forbidden Gate incident, and the rise of an unpopular conservative domain government;
2) The role and lasting posthumous influence of Yoshida Shōin.

As we have already seen, circumstances enabled Takasugi and the *shotai*, at least partly by virtue of greater popular support in the countryside, to ignite the ire of the loyalists and drive out the conservatives, and then to fill the power vacuum with relatively moderate members from their own ranks (Kido). The bombardment of Shimonoseki, on the other hand, taught the more clear-sighted and perceptive among the loyalists both that *jōi* was untenable and that Western arms and techniques would be indispensable in the conflict brewing with the Bakufu. But figures such as Kido and Takasugi

[47] Craig, *Choshu*, p. 358.

cannot be mentioned without discussing the influence of their great, fanatical teacher, Yoshida Shōin.

Yoshida is well-known as a *sonnō jōi* zealot,[48] yet despite his apparent opposition to all things foreign he made a famous attempt to see the world by trying to board Perry's fleet in 1854.[49] How can we reconcile such a strange dichotomy? Perhaps the answer is as simple as Sun Tzu's, "Know thy enemy", but more likely, Yoshida wanted to gather both information about the West, and skills that could be put to use in making his own country stronger. Already by 1864, there was a move away from *jōi* to *fukoku kyōhei* and soon after to 'Topple the Shogunate', and so even if Yoshida's students were, privately, fanatically anti-foreign, there was an understanding that they still must learn what the West could teach scientifically and militarily, if only to be strong enough to fight off later encroachments by the West, to fight fire with fire, as it were. This practical, adaptable interpretation of the original *sonnō jōi* movement, which allowed Yoshida to advocate studying abroad even as he upheld the *jōi* standard, served his students well in later years.

How then does Yoshida relate to the idea of the service intelligentsia class? It was just such Yoshida-trained, card-carrying service intelligentsia members as the middle-ranked Kido, whose birth father was a fief doctor; Takasugi, who visited Shanghai and witnessed conditions there; Itō Hirobumi, a farmer's son brought up as a samurai who studied in London in 1863; the *ashigaru* Yamagata Aritomo with his tiny stipend but advanced education; and so on that were best able to recognize both the impossibility of *jōi* after the Four-Nation Fleet bombardment of Shimonoseki and the great value of Western skills (like for example rifle formations) as well as the value in harnessing the xenophobia and resentment of the commoners and spurring them on to fight alongside the loyalist samurai.[50] Consequently, these intelligentsia figures carried out several significant breaks with centuries-old tradition, notably the reorganization of domain military forces along Western lines

[48] To see a representative description of Yoshida as a nihilist, see Harry Harootunian, *Toward Restoration* (Berkeley, 1970), p. 193.
[49] Straelen, H. Van. *Yoshida Shōin: Forerunner of the Meiji Restoration* (Leiden, 1952), pp. 24-7.
[50] Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 236-8.

(meaning that, for example, highly ranked samurai in the Kiheitai were treated no differently than the peasants standing alongside them) and the effort to increase discipline among the *shotai*. Takasugi's creation of the samurai-commoner mixed force Kiheitai in 1863 is a well-known example of this somewhat radical reform, but it seems clear that he learned the importance of Western rifle formations from none other than Yoshida himself, who was advocating the creation of a commoner-based army as early as 1858.[51] It is possible that Yoshida was inspired, in developing these ideas, by the participation of commoners in an 1852 movement within Mito, and in a more general way by *Mitogaku*, but *Mitogaku* writings admitted of a wide range of interpretations, and Yoshida chose to see such writings as advocating loyalist rebellion—that was his activist contribution.[52] Yoshida also wrote in his *kyōfu no gen* ("Words of a Madman") that if no person of suitable ability can be found among the eligible ranks for a particular post, it would be best to take a person from the lower ranks, or if that too is impossible, to take someone from among the commoners; in such revolutionary ideas, we can see the beginnings of the egalitarian reforms of the Meiji Restoration.[53]

3. Conclusion: why Chōshū?

Chōshū, more than any other domain, led the loyalist and then the 'Topple the Shogunate' movement for five major reasons:

1) Their motive to act, i.e. their resentment against the Tokugawa, festering since Sekigahara, due to the vast reductions in their holdings;
2) Chōshū had the means to act thanks to its *buikukyoku* funds, used to purchase the technological edge in the critical struggle with the Bakufu during the Second Punitive Expedition, as well as its unique connection to the Court;
3) Circumstances such as the lack of a strong-willed daimyo, the limited government control over rural areas and over semi-autonomous units like the *shotai*, the fact that the domain was very distant geographically from the seat of Bakufu power, and the destruction of the moderate and then the conservative

[51] Huber, *Revolutionary Origins*, p. 75.
[52] Koschmann, *The Mito Ideology*, p. 174.
[53] Huber, p. 44.

bureaucratic cliques conspired to allow action in Chōshū that wasn't possible even in other largely anti-Bakufu domains like Satsuma, with its rigid society and strong leader, Tosa, with an active daimyo indebted to the Tokugawa and thus antagonistic to the loyalist movement, or Mito, so close to Edo and with an at least nominally pro-Bakufu daimyo;

4) The existence of a trans-status group 'service intelligentsia' class, for which evidence is strongest in Chōshū (though a similar class may have existed in some of the other anti-Shogunate domains); it functioned to create a strong vertical alliance among Chōshū, perhaps best encapsulated by the mixed-status Kiheitai;
5) The lingering influence and example of Yoshida Shōin on his students, combined with the fact that hardliner expulsionists like Kusaka Genzui, after succeeding in weakening the conservative faction in Chōshū, were themselves eliminated in the Hamaguri gate incident, meaning only pragmatists like Kido Kōin were left to strike a deal with Satsuma and thereafter rule the country.

These factors combined to make Chōshū a breeding ground for an anti-Bakufu movement, whose revolutionary spirit continued to grow even despite initial setbacks like the bombardment of Shimonoseki and rose to a crescendo after the triumph over the Bakufu army in 1866. Domain rivalry with Satsuma led Chōshū's moderates and extremists alike to embrace a steadily more radical pro-Court policy in 1863 onwards, in order to reclaim their role as mediators between the Court and the Bakufu and to distinguish themselves from the accommodationist 'Union of Court and Camp' (*kōbu gattai*) camp of Satsuma. Once they united with their erstwhile enemies in 1867-8, their efforts at opposing the Bakufu proved so successful the reformers in Chōshū and Satsuma discovered that their reforms could be carried much further than anticipated; in that moment, the Meiji Restoration was begun. And dominating both Bakumatsu and its aftermath, more than anyone else, were the adaptable, intelligentsia-class students of Yoshida Shōin, ready to remake the country. Hopefully, future generations of scholars will be willing to risk challenging established views, as only then will our field be able to incorporate alternate perspectives, and avoid historiographical stultification.

Kokoro are ya
Hito no haha taru
Hitotachi yo
Kaku naru koto wa
Mononofu no tsune

Keep in your hearts,
Ye who are mothers,
The great sadness
Which is the common fate
Of the samurai.[54]

[54] This *waka* that Yoshida wrote to his three sisters takes on a new meaning given the eventual fate of the samurai class; it can be found in Straelen, *Yoshida Shōin*, p. 115.

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Effects of a medium-term exercise or dietary restriction on appetite regulation and compensatory responses

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Abstract

Studies have assessed the ability of exercise interventions to create a stronger coupling between energy intake (EI) and energy expenditure (EE). The present study compared the effects of 4-week exercise and diet intervention programs. Three males and nine females (mean age 35 ± 9yr, mean height (cm) 170.42 ± 9.68, mean weight (kg) 72.77 ± 13.23, mean BMI 25.0 ± 3.8 kg/m^2) participated in either the exercise (n=7) or diet (n=5) intervention. The exercise and diet interventions comprised of a 500 kcal/d increase in EE for 5 days/wk and a 500 kcal/d energy restriction respectively, for 5 days/wk for 4 weeks. Energy compensation response to the two interventions was assessed by comparing *ad libitum* energy intake responses to high-energy (HE) (556 kcal) and low-energy (LE) (239 kcal) pre-load breakfasts administered at baseline and at the end of the interventions. Visual analogue scales (VAS) were used to assess subjective appetite sensations. No significant improvement in compensation sensitivity was observed in the exercise group. However, there was a trend towards a decrease in test meal intake after the HE pre-load at week 4. The diet group did not change intake in response to the varied energy content of the preloads. However, a lack of compensation resulted at week 4 with the HE pre-load. This study did not statistically support previous findings of the effect exercise and diet interventions have on appetite and compensatory responses; exercise improves appetite control by coupling EI and EE and dieting leads to a dis-regulation of appetite control.

Keywords: appetite, compensatory responses, diet, energy balance, exercise.

1. Introduction

The rate of obesity is continually rising, increasing the risk of coronary heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure and metabolic syndrome, among others (Gregory, Foster et al. 1990; Hedley, Ogden et al. 2004). The regulation of energy balance and the coupling of energy intake (EI) to energy expenditure (EE) are important for maintaining a healthy body weight (BW) (Blundell, Stubbs et al. 2007). There is some disagreement regarding whether diet or exercise interventions are more effective for weight loss. The efficacy will depend on the extent of compensatory responses; the mechanism by which a deficiency is counter-balanced in an attempt to maintain homeostasis. For example, a compensatory response to exercise, such as an increase in EI, could prevent a negative energy balance (NEB) and may hinder weight loss (King, Caudwell et al. 2007), and dieting may not lead to an inevitable weight loss since a NEB induced by restricting EI causes a strong drive to increase food intake (Doucet, St-Pierre et al. 2003). A decrease in EI and/or an increase in EE are two behavioral factors used to prevent, or treat obesity. From a homeostatic perspective, it is believed that perturbations to energy balance will be compensated for in an attempt to prevent weight loss (King, Caudwell et al. 2007). In addition, a sedentary lifestyle could predispose individuals to a positive energy balance (PEB) by reducing appetite-regulation sensitivity and dis-regulating appetite homeostasis, leading to an un-coupling of EI and EE (Martins, Truby et al. 2007). Males who underwent a period of regular exercise demonstrated good compensation to energy manipulations and improved sensitivity to appetite control, suggesting exercise may improve the sensitivity of appetite regulation (King 2008; Long, Hart et al. 2007; Martins, Truby et al. 2007; Mayer, Roy et al. 1956). Thus, there is some evidence that a coupling of EI and EE exists in active individuals and an un-coupling exists in sedentary individuals (Mayer, Roy et al. 1956).

The appetite regulatory system has been described as asymmetrical: that it will strongly defend against under-nutrition and weakly defend against over-consumption (Blundell, Stubbs et al. 2007). Appetite is

largely dependent on previous EI and also influences subsequent EI. Although there is ample evidence regarding exercise and its effects on appetite regulation, there is limited evidence comparing exercise and diet and its effects on appetite.

The purpose of the present study was to compare the sensitivity of compensatory responses between a 4-week diet and exercise intervention and examine the effects of these interventions on appetite regulation using an acute dietary manipulation, and measuring subsequent appetite and compensatory behaviors on energy balance. The current study used a relatively short (i.e. 4-week) model that may negate the need for longer-term interventions to identify and characterize compensatory responses. Previous interventions tend to use the 12 week standard intervention. One of the aims of this study was to determine whether a shorter intervention period could be used to detect differences in sensitivity to compensation.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1 Participants

Thirteen healthy participants (three male and ten female) with a mean age of 34.6 ± 9.2 were recruited from among the students and staff of Queensland University of Technology (QUT). Participants' characteristics are displayed in Table 1. Eleven participants were sedentary (undertook less than 60 minutes/week of moderate activity) and two were active exercisers (exercised more than 60 minutes/week of moderate activity). Of the 13 participants, 12 completed the entire study and one (diet intervention female) withdrew. All participants signed a consent form prior to commencement of the study and were debriefed at the conclusion. The study was approved by QUT's Human Research Ethics Committee.

2.2 Design

The total duration of the study was nine weeks because it was comprised of a baseline phase (weeks -4 to 0) and an intervention phase (weeks 0 to 4). The rationale for the baseline study was to incorporate a maintenance period. The intervention phase consisted of either a diet or exercise intervention. Five participants (three females and two males) were randomly assigned to the diet intervention group

and seven participants (six females and one male) were randomly assigned to the exercise group.

Table 1. Participant baseline characteristics

N=12	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Age (yr)	34.58	9.21	20	50
Height (cm)	170.42	9.68	160	190
Weight (kg)	72.77	13.23	57.9	99.6
BMI (kg/m^2)	25.0	3.68	20.5	34.4

2.21 Diet Intervention

The energy restriction (reduction in EI by 500 kcal/d) was prescribed by assessing habitual diet records using the two-day Multi Pass Phone Interview (MPPI) (Moshfegh, 2008) during two consecutive weekdays at weeks -4 and -2. Daily EI (food and drinks) were categorized into breakfast, mid-morning snack, lunch, afternoon snack and dinner. The 500 kcal reduction in EI was implemented across all participants uniformly by identifying a relatively high energy-dense meal or snack and replacing it with a reduced calorie Sustagen® milkshake drink, which was tailored for each individual. Compliance during the intervention was 100%, which was assessed by the MPPI.

2.22 Exercise Intervention

The exercise intervention consisted of five sessions per week for 4 weeks. Daily EE was increased by 500 kcal by performing supervised exercise in a laboratory. The American College of Sports Medicine walking calorie formula (American College of Sports Medicine, 2010) based on BW, walking speed and surface incline was used to calculate the exercise intensity (HR) and duration for each participant to ensure 500 kcal were expended at each exercise session. A treadmill was used as the mode for exercise (Proform 500ZLT, ICON

IP. Inc., USA). 65% (standard deviation [SD] of 10.1%) of maximum heart rate. The duration and intensity were recorded using a heart rate monitor (Polar S625S; Polar Oy, Kempele, Finland). The treadmill protocol began with a walking speed of 4.8 km/h with the treadmill surface at 5% incline with each exercise session lasting under 60 minutes. Resting heart rate was measured at the beginning of each exercise session to compensate for any gradual potential increase in physical fitness during the intervention, which was adjusted for by increasing walking speed and/or surface incline.

2.23 Probe Measurements

A series of probe measurements occurred at weeks -4, -2, 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. Body weight was measured at the beginning of each meeting with minimal clothing. Appetite measurements were conducted on appetite test days at weeks -4, 0 and 4 to compare the effects of the interventions on compensatory responses.



Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of the study and associated measurement periods. Weeks -4 to 0 represent the baseline and Weeks 0 to 4 the energy-balance interventions.
*Carried out over two consecutive days.

2.24 Energy Compensation Challenge

An Energy Compensation Challenge (ECC) was conducted on the appetite test days scheduled at weeks -4, 0 and 4, which consisted of measuring the energy intake responses to manipulating the energy of

a fixed meal; low- and high-energy preloads. A similar protocol was employed by Martins et al. (Martins, Truby et al. 2007). Participants arrived at 8 am at the Human Appetite Research Center after an overnight fast and having not participated in any physical exercise for at least 24 hours. A randomized single-blind design was used for the ECC, which consisted of a covert acute energy manipulation as either low-energy (LE) pre-load (239 kcal) or high-energy (HE) pre-load (556 kcal) breakfast milkshakes (see Table 2 for energy and nutrient information). Each appetite test day was separated by at least two days to prevent any crossover effects. The order of HE and LE pre-loads at each assessment time was counterbalanced between participants but not between weeks. Three hours after the breakfast pre-load a lasagne and vegetable meal (Lite 'n' Easy®) was served as an *ad libitum* test meal lunch to assess compensatory responses. The *ad libitum* lunch was weighed before and after consumption (to the nearest 0.1g) to calculate the amount of energy and macronutrients consumed. This calculation was based on the manufacturers' energy content information. Participants were instructed to eat until they felt 'comfortably full.' Subjective appetite sensations were measured immediately before and after each meal (breakfast and lunch), and every 60 minutes during the inter-meal period.

Table 2. Energy and nutrient values of the pre-loads

Nutritional composition pre-load	Low-energy pre-load	High-energy
Energy (kcal)	239	556
Protein (g)	1.5	2
Carbohydrate (g)	10.16	99.9
Fat (g)	16.63	16.63

2.25 Food and Nutrient Preference

Subjective appetite sensations (i.e. hunger, contentment and satiety) were administered using a computer-based Visual Analogue Scales (VAS), which included a series of questions on subjective appetite sensations such as, "How HUNGRY are you now?" Below the visual stimuli is a 100 mm scale with "not at all" on one end and "extremely" on the other end. Using the mouse, participants move a

centred cursor along the scale and click on the scale according to how they feel. Participants were required to answer questions regarding hunger, fullness, and contentment (Blundell, Hill et al., 1984). The VAS was measured immediately before and after each meal (breakfast and lunch) and every 60 minutes during the inter-meal period.

2.3 Statistical Analysis

The analyses compared diet and exercise groups and also within the groups to observe changes between week -4 and 4. Data were analyzed using SPSS package (version 16.0, IBM Corporation, USA). The ECC test day (pre-load shakes and *ad libitum* lunch) were analyzed with mixed measures ANOVA to allow for within- and between-subject comparisons. Statistical significance was assumed at $p<0.05$. Data were divided and structured (where applicable) to include the effects of week, pre-load and intervention group. Area under the curve (AUC) was utilized to differentiate if any differences between two forms of energy manipulation would have an effect on VAS, hunger and fullness on energy compensation challenge days.

2.4 Results

2.41 Ad Libitum Lunch Test Meal

Data are presented for 12 participants (three men and nine women). The mean difference (i.e. compensation) in EI between the LE and HE pre-load was -35.3 and -42.6 kcal at week -4, and -6.7 and -19.8 kcal at week 0 for the exercise and diet groups, respectively (Table 3). At baseline, neither group compensated for the differential in energy of the pre-loads. The HE pre-load suppressed EI more than the LE pre-load at weeks -4, 0 and 4 in the exercise group. The same effect occurred among the diet group at weeks -4 and 0, but not at week 4. The greatest compensation occurred at week 4 in the exercise group (Table 3). Neither group fully compensated for the manipulated energy differential (317 kcal) between the pre-loads. When the LE and HE intakes were pooled, total mean *ad libitum* test meal consumption was 412 ± 131.5 kcal for the exercise group, compared to 499 ± 157.5 kcal for the diet group (Table 3); differences were not statistically significant between the two groups across all weeks and preloads ($F(1,10)=1.34$).

Table 3. Mean ad libitum test meal energy intake (kcal) for each group and pre-load type at weeks -4, 0 and 4.

Week	Exercise	Diet
-4LE	432.7 ± 118.1	518.8 ± 128.8
-4HE	397.4 ± 143.4	476.2 ± 139.2
0LE	411.4 ± 107.8	474.4 ± 140.2
0HE	404.7 ± 89.0	454.6 ± 110.3
4LE	441.0 ± 159.2	524.0 ± 231.8
4HE	384.8 ± 180.6	547.0 ± 168.1

2.42 Visual Analogue Scales: Hunger and Fullness Ratings

The AUC hunger scores following the LE pre-loads were consistently greater for both groups during weeks -4 to 0. Thus, the HE pre-load lead to a greater suppression of hunger compared to the LE pre-load, however this did not reach statistical significance ($F[1,10]=1.36$).

Table 4. Mean area under the curve of subjective scores of hunger (mm) for each group and pre-load type at weeks -4, 0 and 4.

Week	Exercise	Diet
-4LE	41.7 ± 16.4	38.1 ± 25.7
-4HE	30.0 ± 18.6	31.4 ± 23.9
0LE	42.7 ± 19.4	37.9 ± 18.4
0HE	42.6 ± 17.9	33.4 ± 22.6
4LE	50.0 ± 16.6	42.8 ± 15.9
4HE	35.9 ± 22.0	41.3 ± 18.0

There was a trend in the suppression of AUC hunger for the HE pre-load compared to the LE pre-load ($F[1,10]=1.36$, p-value not significant) and there was a main effect of time on AUC hunger

(F[5,40]=31.7, p<0.05) (Table 4). AUC hunger increased in both groups between weeks 0 to 4, however, this was not statistically significant (F[2,20]=2.5, non-significant) (Table 4). There were no significant difference in AUC hunger between the two groups across all weeks and pre-load types, (F[1,10]=0.11, p-value non-significant).

There was a trend towards greater mean AUC fullness after the HE pre-load during baseline and intervention compared to the LE pre-load for both groups (F[1,10]=0.49, p-value non-significant). There were no differences in AUC between the LE and HE pre-load. AUC fullness was higher for the diet group than the exercise group in both pre-loads. For the diet group, there was no significant difference in mean AUC fullness between the two pre-loads at week 4 (LE pre-load 47.6 mm, HE pre-load 47.7 mm). Although there was no statistical significance, both groups experienced a decrease in mean AUC fullness after both pre-loads during weeks 0 to 4. In addition, AUC fullness was greater in week 0 for the diet group compared with the exercise group and this trend continued into week 4 but only for the LE pre-load. There was no difference in fullness ratings between the two groups across all weeks and pre-load types (F[1,10]=0.59, non-significant) (Table 5).

Table 5. Mean area under the curve of subjective scores of fullness (mm) for each group and pre-load type at weeks -4, 0 and 4.

Week	Exercise	Diet
-4LE	46.4 ± 13.2	49.5 ± 20.2
-4HE	48.8 ± 13.4	57.5 ± 29.9
0LE	46.3 ± 12.7	52.1 ± 21.5
0HE	50.3 ± 15.8	55.4 ± 18.1
4LE	40.7 ± 14.9	47.6 ± 17.8
4HE	49.3 ± 17.8	47.7 ± 16.1

3. Discussion

The main aim of the study was to manipulate EI and EE through a medium-term energy restriction diet and exercise intervention

respectively, and to compare the consequent changes to energy intake, which we consider to be a measure of compensation to the altered energy balance. We also wanted to determine whether a 4-week intervention was sufficient to detect compensatory responses. To the best of our knowledge, this was the first study to compare compensatory responses in a 4-week exercise and diet intervention using acute energy pre-load manipulations.

No significant improvement in compensation sensitivity in the exercise group was observed during the exercise intervention. However, there was a trend for the exercise group to eat less *ad libitum* lunch after the HE pre-load compared to the LE pre-load at week 4. This suggests that the exercise intervention affected the sensitivity to regulate energy balance among the exercise group, creating a stronger coupling between EI and EE, and previous studies have demonstrated that the coupling between EI and EE regulation and covert energy manipulation sensitivity is increased through the effects of exercise (King, Caudwell et al. 2007). The diet group did not demonstrate improved compensation for the difference in the energy content of the pre-loads following the diet intervention. However, small trends were observed – a lack of compensation resulted at week 4 with the HE pre-load, suggesting the diet group experienced a 'de-sensitised' effect to appetite sensations. This trend is in line with past research suggesting that dieting leads to an un-coupling between EI and EE (Mayer, Roy et al. 1956). This lack of compensation following the HE pre-load is characterized by restrained eaters and represents a form of disinhibition. The diet intervention may have predisposed the diet group to a weaker coupling between EI and EE, thereby dis-regulating energy balance. Previous evidence suggests that exercise increases the sensitivity of satiety and cessation of EI during an eating episode (Long, Hart et al. 2007), which suggests that sedentary people are less sensitive to acute post-meal satiety signals.

The two pre-loads had varying effects on compensatory appetite responses (palatability, VAS and *ad libitum* test meal intakes). The LE pre-load caused lower ratings of fullness, contentment and filling, and greater ratings of hunger and greater *ad libitum* test meal consumption. The reverse was observed with the HE pre-load; however, this pattern was not always demonstrated among the diet group. Thus, the two modes of creating a NEB (exercise and diet

intervention) resulted in contrasting outcomes in the pre-loads and their compensatory appetite responses.

Test meal EI and AUC hunger increased in the diet group at week 4 for both pre-loads, suggesting that the diet group's subjective appetite sensitivity (i.e. hunger sensations) were affected. The diet group consistently consumed more energy at the test meal than the exercise group across all weeks, which was combined with greater AUC fullness. Conversely, the exercise group consumed less energy at the test meal than the diet group, and experienced lower AUC fullness. The appetite-regulatory system is often described as asymmetrical. That is, it will defend a period of under-nutrition, but not over-consumption. The exercise group appeared to have reached homeostatic energy balance regulation by averting the passive act to over-consume. The exercise group's appetite compensatory responses suggest that changes in EI and EE were detected by an increased sensitivity of the energy balance regulatory system. Similarly, a 6-week study conducted by Martins et al. used a moderate exercise program on short-term appetite control also reflected these findings. More specifically, that exercise increased eating behavior sensitivity (Martins, Truby et al. 2007). Conversely, the diet intervention in the present study did not exert a significant compensatory response and thus may have been predisposed to the asymmetrical precedence towards EI, and this reduction in sensitivity of the energy balance regulatory system suggests an un-coupling between EI and EE. The primary aim of dieting is to promote a NEB and, as previously mentioned, the body strongly resists a NEB and counters this by increasing the drive to eat (Doucet, St-Pierre et al. 2003). This suggests that dieting promotes a weak control over EI and poor regulation of compensatory responses, leading to a de-sensitized energy balance regulatory system. Additionally, the diet group's increase in VAS hunger ratings, decrease in VAS fullness ratings, and increase in test meal EI after four weeks of energy restriction, supports the implication of a predisposition towards a weaker energy balance regulatory system (i.e. an un-coupling between EI and EE) producing weaker compensatory responses to pre-load energy manipulations compared to the four weeks of EE among the exercise group. In contrast, the exercise group's VAS, MPPI and test meal EI resulted in opposite effects; better compensation. Previous studies have demonstrated the positive effects of exercise on compensatory responses to covert energy manipulations and the coupling between

EI and EE regulation sensitivity (King, Caudwell et al. 2007), while dieting has resulted in an un-coupling of EI and EE, i.e. a failure to show sensitivity to detect covert energy manipulation (Mayer, Roy et al. 1956).

The findings of this study must be interpreted in the context of a number of study limitations. Firstly, this study was limited a small sample size in both intervention groups, which may have affected the ability to detect statistically significant associations between the two intervention groups and between baseline and follow-up. The study also relied on the use of self-reported dietary intake and physical activity data. Given that the intervention groups were stratified by these two behaviors, differential reporting in diet and physical activity may have resulted in bias in the associations found. Participants in the dietary intervention undertook their intervention un-supervised, which may have resulted in lower compliance among the diet group compared to the exercise group. Secondly, the intervention occurred over a relatively short time period (i.e. four weeks). While this would not have biased the associations found between intervention groups as this time period applied to both groups, it may have resulted in null-associations between the outcomes as the modified behaviors were not sustained for a long period of time. Lastly, gender and its effect on appetite regulation were not tested for.

4. Conclusion

The present study compared the behavioral compensatory responses to a diet and exercise intervention. A pre-load manipulation was used to test the provide evidence that one of the benefits of exercise is that it can lead to improved appetite control (Mayer, Roy et al. 1956; King, Caudwell et al. 2007). Compensation for the pre-loads during the intervention phase for the exercise group showed a better trend compared to the diet group, suggesting a more sensitive energy balance regulatory system may have resulted from the exercise intervention compared to the diet intervention. Previous studies have indicated that a sedentary lifestyle predisposes individuals to a PEB by the reduction in appetite regulation sensitivity and a dis-regulated appetite homeostasis (Mayer, Roy et al. 1956) while leading to an un-coupling of EI and EE (Martins, Truby et al. 2007), and that sedentariness leads to a weaker short-term appetite response to covert energy manipulation compared to those who are active (Long, Hart et

al. 2007; Martins, Truby et al. 2007; Mayer, Roy et al. 1956). In addition, a similar study has suggested that active men decreased EI following a HE pre-load compared to sedentary men who showed no change in EI following both a HE and LE pre-load (Long, Hart et al. 2007). Furthermore, males who underwent a period of regular exercise demonstrated good compensation to energy manipulations and improved sensitivity to appetite control, suggesting exercise may improve the sensitivity and detection of EE versus EI (King 2008; Long, Hart et al. 2007; Martins, Truby et al. 2007; Mayer, Roy et al. 1956).

Although this study lacked in the number of participants, this model has demonstrated numerous trends that effectiveness of diet and exercise interventions may be linked to compensatory responses. Collectively, the present study and the findings of existing research suggest that exercise improves appetite control by coupling EI and EE, and that sedentariness promotes weight gain, not just via a reduction in EE but also due to a dis-regulation of appetite control. Further identification of compensatory responses may assist in improving the effectiveness of diet and physical activity interventions by tailoring weight-management programs. This study's findings have important implications for the current obesity epidemic and weight-related chronic disease. The regulation of EB and the homeostasis of EI to EE are vital for maintaining health and a healthy body weight. Although small trends were seen among the diet and exercise groups, compensation for the pre-loads during the intervention phase for both groups did not reach statistical significance.

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Offender Rehabilitation through Arts and Culture in Akita: A Dilemma of a Community-based Rehabilitation

Mayumi TERANO

Abstract: The project explored the nature and current practices of offender rehabilitation in Akita, and analyzed possible barriers against implementation of arts and culture-based offender rehabilitation practices in Akita. The data were collected through focus groups and interviews, conducting semi-structured conversations with the foci of: general functions of the institutions or the group/individuals; characteristics of offenders and perceived challenges faced by stakeholders; and potentials and challenges of art-based interventions. This paper reports the findings on the community-based rehabilitation initiatives.

The findings of the research includes: The opportunities for arts and cultural activities during non-custodial treatment is limited or has become more limited than in the past. Identified issues, concerning the principle of arts-based rehabilitation and community inclusion, are: stronger focus on accountability, punishment and control affecting individual rehabilitation; and distance with the community at different levels. The results are discussed from the 'systems' and the ‘community’ perspectives, focusing on the impact of recent changes in legislation of rehabilitation practices reflected in the stakeholder observation, and also the characteristics of 'community', possibly affecting the environment for offender rehabilitation in Japan.
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Keywords: Offender rehabilitation, Arts and culture intervention, Community sentences, Akita

1. Introduction

Japan is considered to be one of the safest countries among the OECD nations. Its homicide rate[1] measures a mere 0.3 compared to the OECD average of 4.1 (OECD, 2016). On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice (2015) reveals that, while the aggregate number of incarceration and reoffending cases has decreased since 2003, the ratio of reoffenders has increased from nearly 30 % in 1997 to 50% in 2014 (p.14). Efforts for offender rehabilitation and social reintegration include programs against drug, violence and sexual offenses, and programs for empathizing with victims, traffic rule awareness, and employment (Fujimoto, *et al*. 2015). However, employment, reintegration with families, and poverty have been particularly problematic among aged offenders, and social isolation could trigger re-offending. Akita has the nation's highest ratio of ageing population at 32.6%, compared to the national average of 26.3% (Cabinet Office, 2014). As such, effective measures against re-offending while preventing isolation, access to employment, and life support are particularly acute.

A wide range of arts-based rehabilitation and re-integration initiatives are offered by external organizations, such as community groups and professional non-profit groups, particularly in Europe and North America. Their unique intervention schemes are gaining recognition, and they are often employed in therapy or training. Studies found these activities can empower and assist individuals toward reintegration, by developing empathy and communication skills (Appleton, 2000; Crichlow and Visano, 2015).

At the same time, Akita represents a rich cultural heritage site with many traditional festivals, crafts, art work and other relevant activities. However, due to the aging of these traditional craftsmen and a decreasing young population, the preservation of many of these traditional culture and art forms is under threat. The offender engagement in traditional arts and crafts has the potential to contribute towards developing resources and expertise in these endeavors in Akita.

[1] The homicide rate is calculated with the number of murders per 100 000 inhabitants (OECD, 2016).

This study, therefore, was designed with the following aims: to gain an understanding about the nature of current offender rehabilitation initiatives in Akita, especially in relation to artistic, cultural, and creative activities; and to explore the potential of developing, or strengthening, the rehabilitation support initiatives through the use of the prefecture's artistic and cultural assets, and by increasing citizen participation. Informed by this research project, this paper reports the findings concerning the initiatives in community-based rehabilitation programs, as opposed to those undertaken during incarceration.

2. Literature review

This section will clarify the research context, relevant concepts and theoretical discussions. It will also describe the rehabilitation system and arguments concerning rehabilitation support in Japan, particularly regarding arts-based intervention in the criminal justice system.

2.1. Community Rehabilitation Practices

Rehabilitation support is provided to those who are on parole, probation, or release. Its purpose is to provide assistance for offenders to reintegrate into a society through rehabilitative measures and monitoring by probation officers, community organizations and volunteers. The main foci during this process are acquiring housing and employment or education, while reestablishing the links with their family and the society at large (Fujimoto, *et al*., 2016).

The condition and treatment of individual probationers and parolees are examined by Regional Probation Offices and Regional Parole Boards. A Probation Office then places the individuals under the supervision of the appointed Volunteer Probation Officers (VPOs), meeting periodically while living in their residence. Those who are without homes will be placed in a Rehabilitation Aid Hostels that provide lodging, food and a life support. Probationers and parolees can seek an employment opportunity from the employers listed as Support Employers (*Kyōryoku Koyōnushi*) and may be required to attend rehabilitative programs depending on individual circumstances. They are also required to engage in community service activities for a certain duration. The voluntary organizations and institutions, such as regional Rehabilitation Support Centers, Women's Association for Rehabilitation Aid (WARA), BBS (Big Brothers and Sisters

Movement) work with the Probation Office to provide community-based supports.

2.2. **Arguments about the System**

In some countries of the world, overcrowded prisons and problems of recidivism lead to policy alternatives in criminal justice system, which include diversification of the paths to incarceration and release. They are aimed at reducing custodial sentences, centered on sanction and control, by expanding non-custodial treatments and welfare supports that focus on rehabilitation, and they are considered meaningful particularly for offenders who are aged, as well as those who with mental disabilities, drug addiction, and/or other physical and emotional conditions (Doi, 2012). Changes in the legislation of Japanese rehabilitation support system are made via a slightly different rationale, as its crime rate has been in decline in recent years; nevertheless they are influenced by such global trends (Sasaki, 2012).

Rehabilitation support in Japan has its origin in 17th Century but the current system has its base in the late 19th Century, which evolved to be a formalized legal system after the Second World War (Hirokawa, 2011; Fujimoto, *et al*., 2016). However, with public pressure for accountability in community-based measures, the Offenders Rehabilitation Act was set up in 2007 and was revised in 2015. In 2013, Social Contribution Activity (*Shakai Kouken Katsudou*) was included in the Special Condition of the Act (UNAFEI, 2014). There are debates about the impact of these changes, and many argue that they lead Japanese rehabilitation support system to be oriented towards restriction and control, which could produce adverse impacts on offender rehabilitation (Sasaki, 2012; Amari, 2012).

2.3. Use of Arts in Offender Rehabilitation

Scholars and practitioners report positive impacts of arts intervention in criminal justice, but inherent challenges exist with the lack of quantitative and longitudinal evidences on the impact on reconviction. It is due to the nature of such activities, making it difficult or impossible to gain access to participants after their release or transfer. However, much qualitative evidence is available to demonstrate its impact in changing participants' thoughts, behaviors and actions

(Crichlow and Visano, 2015). Artistic expressions enable empowerment, agency, care for others and the sense of community (Glynn, 2014; Appleton, 2001). At the same time, arts activities or efforts could be co-opted or become complicit in the penal power, which diverts from such original intentions (Cheliotis, 2014).

From a social perspective, participation in arts and cultural activities by a broad section of society is known to rebuild a community, which could improve social issues (Noda, 2014). This rationale for non-custodial measures, while assisting offenders to re-establish their social links through organized support, is closely linked with a theory of self-control, which describes how one's involvement and attachment to the society leads to avoid deviant behavior (Hirschi and Goffredson, 2000).

From these perspectives, this study explored: What are existing opportunities for arts and cultural activities for offenders; how do they help them rebuild the links with the community; and, does the current rehabilitation support system benefit offenders as claimed in these theoretical assumptions?

3. Method

The research was conducted in an exploratory manner, guided by the above questions. The data collection included a series of interviews and focus groups with the stakeholders of offender rehabilitation in Akita prefecture. Focus groups were set up with Volunteer Probation Officer associations around the prefecture (Akita Ward, Yokote Ward, Honjyo Ward, and Odate Ward), totaling 23 participants. Other interviews were conducted with representatives from Akita Probation Office, Rehabilitation Aid Hostels, WARA, and Akita Prison, totaling 11 participants. Interviews and focus groups were conducted in semi-structured conversations, with questions on: the general functions of the institutions, the group or individuals; characteristics of offenders and perceived challenges faced by stakeholders; and potentials and challenges of art-based interventions.

4. Results

The opportunities for arts and cultural activities during non-custodial treatment were found to be quite limited, despite the expectation that

offenders would have access to a variety of activities unlike in custodial setting. Therefore, the activities that help offenders engage with the community broadly were also included. These activities are reported here as 'organized' and 'informal' opportunities, as they seemed to have different natures. The former include the ones conducted as required or as a group, and the latter are ones done by discretion of supervising Volunteer Probation Officers or community support organizations as considered useful for individuals.

4.1. Organized Opportunities during Community Sentences

The activities in this category include: treatment programs in the Rehabilitation Aid Hostel in Akita City, named '*Shijinkai*'; social contribution activities; and activities by supporting employers. Activities in Rehabilitation Aid Hostels in general include group based training, including Social Skills Training (SST), and individual guidance. The foci include employment, finance management, everyday life organization, communication, and issue-based treatment such as drug, alcohol, and gambling. Community volunteer work and cultural activities are organized, sometimes with the assistance of external organizations. They also arrange access to medical treatments as required. Some hostels in Japan organize arts and cultural activities that include pottery, paper craft, collage, noodle making, singing, and jewelry making. They tend to be available especially in larger cities and metropolitan areas with higher number of prisoners. In *Shijinkai* in Akita, however, the activity range seems rather limited. The activities with the external organizations are periodic 'home food dinners', contributed by the women's group (WARA), Christmas and New Year's event. However, the hostel staff said the residents hardly ever meet WARA members because residents are normally working during the day, and the WARA members cannot stay through the evening due to family obligations. Therefore, they simply deliver the cooked food to *Shijinkai* during the day and do not interact with the residents. They used to organize more events 15 to 20 years ago, but the availability of the members became more limited. The cultural activities include participation in a local traditional festival, 'Kanto festival', which wishes for good rice harvest for the year. The decline of such activities may also be due to budgetary constraint, as the subsidies from the government were reduced sharply through the last several years. The staff also explained that residents are reluctant to participate in non-required

activities during evenings and weekend, and prefer to rest from work. Besides these issues, the following concerns were expressed:

- A set of required programs, organized by the government, are normally top-down and restrictive, and do not encourage much motivation by participants.
- The 'atmosphere [of Shijinkai] could appear like a prison to external people', which would deter their involvement (According to Shijinkai staff member, September, 2015).
- The local community generally does not have a positive impression about the institution and the residents, and the staff is often reluctant to involve them.
- Many residents, especially those from prison backgrounds, have given up the 'ability to think' as things are decided upon in minute detail and highly regulative.

During the community treatment, the offenders are also required to engage in Social Contribution Activities; a requirement set up in 2013 as part of the Special Conditions (Fujimoto, *et al*., 2015). This was one of the limited occasions that offenders engage with the community. The sites of these activities are normally determined by the Probation Office, but VPOs or the community groups are also encouraged to recommend potential sites. They are mainly elder's nursing homes and homes for people with disabilities, and the offenders engage in tasks such as cleaning and gardening. The VPOs coordinate the visit activity, and a group is formed with the offenders, VPOs and some members of WARA. The mixture of such members is aimed at masking the individuals with criminal background during the volunteer work. Some sense of efficacy of this activity is observed by the participants as they receive a sense of appreciation for their contributions at these sites. The investigator asked if there is a possibility that arts and cultural activities could make up a part of these social contribution activities, for example, by assisting in the creation of local crafts and artistic ornaments, such as wooden crafts made out of cherry bark or Akita cedar. Questions regarding potential involvement in arts and cultural activities through employment were also asked. In other words, the investigator asked if the list of supporting employers could include traditional craftsmen so that the offenders have the opportunity to experience arts and cultural activities. However, such a possibility seems slim. It is because the types of volunteer sites are currently limited to ones above mentioned. Traditional craftsmen are also unlikely to become support employers

because those professionals do not tend to have enough capacities to train ex-offenders.

4.2. Informal Opportunities (Other Stakeholders Involvement)

The informal opportunities could be individual activities with VPOs and other possible activities with *Shijinkai* and the employers. An offender and the appointed VPO meet periodically, where VPO interview and check on the offender's employment and living conditions. The meetings are done either in the VPO's home, the offender's home, or the Rehabilitation Support Center nearest the offender's residence. VPOs are in a position to encourage/supervise offenders in these activities, but they have limited flexibility and capacities in their decision making, time, and the means of risk management. Some VPOs expressed that there are increased requirements (activities and monitoring) for offender management and decreased flexibility to decide a range of activities. For example, VPOs are required to fill out a set of forms and submit them to the Probation Office, and the procedures have become more complex in recent years. They also said, in the past, VPOs sometimes took the clients to cultural events and festivals, work or volunteer experiences, as perceived useful considering the client's need and capacity. However, nowadays VPOs have to go through more complex procedures to request permissions to do such activities, which discouraged them from making such arrangements. These requirements and formalities seem to create the distance with their clients as well.

Another cultural opportunity was participation in the Kanto Festival, which occurred in the past, either via the cooperation of *Shijinkai* or the support employer. Kanto is a traditional festival in Akita organized to pray for good rice harvest, involving the main performers, who carry tall poles with dozens of lanterns, the music performers, and the cheerers. A few offenders took part when the employer or *Shijinkai* participated in the event in the past, but they worked mainly as assistants and not as performers. Many participants are reluctant to appear in public through these activities, and hence do not readily engage in such public activities.

Indeed, the offender's stigma toward the public was expressed as the main concern in community-based treatment, and stakeholders deal

with much sensitivity. For example, when VPOs visit the client's home, they take the utmost care to not let the neighbors discover that the person they are meeting is an ex-offender. They do so by choosing visit times and attire in an inconspicuous manner. Some Rehabilitation Support Centers choose not to openly display signage for this purpose. The prejudice against offenders in the community can also be seen from the neighbor's opposition that many Rehabilitation Aid Hostels face. Some VPOs expressed that the relationship with the community, or the impact of anyone finding out someone's criminal background, is particularly concerning in the countryside environment, where rumors tend spread quickly in close-knit societies like Akita.

5. Discussion

The above findings show that the opportunities for arts and cultural engagement during Rehabilitation Support practices, or engagement with the community in general, in Akita are quite limited or have become more limited compared to in the past. Some issues concerning the principle of arts-based rehabilitation and community inclusion are: stronger focus on accountability, punishment and control affecting individual rehabilitation; and distance with the community at different levels. The former will be discussed as 'systems' issues and the latter as 'community' issues.

5.1. Systems-level Issues

Recent changes in the system, in terms of the accountability and requirements, as well as the budgetary issues were found to be a central concern at the systems-level. As stated earlier, the rehabilitation support is faced with decreased budgetary support and increased requirements and regulations that make implementation of diverse community based activities difficult. Rehabilitation support is set up on the principle of protecting society and promoting individual and public welfare through providing appropriate community-based treatment to offenders, preventing re-offense, and supporting independence (Ministry of Justice, 2016), thereby enabling reintegration. Faust and Clawson (2004, p.12) propose the 'Eight Guiding Principles for Risk/Recidivism Reduction'. They are:

1. Engage on-going support in community;
2. Increase positive re-enforcement;
3. Skill training with directed practice;
4. Target intervention;
5. Enhance intrinsic motivation;
6. Risk/need: assess actual risk;
7. Measuring relevant practices; and
8. Measurement of feedback

The implementation of the Offender Rehabilitation Act (Ministry of Justice, *ibid*.) was set up with the intention of improving accountability of the existing community treatment. Observation and experiences of stakeholders in Akita seem to indicate that increased accountability and regulatory measures had made their work less flexible; hence it became discouraging and difficult to engage with offenders' individual needs. The current Japanese rehabilitation support system relies highly on the good-will of the VPOs, and individual VPOs bring in their unique experience to their work. The current system adapts some elements of the 8 principles by Faust and Clawson, such as 1, 3 and 4, while introducing risk-avoiding measures, but it has the aspect of working against number 5, by discouraging the motivation of the volunteers and the clients. The increase of requirements and restrictions can also work against the Act's intention of 'ensuring the individual and public welfare'. As Someda (2006) argues, although probation may be similar to welfare services, such as the way it apply many social work approaches, its principle is different, in a way that requirements and regulations within probation do not allow individuals the rights to choose the types of rehabilitation activities or to end them (p.341). Therefore, the more regulations and requirements are applied to the rehabilitation support practices, the further it strays away from its own principles. Amari (2012) also argues that recent trends in rehabilitation support policies is making the traditional principle of 'community treatment' in Japan move toward 'community penalties', as experienced in some Western nations (p.62-63).

5.2. Community Support Issues

Arts and culture based interventions in offender rehabilitation are built on principles of empowering individuals through promoting self-understanding, expression, and learning to be in a community,

and the community to value diverse expressions (Crichlow and Visano, 2015; Noda, 2014). The data from this study indicate that regulatory environment is creating a distance between offenders and those who support them and decreasing flexibility to arrange activities based on individual needs. The inherent difficulty of working in and with the community for offender rehabilitation also exists. The sensitivity against revealing one's criminal background particularly in the country-side environment means strong communities actually work against supporting offender rehabilitation efforts. Considering the supposedly positive impact of the community tie toward avoiding deviant behavior, such as the one advocated by Hirschi and Goffredson (2000), this dilemma needs to be analyzed further. One possible explanation is that Japanese society values a community wherein there are strong expectations that individuals behave based on the roles, values and beliefs of the society. The nature of social ties in Japan is built on the idea of a 'community', where rules are made in a rather personal and informal manner. In a modern Western 'society', on the other hand, people follow rules that are impersonal and ground on formal values and beliefs (Stewart and Bennett, 1991). In other words, Japanese society values individual efforts of adapting informal rules and value standards of the society, i.e. *seken no okite* in Japanese, rather than pursuing individual values and beliefs. This makes it challenging to the society to support offenders' self-realization efforts instead of expressing remorse to the society due to their deviant behaviors (Abe, 1995).

6. Conclusion

This paper explored the nature of rehabilitation support practices in Akita mainly through qualitative interviews with local stakeholders. Although the information – particularly on the arts and culture-based activities – was limited, useful perspectives were gained regarding the trends of rehabilitation support practices and issues, reflected in stakeholder experiences, that have much implication on desirable environment for implementing arts and culture based rehabilitation. Arts and cultural activities existed as part of rehabilitation practices and their values were acknowledged in the past. The rehabilitation practices developed in Japan were based on the citizens' voluntary initiatives and are still highly reliant on the community's good will, involving a wide variety of community-based activities including artistic and cultural activities. However, the analysis saw the tendency

of the practice moving from this community-based flexible support strategy toward a more regulated and formalized one, thereby affecting the important personal distance between those who support and are supported. This presents a 'dilemma' of the system's development particularly in enabling arts and cultural activities that could be suggested by VPOs and other community support members for offender rehabilitation. This issue of community based rehabilitation is raising much discussion among the academics and practitioners in diverse disciplines concerning what is 'effective' and sustainable.

The limitations of the study include: the low crime rate and population in Akita allowed the study to explore only a very limited range of offender rehabilitation practices. In other areas of Japan with higher crime rates and more active offender rehabilitation practices in a community, a higher variety of such activities may be found, as seen in some metropolitan areas like Tokyo. Exploring the different practices and comparing the case with Akita would enable further understanding about socio-political factors linked to arts and culture-based rehabilitation support practices. Limited access to data on prefecture-based crime and rehabilitation situation, especially the ones per age group also prevented a detailed analysis of the particular issues faced by the ageing society. Further analysis on the impact of recent shifts in rehabilitation practices would be useful, particularly in relation to the notion of restorative justice, reflecting on the international experience. Analyzing their links with the Japanese socio-economic condition allows further understanding of their implications for alternative measures for its rehabilitation support practices.

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Fostering Markets and Eroding Legitimacy: Economic Liberalization and Foreign Direct Investment in South Korea

Kevin HOCKMUTH

Abstract: This paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the complexities entwined with carrying economic liberalization by focusing on the politics of development, liberalization, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Korea. The first section identifies key political, economic, and ideological components of Park Chung Hee's developmental system and demonstrates that it entailed political and social mechanisms far beyond its notable economic institutions. This analysis is then employed to develop an enriched understanding of the contentious politics surrounding FDI liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s during the presidencies of Chun Doo Hwan and Kim Young Sam. These sections demonstrate that both societal and bureaucratic actors often rooted their resistance to reforms within the ideological milieu that underpinned the Park regime's legitimacy. Particularly, that the fervent nationalist, autonomy-centered language deployed to support the developmental dictatorship served to delegitimize market reforms as well as those who supported them. Finally, the paper incorporates data collected during field research at several universities in South Korea during March 2016 to evaluate the efficacy of official efforts to alter public sentiments, as embodied by the socio-cultural component of Kim Young Sam's *segyehwa* initiative. The data lends some credence to the notion that this generation of Koreans holds more positive attitudes towards globalization than their predecessors, but that this has done little to change their overriding negative assessment of major political and economic institutions.

Keywords: South Korea, political economy, foreign direct investment, economic liberalization

1. Introduction

Over the last several decades a great deal of the discourse—within both academia and the media—surrounding national economic policy has taken the assumption of ever-hardening imperatives born of the accelerating pace of global trade and financial flows as a default point of departure. From this perspective, the questions surrounding domestic economic adjustment to the demands of the international marketplace often take the form of *when* and *how* an economy will yield to the presumed dictates of the new order as opposed to more fundamental debates questioning *whether* greater integration into the global economy is indeed the appropriate course to pursue.[1] This focus on the increasing homogenization of foreign economic policy has often come at the cost of exploring the wide variation across individual cases. The process of economic liberalization and its political contestation in any given society is not one that develops from a neutral starting point but is rather by definition a venture that commences *in medias res*. As David Kang (2010, 6) reminds us, if globalization is simply a process that yields principally undifferentiated policy dispositions, then seeking to enmesh our understanding of the present within the constructs of the past becomes a largely fruitless endeavor.

Certainly, recent events and trends in international affairs lend further credence to the notion that the inexorable march towards deeper levels of global economic integration is not nearly as settled as once believed. The global financial crisis of 2008 has been followed by a series of notable reversals including: the British vote to exit the EU, the rising electoral stature of nativist parties in France and Germany, the election of Donald Trump, as well as the perilous status of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The amalgamation of these events has compelled even the staunchly pro-globalization *Economist* magazine to recently acknowledge that the advance towards ever-winnowing barriers to international economic flows has begun to ebb. Perhaps more illuminating was the same article's mention that

[1] In terms of the academic discourse, Frieden and Rogowski (1996, 25-47) offer a comprehensive overview of this framework of analysis and its implications for political economy research.

economists, for the most part, "have been blindsided by the backlash."[2]

One explanation for why the denizens of economics have been so startled by the apparent rollback of what has long been considered settled 'optimal' policy is that it is being accomplished primarily via the democratic process. To be sure, the assumption of a seamless, symbiotic relationship between the market economy and electoral democracy has been embedded in post-Cold War academic and public discourses to the degree that the onus to defend its veracity has largely dissipated. The intensifying accumulation of democratically engineered salvos against economic globalization warrants revisiting this bedrock assumption.

As with the aforementioned shocks to the political-economic status quo materializing around the world, contemporary South Korea (Korea hereafter) have been fraught with rising social discontent directed at the perceived ineffectualness of major political and economic institutions. The mass demonstrations that have most recently roiled the streets of Seoul certainly reflect the public's angst over the misdeeds of Park Geun Hye's administration. However, they also represent a deeper dissatisfaction rooted in the belief that Korean society increasingly exhibits a calcified socio-economic structure that renders the oft-noted heroic educational exertions made by Korean students in pursuit of greater economic security and status largely futile.

This rising disaffection among younger Koreans in recent years has found an outlet on various social media platforms under the rubric 'Hell Joseon'. This term references the dynasty that ruled Korea for over five centuries (1392-1910) before colonization by Japan. From the 'Hell Joseon' frame of reference, contemporary Korean society is becoming analogous to the monarchy's rigid patrilineal social hierarchy where a vast majority of the population languished in an intergenerational stasis as tenant farmers or even slaves. At its core, this phenomenon embraces the view that the contemporary political-economic landscape is riddled with false promises, demanding high levels of supplication from all while doling out rewards only to those born into fortunate circumstances—or 'golden spoons' (*geum sujeo*)

[2] "The Consensus Crumbles", *Economist*, July 2, 2016.

in colloquial parlance.[3] A recent survey of college students and young adult workers found the 'Hell Joseon' perspective commanding the sympathies of just over 90 percent of those in their 20s and 30s, indicating the breadth of these sentiments.[4] The ensuing analysis serves not only as an effort to enrich our understanding of key junctures in Korea's recent history in and of themselves but also in their capacity as antecedents to the widespread dissatisfaction presently bubbling to the surface.

A central contention advanced in this article is that embedding investigations into the processes of economic liberalization in Korea within the socio-historical context which they emerged measurably enhances our understanding of the attendant controversies and conflagrations. Such an approach provides a more textured and nuanced understanding of the Korean case and allows us to observe the complexity involved in the changing nature of state-society interaction amidst twin efforts to foment a more marketized economic order and sustain the durable political consensus needed to legitimate such arrangements. More pointedly, the argument is that, in their efforts to sustain economic growth via neoliberal reforms, policymakers placed a significant strain on the ramparts of Korea's developmental system and the sources of its legitimation with such fissures manifesting themselves in the form of extensive societal discontent. At a minimum, making allowances for such considerations may serve to reduce the likelihood of being 'blindsided' by the gathering backlash against economic globalization.

With these observations in mind, this paper seeks to locate the evolving nature of the state and society's interaction with the push and pull forces—destined to materialize in any significant reform effort—through the lens of the treatment of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) within its historical and institutional context.[5] FDI

[3] For a more detailed explication of the 'Hell Joseon' phenomenon see "Korea, Thy Name is Hell Joseon" in *Korea Exposé*, Sept. 22, 2015. (https://koreaexpose.com/voices/korea-thy-name-is-hell-joseon/)

[4] "90% of young Koreans sympathize with 'Hell Joseon'", *Korea Times*, July 2, 2016.

[5] FDI is generally distinguished from foreign portfolio investment based upon the establishment of either a controlling stake in a firm or one that yields substantive influence over its direction. This can be achieved either through the direct purchase of a firm or the creation of a subsidiary operation.

is a particularly useful vantage point for analyzing the political and economic tension embedded in liberalization efforts as local control of domestic business enterprises served as one of the central pillars of the Korean developmental system's legitimation. The politics of FDI liberalization in Korea have been highly fraught, especially since the 1980s when economic liberalization was officially embraced by the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo Hwan.[6] In fact, despite a succession of presidents who actively embraced economic globalization as a critical component of Korea's continued economic expansion, this study demonstrates that the public and portions of the bureaucracy retained a high degree of antagonism towards such efforts.

In light of these observations, the first section of the paper presents an overview of the developmental system erected under the autocratic rule of Park Chung Hee, identifying several of its key institutional and ideological components. This discussion is followed by a focus on the politics of FDI policy in two distinct time periods. The first analyzes the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo Hwan who ruled from 1980-1987. This period is particularly notable in that it was during this time that neoliberal economic ideas began to make significant inroads in the Korean state. Thus, it offers the opportunity to observe the ways in which these new ideas interacted with long-held notions regarding the proper form and content of economic policy. The second looks at the initial years of the Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1996) that emerged in the early years of Korea's democratic transition. This marked the first period of rule by a non-military figure in over three decades. The analysis focuses not only on initiatives to reorient FDI policies and the political contention they fomented but also the concerted efforts by high-ranking officials to affect fundamental changes in the population's perception of the international economy and foreign economic actors. Within the context of these initiatives, the final section of the paper presents

[6] In the context of FDI, economic liberalization can be largely construed as policies that improve the ease at which foreign investors are able to purchase stakes in Korean firms or establish businesses in Korea. This includes rules governing restrictions on the percentage of foreign ownership, sectoral barriers to entry by foreign firms, limitations on the scope of business activities foreign firms are allowed to engage in as well as informal barriers to entry which may include regulatory complexity and bureaucratic resistance.

findings from field research conducted in Korea in March 2016 to gauge the degree to which these efforts to promote the virtues of greater economic liberalization has taken hold within the younger generation.

Developmental Legacies

On May 16, 1961, a cadre of discontented military officials headed by Gen. Park Chung Hee seized the reins of power and set about cultivating a new order that would profoundly shape the contours of Korean society up to the present day. Drawing from his background in the Japanese Imperial Army he fashioned himself as a modernizer in the mold of Meiji-era Japan under the banner of *buguk gangbyeong* (rich nation, strong army) (Moon and Jun 2011, 118-19). More importantly, beyond the mere appropriation of slogans he readily embraced the model of 'total mobilization' that had defined the Japanese wartime society (119).[7] In service of the coup plotters' desire to wipe the slate of state clean more than forty-thousand civil servants were dismissed. Thousands of civilians deemed to be undesirables were rounded up off the street.[8] Additionally, a large number of Korea's major industrialists were jailed and compelled to 'donate' their assets to the newly formed Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) (Kim, H.A. 2011, 92-96).

However, perhaps unsurprisingly, after being hauled in and called to account for their corruption and profiteering, these captains of industry were in little time returned to their businesses with the line of authority now clearly impressed upon them. To be sure, these individuals and their firms were of critical importance to Park's long-term vision of significantly enhancing Korea's industrial and military might (Moon and Jun 2011, 118-19). In forging the set of institutional arrangements that would place the state at the center—though in close collaboration with industry—of economic organization the Park

[7] Carter Eckert's (2016) recent book, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-1945* provides a definitive account of the connection between Park's time in the Imperial Army and his political vision.
[8] Kim (2011, 93) lists the range of transgressions that could land one in state custody as including: dancing, smoking foreign cigarettes, illicit profiteering, being branded a hoodlum, or identified as a communist sympathizer.

regime was laying the groundwork for both Korea's breakneck industrial ascendancy and a host of difficulties that would hamper Korean society for decades to come.

With regards to FDI, Park and his economic planners made a conscientious decision to redress Korea's significant capital scarcity largely through foreign loans instead of investment (Mardon 1990, 119-22). This is not to say that Korea was wholly bereft of FDI during this period, rather that the state strove to curtail it to the greatest extent possible. The Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA) of 1962 sought to incentivize investment into industries the state had targeted for its industrialization goals. The restrictive approach to FDI was seen as a means of enhancing the state's policy autonomy by concentrating ownership in the hands of Korean firms beholden to the state as well as warding off potential demands from foreign firms regarding the legal and regulatory framework (Kim and Hwang 2000, 267-294).[9] Beyond bolstering the state's decisional autonomy, this formulation also grew out of historical considerations and the memories tied to the Japanese colonial period (Kim and Park 2011, 271: see also; Eichengreen, Perkins, and Shin 2012, 268; Thurbon and Weiss 2006, 5). This perspective was integrated into a more general disposition that Korea's recent historical experiences dictated that domestic ownership of land and productive assets be of paramount importance.

More importantly, these policies were not merely packaged and sold to the public in economistic terminology. Rather they were cloaked in highly emotive, nationalistic language that placed the state's economic activities on par with a mission of national reclamation and salvation. In this passage from his treatise *State, Revolution, and I*, Park extols the redemptive, spiritual, and nationalist content of his agenda.

[9] The Korean economy certainly benefited immensely from its dense set of Cold War security ties to the U.S. Similarly, Park's decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Japan—which set off a social upheaval that nearly toppled his regime—was largely driven by the conclusion that the incorporation of Japanese capital represented an essential component of his economic strategy. However, as Moon and Jun (2011, 127-28) contend, despite these relations the state retained a wide degree of discretion over the magnitude and scope of foreign entities operating within Korea.

> I was keenly interested in the increasing powerlessness and breakdown of the spirit of the Korean people. In other words, *Our Things*, Korean Things, *Koreans' Things* were gradually receding, disappearing. I could not suppress the depth of the anger I felt at the emergence, in their place, of American things, Western European Things, Japanese Things. The Democratic Party regime might call this a flowering, the development of a modern civilization and society. But clearly this meant that Korea was being lost. (cited in Hughes 2012, 140 [original emphasis])[10]

Thus, in the state's interaction with the populace, this nationalist ethos came to subsume the entire category of modernization with the industrial economy serving as a vehicle of its actualization (Kim and Park 2003, 41). The tentacles of the state reached into all facets of society as its message of national struggle was filtered into the education system that was centrally controlled and tightly monitored to ensure fealty to state doctrine (Hart-Landsberg 1993; see also Moon 2005, 18).

A central component of this doctrine was the effort to brand Korean history a failure in as much as it had been inhibited by backward thinking and a misplaced reverence for China (Lee 2007, 37; Jager 2003, 95-96; Hughes 2012, 137). Thus, Park's system was not simply a system of economic improvement but one that promised to conjure "a health always latent but never achieved" by the Korean people (Hughes 2012, 136). Kim (2006, 5) emphasizes the centrality of the Park system's historicism to the extent that Korea's industrialization epoch becomes nearly indecipherable absent "an understanding of how the state utilized cultural and historical legacies to achieve its objectives." For Park, the invocation of this profound struggle for national redemption served as a means to mobilize the masses in service to his cause while at the same time presenting himself as a figure who transcends mere politics (Moon and Jun 2011, 128-29). In everyday life, Koreans were exposed to a litany of posters, billboards, banners and media reports that militarized economic activity such as,

[10] See also Lie (1998, 58-60) for a discussion of Park's criticism of rising foreign influence within Korean society.

"occupation of ten-billion dollar export hill," "export warriors," and "industrial soldiers" (Kim and Park 2003, 41-43). Concomitant with these exhortations was the regime's belief that democracy was at best ancillary and perhaps even inimical to advancing the core mission of national redemption and security (Kim, Y.J. 2011, 98-100).

The preceding analysis of the Park Chung Hee era provides insights into how the regime was constructed both institutionally and ideologically. It offers the opportunity to consider this period of industrialization not only in terms of the population's steadily improving economic fortunes but also the mechanisms through which the regime wed this economic expansion with its political and ideological agendas. Most important in terms of the ensuing analysis is how the developmental period bequeathed an institutional and ideological configuration that was incommensurate with the emergent neoliberal order in the 1980s-90s. This was particularly evident in the realm of FDI as Korea's developmental system had been fashioned to limit direct foreign involvement in the domestic economy in the service of both political and economic exigencies. Additionally, the developmental system's reliance on debt as the central means of foreign capital inducement would begin to encounter severe limitations with costs growing exponentially as Korean production moved further up the technology chain.

In conjunction with these functional limitations, the preceding analysis also makes clear that these political-economic configurations were underpinned by a highly charged nationalist ideology that cast the regime as far more than a wealth accruing enterprise given its mission as an ultimate redeemer of the Korean nation. This has the effect of moving sentiments towards FDI out of the realm of mere economistic rationality and embedding them within far more emotive categories such as national strength and vitality. At its core this ideological framework built upon the incantation of Korea as a "pure, homogeneous nation" that must be recovered and brought back to health (Hughes 2012, 136). Within this ideological climate, it is not difficult to understand how a pernicious view of foreign economic entities could take root and embed itself within the cognitive framework of both policymakers and the public.

2. The rise of the Neoliberals and FDI (1980-87)

Mired in the shock following Park Chung Hee's assassination in October 1979, Korea found itself ensnared by simultaneous political and economic crises. Following a brief interlude of open politics, General Chun Doo Hwan, a close Park associate, seized power in a military coup that December, attempting to stem the democratic tide and maintain the military's grip on power. Upon solidifying his control over the levers of power, Chun found himself faced with a severe financial crisis brought about by the combination of rising oil prices and burgeoning governmental debt obligations resulting from the massive outlays tied to Park's industrialization program. Further, these expenditures had yielded a high degree of overcapacity for Korean industry and inflation approaching an annual rate of 30 percent in 1980.[11] After averaging 10.27 percent annual GDP growth from 1971-79, in 1980 the economy contracted by 1.9 percent and the current accounts deficit stood at $5.07 billion representing 13 percent of GDP.[12]

This economic tumult served to further exacerbate a crisis of Chun's political legitimacy. He believed that putting the Korean economy back on track could serve a means to validate his newly christened authoritarian regime (Kim, E.M. 1997; Moon 1999).[13] In pursuit of this objective, Chun sought out prominent, American-trained, neoliberal economists within the Korean bureaucracy and the Korean Development Institute (KDI) (Mo 1999; Pirie 2008, 87-88). Central to this process were the neoliberal proponents, Kim Jae Ik and Kim Ki Hwan, whose ideas about how to stem Korea's economic malaise were actively courted by Chun in the wake of the coup. In fact, Kim Jae Ik took to tutoring the economic neophyte Chun three to four times a week and convincing him of the efficacy of his market-

[11]Statistics Korea accessed Jan. 1, 2017. http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1J15041&conn_path=I2&language=en

[12]Bank of Korea accessed Jan. 1, 2017. http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (Subject 16: Macro Economic Analysis>Economic Growth, Employment & Wages>Growth rate of GDP)

[13] Beyond the naked power grab that characterized his ascent to the presidency, Chun was severely blemished by his decision to turn the full force of the military against democratic activists in the city of Gwangju in May of 1980. The ensuing massacre claimed hundreds of lives and only served to stoke the mounting opposition to his rule. See Shin and Hwang (2003) for an excellent account of the events and their impact.

centered policy proposals (Clifford 1998, 180-82). Chun paid rhetorical homage to this new direction in a 1982 speech, recalling

> [a] past when foreign companies wanted to invest in Korea there was too much red tape involved because the government wanted to regulate and control them…In the past foreigners weren't allowed a share over 50 per cent but I am going to allow foreign investors to go up to 100 per cent. (Speeches of Chun Doo Hwan, Vol. 1, 222 cited in Bishop 1997, 85)

In accordance with the neoliberal views on the benefits of FDI, Chun and his allies saw it as a key component of boosting the technological sophistication of the economy and utilizing the know-how of foreign firms to accelerate the expansion of its productive capacity (Kim and Hwang 2000, 268). Furthermore, there was also hope among neoliberal advocates that the introduction of greater foreign ownership into the domestic economy could serve as a conduit for corporate reform (Bishop 1997, 79). The effects of this influence yielded some tangible shifts in the direction of a more liberal approach to FDI as in 1984; the FCIA was amended, and the sectors open to foreign ownership switched from a positive to a negative list system. In addition, control over FDI approval was transferred from the Economic Planning Board (EPB)—which served as the hub of the state-directed economy—to the Ministry of Finance which was more amenable to foreign investment.

Indeed, this reform initiative did produce a good portion of the Chun administration's desired outcomes both economically and politically. Following the debt-fueled downturn in the early 1980s, the Korean economy was again churning out double-digit GDP growth by the middle of the decade with inflation settling back down to acceptable levels. Net inflows of FDI relative to GDP steadily ticked upward with 1987's 0.41 percent more than triple the 0.13 percent registered in 1981.[14] Perhaps more significantly for the apprehensive regime, the re-stabilization for the economy had helped to secure a foothold of support—or at least an absence of resistance—in the urban areas among upper and middle-class white collar workers (Choi 1993, 31).

[14] World Bank. Last Accessed Jan. 1, 2017. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS&country=KOR#

Ironically, it was these improving conditions that precipitated the regime's relaxation of some of its most repressive instruments which in turn would create the political space needed for the democratization movement to break through (Kim, S. 1997, 1135-36). Thus, for the Chun administration, the liberalization reform efforts were attractive in as much as they offered the hope that economic stabilization and a return to sustained growth would help to revive the implicit understanding between the state and society that political quiescence would be rewarded with improved economic fortunes.

However, resistance to these efforts emerged from seemingly disparate sectors of Korean society, namely radical student and labor activists along with conservative members of the state's vast economic bureaucracy seeking to defend the status quo. Both groups would find the reform efforts, embodied in the regime's efforts to induce greater foreign investment, as potentially pernicious harbingers of a receding national autonomy that had served as one of the central tenets of the developmental-authoritarian system. While certainly rooted in vastly different political positions vis-à-vis the state, the theme of warding off foreign influences within the domestic sphere was prevalent in both of their perspectives.

Within the bureaucracy, many actors remained sympathetic to the status quo assumption that increased levels of foreign ownership in the domestic economy carried with it a host of negative externalities and was something to be avoided to the greatest extent possible. These concerns were abetted by a low confidence in the state's institutional capacity "to control the negative long term effects from possible domination by foreign firms over domestic industry" (Park 1990, 48). Even those advocating liberalization as means to revitalizing the economy drew a line when the issue came to foreign ownership. Jung Ku Hyun, writing for Daewoo's economic think tank in 1987, made the case that it is better for Korea to focus on trade liberalization—as opposed to FDI—as a means of instilling market discipline on firms because above all else, "[w]e must not accept the subordination of the Korean economy to foreign firms" (cited in Cherry 2007, 40-41).

The perseverance of this nationalist orientation can also be observed through foreign stakeholders who continued to complain that their personal interactions with the bureaucratic agencies responsible for

overseeing investment activities did not reflect the apparent neoliberal turn promulgated by Chun and his top economic advisor Kim Jae Ik (Bishop 1997, 87). The continuing default position of many bureaucrats, as articulated by EPB advisor Koo Bohn-young, is that FDI "is restricted to those projects where foreign marketing or technical skills are required. If only capital were required, the government would attempt to borrow it" (quoted in Mardon 1990, 120). Indeed, as Table 1 demonstrates, the state's resort to licensing continued to accelerate rapidly even under the new ostensibly neoliberal outlook. Additionally, the figures offer a clear illustration of the increasingly prohibitive outlays associated with technology acquisition in the more capital-intensive manufacturing industries state planners were keen to nurture. In sum, while the debt crisis of 1980 and the rising prominence of neoliberal economists in the Chun administration had certainly precipitated the introduction of new ideas that challenged the conventional thinking on the role of FDI in the economy, it is clear that their ability to overturn the preexisting skepticism towards foreign ownership was marginal at best.

Table 1: Technology Licensing Expenditures (millions USD)

	1962-1981	**1982-1993.2**	**Increase**
Electronics	60.3	2,577.9	4,278%
Machinery	103.9	1,314.4	1,265%
Refining/Chemicals	179.9	975.7	542%

Source: Hahm and Plein 1997

In terms of social mobilization on the part of dissidents, the contestation of economic liberalization in Korea took the form of a pitched ideological engagement over what constitutes the very nature the Korea nation and in turn its appropriate interaction with the international economy. For instance, the burgeoning student and labor-led *minjung* resistance movement couched its mission in the language of national redemption reminiscent of Park Chung Hee's invocations upon assuming power in 1961.[15] However, *minjung* activists came to the view that rather than making good on its promise of Korea's national restoration, the developmental dictatorship had merely served as an instrument of the U.S.'s geopolitical objectives

[15] Lie (1998, 146) draws a similar connection between the rhetoric of Park Chung Hee in the early days of his rule and that adopted by *minjung* activists in the 1980s.

leaving the state tasked with crushing socialist forces while bolstering reactionary elements (Jager 2003, 99-101). At times, *minjung* activists embedded their resistance to Chun's liberalization measures within an alternative socio-historical narrative through an invocation of the *Donghak* peasants' rebellion of the late nineteenth century (Lee 2007, 59).[16]

Thus, from this perspective, economic liberalization represented not only an unjust economic agenda but also a manifestation of the continuing contravention of Korea's national independence for the sake of satiating the interest of foreign actors. Though these actions were informed by a disdain for the dictatorship, as Namhee Lee (2007, 39) aptly observes, these protestations were "carried out in the name of the nation…and as such they converged on the goal of state-led economic development." Within the context of the state's decades-long reification of the economy as a vehicle for redeeming and uplifting the Korean nation, it becomes easier to apprehend how the maximization of autonomy emerged as a central axis upon which resistance to its reform efforts would turn. From this perspective, a move towards greater inclusion of foreign economic entities within the domestic sphere via FDI threatened to undercut not only long-held assumptions about the economy but also a central pillar of the mythos upon which the regime's legitimacy rested.

In recounting the pushback that emerged to the Chun regime's liberalization efforts, we can observe that the Park Chung Hee era had established both the template for 'normal' politics and the socio-political parameters within which they would be resisted. The fact that resistance in the name of defending national autonomy arose from interests located firmly within the authoritarian order and squarely outside of it offers an indication that actors from across the social and political spectrum viewed economic policies in the context of much grander historical narratives. This again is unsurprising given that merging the two had served as one of the central tenets in Park's efforts to legitimate his authoritarian regime. In the end, the upshot of these historical institutional precursors is perhaps best

[16]The *Donghak* (eastern learning) movement and eventual rebellion emerged in the late nineteenth century as a protest directed at the corrupt political class as well as the increasing presence of Japanese and Chinese economic actors within Korean society.

captured by Woo's (1991, 187) contention that economic liberalization in Korea was largely an "agenda without a noticeable domestic constituency" which perhaps reflects an ethos that places greater stock "in nationalism than in individualism."

3. *Segyehwa* and FDI (1993-1996)

The election of Kim Young Sam in December 1992 marked a watershed moment in modern Korean history as he became the first non-military president in over three decades. He had run as a representative of the middle class and small businesses promising to end that state's excessive attention to big business so as to make the economy work for all Koreans.[17] His central initiative vis-à-vis economic liberalization commenced with the 'Sydney Declaration' on November 17, 1994. The speech marked the launching of his *segyehwa* (globalization) agenda which was envisioned as a means of propelling Korea towards 'advanced nation status' by dismantling all lingering vestiges of the state-driven developmental economy (Kihl 2005; Moon 1999). In many ways, this agenda represented an attempt to fuse neoliberal economic adjustments with the democratic politics that had finally broken through in 1987. Nevertheless, adopting the parlance of market reforms and liberalization was one thing, whereas compelling entrenched bureaucrats and societal actors resistant to liberalization to go along with it was an entirely different matter. As Samuel Kim (2000a, 252) astutely observes, quite often in democratic Korea "the requirements of democratic consolidation at home and competitiveness in the global marketplace become mutually competitive and even conflictive."

With regards to FDI policy, Kim echoed the sentiments expressed by Chun Doo Hwan just over a decade earlier, stating that the "bureaucracy has too much red tape and too many hindrances in inducing foreign capital and technology."[18] The desire by Kim's administration to jump start FDI flows was driven by a conviction that Korea would be left behind in the technology boom if it was

[17] "Scene Change in 'New' Korea", *Asian Business*, June 1993.
[18] Quoted in "Kim opens the door: South Korea reforms for foreigners - and for itself", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 9, 1993.

unable to foster a better climate for investment (Kim, J.D. 1997, 5). As Figure 1 makes clear, the increases in relative FDI inflows



seen in the 1980s were quickly evaporating as levels again fell far below the rates seen in other upper-middle and middle-income economies. Ministry of Finance official, Hahn Jung-gil, expressed his concern that "[d]irect investments by foreigners, particularly those in manufacturing industries, are falling at a worrying pace at a time when this country needs them most to introduce new technology."[19] There was also a growing recognition that the established formula of cherry picking specific FDI projects geared to meet pre-established objectives was losing it viability. Reflecting a growing unwillingness among investors to accede to the piecemeal approach to liberalization, an American executive pointed out that as "[f]oreign companies want to protect their proprietary technologies, they need a majority stake or they will transfer only last year's technologies or not come at all."[20]

In conjunction with the Kim administration's struggle to secure the plaudits of international economic actors, there was also recognition that these reforms were likely to receive a less than favorable reception from sizable segments of society and the bureaucracy that

[19] Quoted in "Scene Change in 'New' Korea", *Asian Business*, June 1993.
[20] Quoted in "Investment: A new welcome mat", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 23, 1993.

were distrustful of permitting a greater foreign presence in Korea. As such, Kim Young Sam looked to reframe economic liberalization, as embodied in his active pursuit of OECD membership, as cementing Korea's rise to a status on par with the most advanced economies in the world providing international affirmation of its newfound prestige (Kang 2000). It is instructive that even at this juncture, as Korea stood at the precipice of entering this exclusive club of developed economies, arguments centered on national standing were still seen as the most effective route for securing public support. Further, the Kim administration also saw the bid to relax FDI restrictions via OECD accession through the prism of the lingering resistance it faced within the bureaucracy. Park Se Il, Senior Secretary for Policy Planning, claimed that "the committee planned to join the OECD *to use it against the government*" (quoted in Thurbon 2003, 351-52 [emphasis added]). This reveals the durability of bureaucratic animus to liberalization to the extent that the president and his advisors sought to subvert their influence through the introduction of an external international body into the process.

Further, Kim's attempts to court the populace in the parlance of national grandeur point to the groundswell of antipathy towards foreign firms operating in Korea that had been gathering steam in the years running up to his election. In the late 1980s over two-hundred foreign firms exited the Korean market and in many cases failed to fulfill existing obligations to employees including back pay and severance packages (Bishop 1997, 113). In response to this, unions created a specific branch for employees of foreign firms and called on the government to exert tighter controls on them, both prior to their entry and during their operations in Korea, and to amend laws to ensure compensation when foreign firms exited (Ibid.). This labor activism occurred in tandem with a mounting public dissatisfaction towards the growing presence of foreign firms and products in the domestic economy which fueled the impression that the Korean government was being bullied into reforms by the U.S to serve its own interests at the expense of Korea's.[21]

In as much as OECD membership came to epitomize Kim's efforts to shake up Korea's foreign economic policy, his attempts to persuade

[21] "South Korea: Trade and Investment - Time for a New Start", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 13, 1992.

the populace to apprehend economic liberalization through the lens of nationalist sensibilities fell largely flat. Labor unions, large segments of the general populace, and Kim Dae Jung—then leader of the main legislative opposition party—all opposed undertaking the extensive reforms needed to meet OECD standards (Saxer 2013, 185). Numerous influential media outlets argued that implementing the reforms required to join the OECD would make Korea vulnerable to foreign control, exacerbate inequality, and produce destabilizing capital flows.[22] To some degree, Kim's focus on national prestige and becoming an 'advanced' nation echoed Park Chung Hee's invocations of similar themes several decades earlier. Gi-Wook Shin (2006, 215) astutely observes that Park Chung Hee and Kim Young Sam are bound by their shared "emphasis on Korea's native culture and national identity as integral to their respective national development projects." Thus, even though by this point in its history Korea had moved firmly in the direction of democratic governance and had been headed by presidents who officially embraced core neoliberal tenets for over a decade, the ideological terrain mapped out during the Park era continued to weigh heavily upon the means through which policy was communicated to the populace. However, the inability for Kim's policy to garner much traction with the public despite his employment of nationalist language in the service of his policies serves as an indication that such associations were far less resonant in the context of policies that engendered greater foreign economic participation in the domestic arena.

In a seeming acknowledgment of this increasing disconnect with the past, the *segyehwa* initiative also contained a socio-cultural component that sought to revise and reorient the public's cognitive framework. The hope was to impress upon them both the necessity of greater economic liberalization and the benefits offered by deeper integration into the global economy (Cherry 2007, 43). Thus, while Western observers tended to view *segyehwa* primarily through the lens of economic liberalization, it was, according to the Ministry of Information and Communications, intended to entail a far-reaching societal reformation towards a more open-minded approach to the outside world.[23] Lee Hong-Koo, who served as Prime Minister under

[22] "Seoul hits impasse over OECD entry", *Financial Times*, Sep. 6, 1996; see also "S. Korea Braces for Restructuring", *Financial Times*, Oct. 14, 1996.

[23] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6/22/1995 (cited in Kim 2000b, 3).

Kim Young Sam, argued that the normative component of *segyehwa* was necessary to transform an economy that was encumbered by "rigid neo-Confucian ethical concepts, the myth of national homogeneity, limited experience with cultural diversity, fear of foreign powers, and anti-internationalization" (quoted in Kim 2000a, 258). Professor Park Young Chul of Korea University echoed these sentiments in his assertion that, for internationalization efforts such as Kim's *segyehwa* initiative to truly take root, "there must be a reevaluation of the deeply-rooted exclusionist thinking in our culture."[24] EPB chief Lee Kyung Shik also identified elements of the bureaucracy as repositories of outmoded thinking opining that "our public officeholders need to change their mindset and stop discriminating against foreign business concerns operating here."[25]

These specific comments and the *segyehwa* program's cultural component more generally reflects the stickiness of the ideology embedded in the Korean developmental system that was launched in earnest over thirty years prior. Kim's administration clearly saw the challenges of liberalizing the Korean economy and improving the climate for investors as ones that involved fomenting an ideological transformation as much as overcoming any of the technical difficulties bound up with these processes. Nevertheless, the general assessments of both policymakers and scholars were not of a laudatory nature. Kim and Lee (2008, 174-75) insist *segyehwa* was merely an exercise in sloganeering with little content or any underlying strategy. Samuel Kim (2000a, 275) argues that in the final analysis no genuine transformation of the public's sentiments occurred and that these reform efforts amounted to little more than "situation-specific tactical adaptation." For his part, a former Korean UN Ambassador cited the "anachronistic exclusive nationalism" prominent in Korea as the chief cause of *segyehwa's* failure to take hold while Han Sung Joo who headed up the president's *segyehwa* initiative labeled Korean society 'parochial' and bounded by "particularistic proclivities" (Lee 2000, 192).

[24] Quoted in "Globalizing the economy: With open arms", *Business Korea*, Dec. 1993.
[25] Quoted in "Globalizing the economy: With open arms", *Business Korea*, Dec. 1993.

Again, the shortfalls of the *segyehwa* agenda and Koreans' apparent 'failure' to embrace the more 'globalized' perspective favored by high-ranking officials emerges as less of a puzzle when we consider that a great deal of the adult population at this time had lived through a period defined by both rapid economic growth and a highly potent and sophisticated propaganda operation that elevated economic activity to a national project far beyond profit and accumulation. From this perspective, we encounter the central theme of this work in that the process of economic globalization is better understood as a process that emerges from and adapts within a specific historical context. Thus, though it is true that to some degree Korea's FDI policy moved in a liberal direction during this period, we also simultaneously witness many of the baseline assumptions driving both popular attitudes and bureaucratic processes proving far more difficult to overturn.

4. Sentiments Towards Globalization and FDI in the post-*segyehwa* Generation

Perhaps the most provocative pronouncement among Samuel Kim's dour assessments of the *segyehwa* period is that globalization seemed to have no impact on bringing about more cosmopolitan attitudes in Korea's youth. If anything, "they tend to be more isolationist, nationalist, and leftist than older generations" (Kim 2000a, 263). This comment, in conjunction with the rather despairing reflections from policymakers and scholars recounted above, invites the question: Two decades later, what has become of the Korean youth attitude? This is particularly interesting as the present group of university-aged Korean nationals has grown up almost wholly in the post-*segyehwa* period which allows us to evaluate whether any of the attitudinal shifts policymakers had hoped for came to fruition; or, if Kim's assessments continue to hold in that nationalist tendencies remain prominent among Korea's youth. Further, as student activists in the 1980s were at the forefront of both the democratization and anti-liberalization movements it is of interest to see where the current generation stands with regards to these issues. As discussed in the introduction, there is widespread dissatisfaction among young adult Koreans, how do these sentiments interact with attitudes towards Korea's relationship with the international economy?

In seeking to shed some light on these questions, I carried out a research project at five Korean universities during March 2016. The project centered on the distribution of a questionnaire that queried students on a wide range of political, economic, and social issues. The following section evaluates their responses to questions related to issues engaged throughout this paper. This research was exploratory in nature and is thus not intended to provide definitive conclusions on these matters. However, the responses do go some way towards illuminating the ways in which the current generation feels towards issues pertaining to FDI specifically and globalization in general.

As one central component of FDI is the ability of a firm to operate in a foreign economy, the data in Table 2 paints a fairly convincing picture of the survey respondents having a largely positive view of foreign firms operating in Korea. While just over 40 percent opted for the neutral category, the fact that those indicating a positive impression outstripped those expressing negative views by a rate of more than 10 to 1 offers a strong indication that among this demographic, foreign companies operating in the Korean economy are held in a favorable regard. However, as detailed in Table 3, we can see a distinct change in sentiments when the question looks at the area of FDI-related to the acquisition of a Korean firm by a foreign buyer. While again a large portion of the respondents cluster in the neutral category, among the respondents who did express positive or negative sentiments those agreeing that foreign purchases of Korean firms should be largely prohibited outnumber those who disagree at a rate of nearly 2.5 to 1. Similarly, when asked about the ability of foreigners to purchase land (which is often closely interlinked with FDI) in Korea (Table 4) we see that just over 40 percent believe that it should be prohibited compared to 26.2 percent who did not favor such a prohibition. It is also worth noting that the proportion of neutral responses for this category was less than in the first two questions indicating that stronger sentiments are attached to this issue.

Taken as a whole, these data provide some indication that among the student population there is a lack of strong animus towards the presence of foreign firms in the domestic economy. However, the fairly stark differences in the proportions expressing negative sentiments towards foreign firms operating in Korea versus those regarding the purchase of Korean assets (either firms or land) demonstrate some continuity with the past in that there is a clear

differentiation in the attitudes pertaining to the ownership of what could be construed as Korean assets.

Table 2
What would best describe your feelings about foreign companies operating in Korea?

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very positive	61	8.3
Positive	341	46.3
Neither positive nor negative	308	41.8
Negative	23	3.1
Very negative	4	0.5
Total	**737**	**100**

Table 3
What best describes your feelings about the following statement: "In most cases, foreign companies should not be allowed to buy Korean companies."

Response	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	31	4.4
Agree	213	29.9
Neither agree nor disagree	361	50.7
Disagree	100	14.0
Strongly disagree	7	1.0
Total	**712**	**100**

Table 4
What best describes your feelings about the following statement: "Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Korea."

Response	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	74	10.4

Agree	223	31.3
Neither agree nor disagree	229	32.1
Disagree	147	20.6
Strongly disagree	40	5.6
Total	**713**	**100**

When eliciting the respondents' attitudes towards the phenomenon of globalization as a general concept, the responses turn decidedly positive. Asked to convey the general tenor of their sentiments toward globalization (Table 5) those reporting positive feelings outnumbered those with negative ones, 69.8 percent to 3.4 percent. When placed specifically within the Korean context (Table 6), the attitudes towards globalization turn even more favorable with 78.5 expressing the view that Korea should accelerate its globalization efforts while only 2.7 percent wishing to see them curtailed.

Table 5
When you think of the term 'globalization,' which best describes the feelings you associate with it?

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very positive	88	11.9
Positive	427	57.9
Neither positive nor negative	197	26.7
Negative	23	3.1
Very negative	2	0.3
Total	**737**	**100**

Table 6
Korea should be globalized.

Response	Frequency	Percent
A lot more	69	9.3
More	511	69.2
Neither more nor less	138	18.7

Less	15	2.0
A lot less	5	0.7
Total	**738**	**100**

Though these questions are phrased in a way that allows each respondent to define the extremely dense concept of 'globalization' in their own way, when looked at in the context of Kim Young Sam's *segyehwa* initiative it is possible to glean some insights from these highly favorable responses. As discussed in the preceding section, from its proponents' perspective, *segyehwa* was as much about changing the public's attitudes towards globalization and its benefits as it was a policy agenda. Additionally, in this context another interesting finding from the survey listed in Table 7 demonstrates that a solid majority of respondents tended to view globalization in cultural rather than economic or political terms. This could potentially be interpreted as indicating that for this population 'globalization' is construed as a favorable—if amorphous—cultural' alternative to what many in this generation perceive to be the moribund political and economic institutions of contemporary Korean society.

Table 7
When you think of the term 'globalization' what do you mostly associate it with?

Response	Frequency	Percent
Economics	237	33.1
Politics	50	7
Culture	396	55.3
Migration	21	2.9
Other	12	1.7
Total	**716**	**100**

In sum, the results suggest that, to a large extent, the sentiments of the younger generation exhibit a decidedly favorable disposition towards globalization and its impact on Korean society. Further, when considered in the context of the high degree of social dissatisfaction, it appears that as opposed to the students of the minjung movement, students in this period do not view globalization as something that runs counter to the goals or viewpoints they may have. When

compared with the pessimistic pronouncements regarding *segyehwa's* effectiveness, the data offer some confirmation of Campbell's (2016) research with the contemporary Korean university student population. She argues that this generation has etched out a new national identity that is qualitatively different from the nationalism rooted in the developmental era. Further research is needed to help parse out the variations in attitudes surrounding the multifaceted concept of globalization. However, while these findings present a fairly strong indication that the cognitive shift envisioned by *segyehwa* advocates are to a large degree present within the generation that came of age in the years following this period, the widespread social discontent among the youth indicates that although successive administrations in Korea have been 'successful' in instilling the public with favorable attitudes towards globalization, they have been far less successful in engendering attitudes that intermix these 'globalized' outlooks with support for domestic institutions.

5. Conclusion

This paper has endeavored to reveal many of the complexities that emerge in the in the process of adopting a more liberalized economic order within the context of globalization. Through tracing the shifts and permutations connected with Korea's FDI policy regime and its interaction with society during several distinct periods in its modern history it becomes clear that the processes bound up with the phenomenon of economic globalization are ones that entail significant social and cognitive transformations that go far beyond mere policy adjustments. Further, by rooting analysis of more contemporary events within the historical context from which they emerged, the sources of the contestation and interests that arise during the process of economic liberalization become easier to identify and their motivations better understood. Thus, the foundational institutions of the 1960s and their ideological underpinnings can be seen to have borne a significant influence throughout the 1980s and even into the post-democratization administration of Kim Young Sam. In fact, it was the very legacy of this ideological influence that Kim's administration sought to directly counteract with its *segyehwa* initiative. In the wake of this period, there was a general conclusion that the efforts had been unsuccessful. However, as the final section illustrates, over twenty years following the segyehwa initiative, there

is some evidence that the present generation of young Korean citizens does indeed possess a different outlook towards greater integration with the global economy when compared with their forerunners. As previously mentioned, more research needs to be conducted to help further our understanding of the specific nature of current attitudes and particularly the ways in which these attitudes interact with the present high degree of dissatisfaction among Korean youth.

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Book Review: Fictionalizing Nation-states

Stephen Morton, *States of Emergency: Colonialism, Literature and Law*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013.

Reviewed by Noah VIERNES

Stephen Morton's *States of Emergency: Colonialism, Literature and Law* (2013) treats the colonial formations of constitutional texts as fictions that run from the emergence of modern nation-states to our precarious post-9/11 era. These fictions stream through occupied Palestine and the counter-terrorism restrictions of the Patriot Act, from post-civil war post-colony Algeria to the continuation of martial law in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand since 2004, as a kind of noble lie used to reinforce contemporary exceptions to constitutional rule. In the heavily saturated noise of the global media, it is increasingly rare for novels and short stories (perhaps more so than cinema and heavily-censored visual cultures) to surface in this story. A constitution is one of many texts in the larger assemblage of the law. Thus, Morton, demonstrates, literary praxis is also a site of resistance.

The formation of nation-states in literary fiction is well-treated, and perhaps overly-simplified in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (2006), first published in 1983. In this classic text, the "imagination" dominates the ways in which the national community is perceived, especially in the colonial contexts that give rise to 20th century struggle for self-determination. Franco Moretti's *Atlas of the European Novel* (1998) shares a closer affinity to Morton's approach and is interested in a particular kind of realism that builds empirical data for "the geo-political reality of the nation-state" (p. 17), on one hand, and an articulation of a new literary geography that is "micro-scopic" in its class-based contours and planetary in the imperial reach of the modern. But Morton reads the novel through 21st century filters that owe as much to biopolitical critiques of Giorgio Agamben (2005) and Walter Benjamin (1999) as they do to what novelists like Don Delillo (2001) wrote shortly after the attack on the World Trade

Center.[1] How is it that nation-states console citizens through the suspension of constitutional protections, and what is the "response-ability," as Marco Abel (2007) calls the ethics of post-9/11 literary critiques of the state, of the writer?

Morton thereby positions writers as a political conscience, but one that must compete with more readily acceptable popular discourses. For instance, Morton (2013, p. 23) turns to Shoshana Felman's reading of Walter Benjamin. Writing against Fascism, exile, and his impending suicide, Benjamin articulated a "tradition of the oppressed" where the institutional erasure of contrary voices reemerges in "different aesthetic forms"; not social realism, or nationalist "resistance literature," but an outside form that considers—for instance—the impact of racialized and gendered displacement. Morton delves deep into colonial narratives of French, British, and South African oppression, among others, to show how colonial proclamations of emergency law also emerged as the dominant voice in contemporaneous fiction. It was within "the condition of being silenced or rendered expressionless" (p. 202), that Morton also addresses Adi Ophir, Michael Givoni, and Sari Hanafi's (2009) concept of "inclusive exclusion" as a "technique of governmentality": specifically, the legal and discursive arsenal of modern states that excludes and dehumanizes their subjects in the manner learned from their colonial predecessors. This inclusive exclusion is key to understanding the inclusion of British emergency laws after 1948 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories or novels that support regimes by selectively including acts of terrorism to bolster the necessity of emergency law in Algeria, Kenya, or Ireland.

One of the book's strong points resides in its seamless transitions between texts. From newspaper narratives of counter-insurgency to colonial novels and emergency acts, *States of Emergency* is a fascinating excursus of how to assemble the primary documents of

[1] Agamben's theory of the state of exception illustrates how violations of normal law are justified through martial necessity (in "a law that suspends the law" [Morton 2013, p. 8]) such that the basis of modern sovereignty materializes as such exceptions become rule. Morton charges that Agamben's theory suffers from a colonial blindspot in an otherwise sharp analysis of states of exception that arose during post-Revolutionary France, Britain during World War I, and Nazi Germany during the 1930s.

colonial regimes in the postcolonial trajectories of states. Morton's (2013) gloss on Fred Burnaby's 1886 novel *Our Radicals*, treated for its hardliner "argument in favor of martial law" (p. 42), illustrates how the Irish insurgency inspired anti-colonial Afghan resistance as a result of the transnational circulation of English-language newspapers. This transnational media imaginary, a global modernity of resistance, feedbacks into the hardliner argument for censorship as one among other legal exceptions justified by the British colonial government. The exception is further justified in the structure of the novel, specifically in the narrative voice, which over-determines violence as a call for an imperial escalation of counterinsurgency operations. In such ways, actual arguments for the renewal of the Habeas Corpus Suspension (Ireland) Act in 1868 could be creatively woven into a contemporaneous intertext based in dominant media forms of the time—i.e., in both newspapers and the novel.

Morton also analyzes and critiques the gendered deployment of national sovereignty between colonial domination and anticolonial resistance. For example, the representation of "violent, monstrous and terrifying" (Morton 2013, p. 52) Irish hunger strikers are feminized and emasculated in ways similar to the larger silencing of women within Irish nationalism. While women remained "icons and fragments" (p. 57) of poetry, and segments of anticolonial resistance in Ireland, such as the anti-land eviction activities of the Lady's Land League, their political agency was rendered invisible by the larger frames of masculine insurgent nationalism and emasculated colonial domination. And while more contemporary forms of women's hunger striking did invoke a singular form of empowerment within a rooted tradition of women's oppression, for example by negating the "idealized Catholic mother" or "image of Mother Ireland," (Morton 2013, p. 58) the ground for what hunger strikes meant for each female participant remained an open question. Morton thus directs his readers toward a feminist politics of inscription in his praise of several works by Eavan Boland. For example, both "Mise Eire" ("I am Ireland") (1980)—a direct reference to Patrick Pearse's poem of the same title—and *Object Lessons* (1995) look beyond the idealized trope of nationhood and its gendered metaphors as critical meditations on the historical silencing of women. Morton's reading of Boland concludes with the 1980 poem "Anorexia," a poem about a female hunger striker split between wasting a 'heretic' body and growing "angular and holy//past pain" (p. 59) to highlight violence

waged when politics requires the deterioration of self in the development of a male-dominated body of the nation.

Morton also introduces Jacques Derrida's concept of *autoimmunity*, which emphasizes the contradiction between the law preserving actions of sovereignty and its paradox of fueling discontent. Morton applies autoimmunity to tortured bodies and heroic soldiering, imagined French memories and the continuation of state violence in Algeria. The French occupation of Algeria was brought to an end by the urban guerilla tactics of the National Liberation Front (FLN), in scenes made famous by Gillo Pontecurvo's 1965 film *Battle of Algiers*. At the time, France fought the media war back home with novels that represented the need for martial law based on what Morton (2013) calls a "fictional state of necessity" (p. 155). But even the best-case scenario shows the French state of self-destruction. Leulliette's *Saint Michel et le dragon* (1961) and Lartéguy's *Les Centurions* (1962), two novels that best represent the state of martial law, cannot justify torture and execution, but they can frame these military exercises as the necessary cost of French sovereignty. For Lartéguy, French paratroopers are "demons," but only "in the imaginary mindset of the FLN" (Morton 2013, p. 154). Between torture chambers and paratroopers, the demons exacerbated their demise. Autoimmunity, the inevitable undoing of the colony by its systemic modes of so-called constitutionality, is predetermined by self-destructive states of exception. But Morton continues. The colonial contradiction between the demons and the masculine bodies of the FLN fed into the "permanent state of emergency of the postcolony" (p. 170). Here, Morton turns to Algerian writers Louisette Ighilahriz, a former FLN nationalist, and the cinematic writing of Assia Djebar, to demonstrate how the "body in pain," as Elaine Scarry (1987) puts it, persists as a contested site between writing and remembering the political subject.

Morton's final case study turns to Israel's state of exception, particularly as it relies on the redeployment of colonial law under the pretext of state preservation. Specifically, Morton cites the continuation of the British mandatory government's "Emergency Defense Regulations" that "aimed to criminalize and control both the Arab and the Jewish populations in order to consolidate [its] civil authority" (Morton 2013, p. 184). The colonial shaping of Israeli policies of Palestinian exclusion remain under-determined yet so

significant for understanding how legal exceptions become norms. As primary sources, Morton chimes, "literary texts can help to elucidate the complex and contested genealogy of colonial power, sovereignty and legality that underpins the formation of the state of Israel" (p. 178). Maurice Callard's *The City Called Holy* (1954) precisely maps the close parallels between the British mandatory authority's emergency regime and post-Holocaust Zionist nationalism, as experienced through the narration of a young British officer. S. Yizhar's novel *Khirbet Khizeh* (1949) enters the world of an Israel Defense Forces officer haunted by the systematic dispossession of rural Palestinian villages, a guilt born from disproportionate applications of universal justice. The problem, Morton suggests, is that the voice of the Palestinian is denied a place in these narratives. *Khirbet Khizeh* recalls the 2008 film *Waltz with Bashir* (2008), a similar story of an Israeli soldier who visits various friends and acquaintances interpret a recurring nightmare (related to a 1982 event during the Lebanese Civil War). But unlike *Khirbet Khizeh*, the film stops short of assigning responsibility for the massacre of 3,000 Palestinian refugees at Beirut's Sabra and Shatila camps which are revealed, in the final scene, as the traumatic source of the character's recurring nightmares. In both *Waltz with Bashir* and *Khirbet Khizeh*, the Palestinian is focalized within the memory of the soldier precisely because the act of imposing the law highlights the fundamental necessity for the existence of the state. And while victimhood of the Palestinian is central to the question of necessity, their voices remain absent in these examples.

Morton recovers the exiled Palestinian tradition of the oppressed through treatments of Ghassan Kanafi's *Men in the Sun* (1962) and Emile Habiby's *The Secret Life of Saeed* (1974) as both exemplify Agamben's assertion that the "bare life" of the refugee "is the sole category in which it is possible today to perceive the forms and limits of a political community to come" (Morton 2013, p. 199). Whereas Kanafi and Habiby are situated within the frame of national liberation they open toward a critical reflection on sovereignty's demand for exile and displacement. But the novels' critique of this sovereignty is mired by the melancholy of emasculation, of loss and docile submissiveness that distances them both geographically from the land of their forefathers and, categorically, from the freedom fighter capable of mounting a resistance.

On the whole, *States of Emergency* recalls similar works that surface as a literary historiography and biopolitical critique of the American-led geopolitical shift since 9/11: for instance, Marco Abel's *Violent Affect: Literature, Cinema, and Critique after Representation* (2007) and, more recently, Arne De Boever's *States of Exception in the Contemporary Novel* (2012). In the latter case, De Boever juxtaposes two fundamental sequences in Jeffrey Eugenides' *Middlesex* (2002), a novel about the coming-of-age of the protagonist, Cal, and the gendered ambiguities of becoming a man. De Boever recalls an early sequence in the novel where Cal locates the dehumanization left to those without a documented identity in his grandparents political escape from massacre by feigning French citizenship. Thousands of Greek refugees were abandoned by French, British, and American evacuation units, left behind as "bare life" with neither proper citizenship nor protections from the brutality of the encroaching Turkish army during the 1922 Smyrna massacre. De Boever compares this earlier indecision of the nation-state to recognize the bare life of the refugee, to the medical decision to resolve Cal's ambiguous sexuality by classifying her as female. The political ingenuity of *Middlesex*, De Boever argues, is that a third narrative—the autobiography of Cal as a man—complicates the others by asserting its right to fictionalize the story beyond the truth claims that previously determined the boundaries of a community. *Middlesex* does justice to the political by illuminating "the ambiguity of life that it sets out to capture" in the emergence of a community to come. If the tradition of sovereign violence resides in the power of "he who decides on the exception" (De Boever 2012, p. 11), where the work of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, and Giorgio Agamben illuminate the familiar post-9/11 sites where legal norms are exempt, the decision rather than the exception might be reconsidered. *Middlesex* ends in Berlin, a city split between its traumatic political divisions and its "'sovereign' and 'imperial'" (De Boever 2012, p. 66)) legacy. It is these ethics of the decision, within the aesthetics of the literary, that provoke a post-9/11 resistance to the exceptions underwritten in prevalent states of emergency. The stories begin and end in these states, and divide along the fault lines of competing narratives. But most of all, De Boever shows, fiction interrogates the laws by which both literature and nation-states organize people.

If there is a weakness to Morton's *States of Emergency*, it is that the book sacrifices precision and a broader readership by taking on too many cases. For instance, whereas De Boever can devote a whole chapter to Eugenedes' *Middlesex*, Morton sometimes seems to cover too much ground, especially in his chapters on Algeria and occupied Palestine. But this is a strength, and a symptom of the empirical conditions under which literature must make its words relevant, a daunting task challenged in the "reality show" lens of contemporary global politics that treads a path through waves of media feedback. Morton moves through time and space, expanding the possibilities of a comparative literature that engages the political within the itinerary of texts. His transnational and transdisciplinary scope signals hope. Could there be such thing as a comparative politics that starts over at these entry points?

Such questions recall Jean Luc Godard's 2004 film *Notre Musique*, which opens with a seven-minute montage of violent images. They begin with those that point to the transition between the colonial and the national and end with 9/11. In the fictional film, based in Sarajevo at an academic conference called Literary Encounters, the filmmaker has arrived to speak on "the text and the image." In one scene, a character chimes, "[h]umane people don't start revolutions. They build libraries." Another calls for a revolution "that reinforces memory, clarifies dreams, and gives substance to images." In such a library, which appears in one scene as an abandoned building in a shelled-out section of Sarajevo, the grievances of two indigenous Amerindians are transcribed in one clerk's act of writing history. But who will read, the sequence seems to ask, from the book of these subaltern voices? Later, in a Holiday Inn, the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish highlights the processes of marginalization when he tells an Israeli journalist that the Palestinian cause is simply a minor character in the history of the Jews and thus an afterthought in the global memory of violence. Nearing the end of the film, Godard gives his presentation on the text and the image and concludes that the oppressed are the "reverse shot" of history writing. Writing and the regime of fiction became all the more significant in the 20th century "[b]ecause the field of the text had already covered the field of vision." Godard's film was particularly important in 2004 since there remained significant questions on how writers would respond to the states of exception that predominate the U.S. led War on Terror (See Baudrillard 2003; Delillo 2001). In the final scene, Godard

receives a call from a character who appeared earlier in the film as the conference translator. The translator informs Godard that Holga, a "French Jew of Russian descent" and conference attendee, invaded a cinema in Jerusalem and held its audience captive. Godard learns that she allowed all to leave except those willing to die for peace. Alone in the theater, Holga is killed by a marksmen under the suspicion of concealing a bomb in her red shoulder bag. Later they search the bag only to find books.

Morton's *States of Emergency* succeeds in its ability to connect these books with the marksmen, an unfolding of colonial violence within the fictions of the state. For enthusiasts of politics and literature, this book and its timely reading list should be considered a valuable resource for the post-9/11 era and the violent formations of the modern state in light of militarization, an ongoing war on terrorism, and its responsive yet creative modes of resistance.

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