

Student Journal
of
International Liberal Arts

2015 Fall
Volume 4, Number 2



AKITA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Student Journal of International Liberal Arts

Akita International University

2015 Fall
Volume 4, Number 2

Faculty Advisors

Paul Chamness Miller, Ph.D.

Cu-Hullan Tsuyoshi McGivern

Senior Editors

Hinako Takeuchi

Nana Wisniewski

Assistant Editors

Kendra Devine-Pringle

Ronan Kelly

Reona Matsuzaki

Satoki Nagayasu

Aki Ogawa

Tatsuki Suzuki

Yuna Uemaru

From the Faculty Advisors:

This journal is student directed and operated. In addition to their own studies and other activities that fill their day, the editors of the journal, comprised of all undergraduate students, both full-time AIU students and international students who are on study abroad at AIU, solicit manuscripts, vet submissions, offer recommended revisions to authors, and assist in the final production that you see before you. Our role as advisors is largely that of a managing editor, assisting the editors as needed, keeping records, and communicating with AIU Press.

In the last issue (Vol. 4, No. 1), the editors made several changes to truly reflect the global focus of our university's mission by welcoming submissions from students at other institutions, especially our partner institutions. We are pleased to that change by including works from students at some of these campuses. The editors also wanted to encourage not only academic essays, but to expand the focus to include other types of works. In this issue you will find a book review as one such example.

Additionally, we wish to thank AIU's president, Dr. Norihiko Suzuki, who has continued to support this endeavor. We also wish to thank the staff of AIU Press, especially Yoriko Haseyama, for their help in sustaining this project and making our students' work available to the world.

We are delighted to experiment with yet another change and offer this as the second issue of Volume 4, the first time to have two issues in a year. The student editors have worked hard to make this issue happen. If you are a student at AIU, we encourage you to volunteer your time as an editor for the next issue. We are also always accepting new manuscripts and creative works; so if you have a work you are particularly proud of, please send it to us (see the call for submissions at the end of this issue)!

With warm wishes,

Paul Chamness Miller, Ph.D. and Cu-Hullan Tsuyoshi McGivern

Faculty Advisors

December, 2015

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| <i>North Korea-Japan Relations: The Problem of Colonization Compensation</i> | 1 |
| <i>Tomoyo Ido</i> | |
| <i>Evaluation of the Role of Religion in the Process of Democratisation: The Case of Egypt</i> | 12 |
| <i>Theodora Ralli</i> | |
| <i>Evaluating the Causes of Palestinian Refugee Crisis 1948-1949</i> | 19 |
| <i>Natsumi Morita</i> | |
| <i>Japanese Leadership Competency: Relationship Management Skills as Global Leaders</i> | 25 |
| <i>Hidenori Matsuura</i> | |
| <i>Public Display of Affection: Comparison of Attitudes between Japanese Returnees and Non-Returnees</i> | 41 |
| <i>Tatsuki Suzuki</i> | |
| <i>[Book Review] Talking at Cross-Purposes: The Dynamics of Miscommunication</i> | 49 |
| <i>Kazuki Tokoro</i> | |

North Korea-Japan Relations: The Problem of Colonization Compensation

Tomoyo Ido

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and Japan currently do not have diplomatic relations. There are several problems to be solved before the two countries can establish diplomatic relations. For example, first, there is the compensation problem. In the past, North Korea has demanded compensation from Japan for their colonization from 1910 to 1945. However, should Japan be responsible for paying compensation, and if so, how much should it pay? Another related issue is that of the notion of a "legitimate Korea." Is the Republic of Korea (South Korea) the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula? If it is, what should North Korea and Japan do in order to normalize diplomatic relations? Additionally, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons. If Japan were to normalize relations with North Korea, what should its position be as a state which does not possess nuclear weapons? Should North Korea give up its nuclear weapons? Should Japan make this request a condition before opening diplomatic relations? Lastly, there is the abduction issue. North Korea has admitted that it has abducted Japanese citizens in the past. Some of these abductees have come back to Japan, but many others have not. Some of the Japanese public refuses to have diplomatic relations with North Korea until the abduction issue is completely resolved. Given the number of complicated issues related to the relationship between Japan and North Korea, and in an effort to narrow the topic, the focus of this paper is on this compensation issue and the "legitimate Korea" issue, which are related to each other.

A Brief History of Korea and Japan

In the beginning of the 20th century, there was only one state on the Korean Peninsula: the Korean Empire. In 1910, Japan, then the Empire of Japan, annexed Korea. Japan continued to rule Korea until the end of WWII. After Japan's defeat, Korea was divided into two by the United States and the Soviet Union: southern Korea being an American protectorate, and northern Korea being a Soviet protectorate.¹ In 1948, the government of the Republic of Korea was established in the south while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established in the North. Even after the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953, the Korean Peninsula still remains divided by the 38th parallel today.

¹ Levinson and Christensen, 392.

History of North Korea-Japan Relations From WWII Until Today

Since the establishment of DPRK in 1948 with Kim Il Sung as the leader, some Japanese nationals have had informal contact with North Korea. For example, a group of Japanese Diet (parliament) members visited North Korea from Oct. 18 to 20, 1955.² Furuya Sadao headed the group and consisted of Japanese Diet members who belonged to the Japan Socialist Party (Nippon Shakai Tou), which was not the ruling party. Figures such as the then North Korean President Kim Il Sung and the then Foreign Minister Nam Il met with the Japanese group. In the joint declaration they released on Oct. 20, they called for the normalization of the two countries, and agreed to make an effort for bilateral trade and cultural exchanges to begin.

In the same month of October 1955, another group of Japanese Diet members visited North Korea from the 26th to the 29th.³ This group, headed by Hoashi Kei, also consisted of Diet members who belonged to the Japan Socialist Party. They, too, met with Kim Il Sung and Nam Il. Some other political figures from the North Korean government had talks with the group as well. This second group of Japanese Diet members also issued a joint declaration with the Supreme People's Assembly and called for the normalization of the relations between the two countries, better access to North Korea for the Koreans residing in Japan, an agreement concerning communication and so forth.

Later, in 1989⁴ and 1990,⁵ other politicians of the Japan Socialist Party visited North Korea. Neither these politicians nor the groups that visited North Korea in 1955 officially represented the Japanese government since they belonged to a political party that was not the ruling party in Japan. In September 1990, however, delegations from the then Japanese ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) visited North Korea together with delegations from the opposition party, Japan Socialist Party⁶. During their visit from September 24 to 28, they held joint talks with delegations from the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). The LDP delegation was led by Kanemaru Shin, the Japan Socialist Party delegation by Tanabe Makoto, and the WPK delegation by Kim Yong Sun. The three parties issued a joint declaration on September 28. The declaration states that "the three parties consider that Japan should fully and officially apolog[ize] and compensate to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the

² "Nicchou Kokkou ..."

³ "Nicchou Kokkou ..."

⁴ Okonogi, 198.

⁵ Ibid., 199.

⁶ The People's Korea.

enormous misfortunes and miseries imposed upon the Korean people for 36 years and the losses inflicted upon the Korean people in the ensuing 45 years after the war. In his personal letter [t]o President Kim Il Sung, President Kaifu Toshiki of the LDP admitted that there was an unfortunate past imposed by Japan upon Korea." The preceding Prime Minister Takeshita had expressed "deep remorse and regret over such unfortunate past" in the Diet in 1989, and the then Prime Minister Kaifu wrote that he "share[d] his view." Kanemaru also expressed apology for Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. The joint declaration emphasizes that "the three parties consider that in connection with the establishment of the diplomatic relations, full compensations should be made by the Japanese government for the past 36-year-long colonial rule and the losses inflicted upon the DPRK people in the ensuing 45 years." Furthermore, the declaration states that "diplomatic relations [must] be established as soon as possible." Another important part of this declaration is that "the three parties consider that Korea is one and that the peaceful reunification through north-south dialogue accords with the national interests of the Korean people." Although Kanemaru was not an official government representative who belonged to the decision-making center, he was an able politician,⁷ and the fact that a group of Diet members of the ruling party took part in the declaration is historically significant. This visit in 1990 can be considered as a "semi-official" visit.

As a result of the Japanese visit to North Korea in 1990, preparatory discussions for the negotiations for normalization began in North Korea in November that year⁸. The first official normalization talks started in January 1991⁹. In the opening statement, the North Korean Chief Representative, Chon In Chol, demanded that "Japan make complete reparations for the war time experience between Japan and Korea, satisfy property rights requests and pay compensation for the colonial and post-colonial periods."¹⁰ The Japanese representative, Nakahira Noboru, however, only acknowledged "property demands for the pre-war and during-war periods,"¹¹ as "North Korea and Japan were not in state of war."¹² Nakahira also stated that the normalization should be consistent with the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea signed in 1965. The succeeding rounds of normalization talks continued in Tokyo and in Beijing. Many issues prevented the negotiation from proceed-

⁷ Okonogi, 198.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 205.

⁹ Matsumoto, 33.

¹⁰ Okonogi, 206.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹² Matsumoto, 33.

ing smoothly. For example, Japan demanded that North Korea accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but North Korea made a counter demand for simultaneous inspection of the U.S. military facilities.¹³ In the third round, North Korea proposed that they normalize relations with Japan as soon as they agree on "the basic issue of diplomatic normalization," and discuss all other issues after they have normalized relations.¹⁴ Japan rejected this proposal.

In September 1991, both the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the DPRK joined the United Nations. In the fifth round of the normalization talks, North Korea altered its demands and merely asked for compensation for the acts inflicted on the Korean people by the colonial control of Japan.¹⁵ It did not mention compensation for the post-war period. In January 1992, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea agreed to accept IAEA inspections. The international community, including Japan, held hope to make sure North Korea was not developing nuclear weapons. However, Japan could not completely eliminate its suspicions against North Korea, and demanded that North Korea put declarations and agreements into effect. There is another issue that was posed by Japan to North Korea involving a Japanese woman with the Korean name of "Li Un Hye." She is thought to have taught Japanese, after she was abducted and taken to North Korea by a North Korean terrorist, Kim Hyon Hee. Japan asked North Korea to investigate the details about Li Un Hye. But North Korea denied Japan's assumption, and with the nuclear inspection issue on top of that, the normalization talks stopped in its 8th round in November 1992.¹⁶

In 1993, North Korea refused IAEA's inspections and announced that it will withdraw from the IAEA¹⁷ and from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)¹⁸ (although it did not actually withdraw for several years). After the normalization talks had stopped in 1992, there were several movements for restarting the talks in spite of the hostile attitude of North Korea. For example, groups of Japanese Diet members visited North Korea in 1995 and 1997.¹⁹ Despite these movements, the normalization talks did not restart until 2000.

After former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's visit to North Korea in 1999, the normalization talks were resumed in April 2000 in Pyongyang. In the ninth round

¹³ Okonogi, 206.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 207.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 209.

¹⁶ Okonogi, 210.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 212.

¹⁸ Huntley.

¹⁹ Matsumoto, 34.

of normalization talks, North Korea gave priority to the issue of "settlement of the past," which was compensation and apology for the colonial rule. Japan quoted Murayama's speech made in 1995 when he was in the position of Prime Minister:

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.²⁰

The Japanese representatives at the normalization talks said that they take the same stance as Murayama concerning the "settlement of the past." Japan's emphases were on the nuclear issue and missiles-that North Korea should accept inspections of nuclear facilities and stop developing and deploying missiles. North Korea's response to this was that the nuclear issue was a problem between North Korea, the U.S, and the IAEA, and that this was of no concern to Japan. With Japan further raising other issues such as the abduction case, the negotiations did not proceed productively, and were once again suspended after the 11th round in October 2000.²¹

From 2001 to 2002, some office-level discussions took place to improve the two countries' relations, and in August 2002, then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announced that he was going to visit North Korea.²² He felt that the "relations will not improve unless the leaders of the two countries exchange opinions." As the very first Japanese Prime Minister to visit DPRK, Koizumi visited North Korea on September 17, 2002. When Japan posed the abduction issue, then Chairman Kim Jong Il admitted that North Koreans had abducted Japanese citizens and apologized.²³ Kim Jong Il and Koizumi signed the "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration."²⁴ The declaration states that "establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK ...would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region."

²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

²¹ Matsumoto, 35.

²² Ibid., 36.

²³ Matsumoto, 37.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

There are four sections in this declaration. In the first section, North Korea and Japan said that "they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002." The second section is related to the "settlement of the past." Japan expressed "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" over the "tremendous damage and suffering" caused by Japan in the past. North Korea and Japan agreed to "mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945" when the bilateral relationship is normalized. Both sides agreed that Japan should provide to North Korea economic co-operation after the normalization. The "economic co-operation" includes "grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations."²⁵ Furthermore, both sides agreed that "other loans and credits ... with a view to supporting private economic activities" should be provided to North Korea, and the status of Korean residents in Japan should be discussed as well. The third section states that "[w]ith respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents ... would never happen in the future." It is assumed that this is referring to the abduction issue. Finally, in the fourth section, the declaration states that "for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements," and the two countries will resolve problems including nuclear and missile issues through dialogue. The North Korean side also expressed its intent to "further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003." The Pyongyang Declaration was a significant step forward in the North Korea-Japan relations and also for the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.

After the successful meeting of the leaders of North Korea and Japan, five of the Japanese citizens who were abducted in North Korea returned to Japan in October 2002. North Korea-Japan relations seemed to be improving, but it deteriorated after the 12th round of the normalization talks held in late October. The five abductees were originally planned to stay in Japan for one or two weeks and go back to North Korea, but the Japanese government did not send them back.²⁶ This stiffened North Korea's attitude and normalization talks have not taken place since then.

In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, restarted their nuclear reactor in Nyongbyon and conducted missile tests.²⁷ North Korea has become nearly isolated in international politics.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Matsumoto, 40.

²⁷ Matsumoto, 43.

The Case of South Korea-Japan Relations

On June 22, 1965, South Korea and Japan established the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.²⁸ Diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan were established by this treaty (Article I). In Article II of the treaty, South Korea and Japan "confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." In Article III, the two countries "confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195(III) of the United Nations General Assembly." Here, the article specifies that it is "the only lawful Government in *Korea*," not "*on the Korean Peninsula*." Thus, we cannot know for sure if it meant "on the whole Korean Peninsula" or "on the southern half of the peninsula," although many scholars such as Quinones interpret this as "on the whole Korean Peninsula."²⁹ Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly also fails to specify the area and states "in Korea."³⁰ Although the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea states that "the English text shall prevail" "[i]n case of any divergence of interpretation," it is noteworthy that the Korean text of this treaty includes different wording from the English text. The Korean text says "한반도에 있어서의 유일한 합법 정부임을 확인한다"³¹ (Hanbandoe isseoseoe yuilhan happeop jeongbuimeul hwaginhandanda)," which directly translated says "only lawful government *on the Korean Peninsula*." The Japanese text uses wording similar to that of the English text, "朝鮮にある唯一の合法的な政府"³² (Chousen ni aru yuiitsu no gouhouteki na seifu)," which directly translated states "only lawful government *in Korea*." As mentioned earlier, the treaty states that the English text prevails, however, misunderstandings may occur depending on which text one sees.

On the same day the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed, the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed³³ (hereinafter "Property and Claims Agreement"). This agreement states that Japan shall give South Korea \$300 million (USD) in grants within ten years

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 241

²⁹ Quinones, 75.

³⁰ United Nations, 25.

³¹ "Daehanmingukgwa Ilbongukkane Kibonkwangyee Kwanhan Joyak."

³² "Nipponkoku to Daikanminkoku ", 238.

³³ United Nations, 258.

and extend long-term and low-interest loans up to \$200 million. Furthermore, the agreement states that the "problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals ... and concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their nationals ... is settled completely and finally." This means that Korea would no longer press compensation claims against Japan. By the end of 1975, Japan has completed providing the above grants and loans to South Korea.³⁴ The stance of the Foreign Ministry of Japan is that there is no need to provide reparation to Korea since Korea and Japan were not in state of war.³⁵ Although it is not written officially in the Property and Claims Agreement, Japan's grants and loans acted as compensation to South Korea for the colonial rule.

Conclusion

Given all the information above, when we consider North Korea and Japan normalizing their relations, first, the two countries must decide whether or not Japan should give money to North Korea. As mentioned earlier, North Korea and Japan agreed in 2002 that Japan will provide economic co-operation after normalization. They also agreed to "mutually waive all their property and claims" when diplomatic relations are established. This means that North Korea, which had been demanding compensation, and Japan decided to follow the example of South Korea-Japan relations, and virtually substitute grants and loans for compensation.

Some may argue that Japan should not provide grant aid or loans to North Korea because Japan officially stated in 1965 that South Korea was the only lawful government in Korea, and Japan has already provided grants and loans to that "legitimate Korea." This argument is not valid for two reasons. First, the lines in Article III of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea claiming that "the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea" are obsolete and do not match today's situation and are, thus, inappropriate. These lines were based on Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 195 (III) also declares that the government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful government in Korea,³⁶ but this statement is not valid anymore. Resolution 195 (III) was adopted in 1948, when neither of the Koreas were members of the United Nations. Inter-Korean dialogue took place in 1972, and since both North and South Korea joined the United Nations in 1991 and gained international recognition, it can be said that the situation has changed and Resolution 195 (III) is

³⁴ "Nikkan Seikyuuken • Keizai Kyouryoku Kyoutei no Jisshi Shuuryou ni tsuitenno Kiji Shiryou."

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

³⁶ United Nations, 25.

not valid anymore. Since the basis of the lines of Article III is not valid anymore, South Korea and Japan should rewrite Article III. The second reason is that it is simply not fair for the North Korean people if Japan does not give any grants to them. South Korean people have had the opportunity to utilize Japan's grants and loans, so the North Korean people should have the same opportunity, too. To be fair, Japan should give and lend the same amount of money to North Korea as it did to South Korea.

In the joint declaration issued by the three parties in 1990, they considered "Korea is one." If Japan is to have diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea, this line must be revised. Since there is no such description in the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration, it may be assumed that North Korea and Japan discarded the 1990 declaration, but we must be careful to avoid anything that might obstruct the normalization procedure. The joint declaration of 1990 was issued by the three parties and the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration by the two governments. Since the bodies that signed them are different, it is not entirely clear whether the joint declaration of 1990 is invalid. It is safer for the three parties to rewrite or nullify the joint declaration of 1990. The same argument can be adapted to the line demanding compensation in the joint declaration.

Although normalization talks have not resumed, the Japanese government's basic policy remains the same; it aims to "normalize the relationship with North Korea."³⁷ Since 1955, Japanese politicians have had contact with North Korea. Japan should gather and study all its information and experiences in order to create an effective strategy for peaceful normalization. Japan has had enough experiences and talks with North Korea to do so. North Korea, on the other hand, must comply with international law and agreements and cooperate with Japan instead of jeopardizing the Northeast Asian region. Hostile actions including the missile launch such as the 2012 missile launch will not bring any good to any country. Instead, peaceful North Korea-Japan relations will contribute to the peace and stability of the whole Northeast Asian region.

Bibliography

Huntley, Wade L. "North Korea & the NPT: The Problems for International Security Posed by North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions Receive Abundant Attention and Analysis," ed. John Gershman, Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2005.
http://www.fpif.org/reports/north_korea_the_npt
 Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia. "Nicchou Kokkou Seijouka ni Kansuru

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

- Ryokoku Giindan Kyoudou Seimei, Dai Ichiji Seimei (Joint Declaration about Japan-North Korea Relations Normalization by Both Countries' Parliament Members, First Declaration)." Tokyo: University of Tokyo, last accessed February 8, 2016,
<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19551020.D1J.html>
- "Nicchou Kokkou Seijouka ni Kansuru Ryokoku Giindan Kyoudou Seimei, Dai Ni Seimei (Joint Declaration about Japan-North Korea Relations Normalization by Both Countries' Parliament Members, Second Declaration)." Tokyo: University of Tokyo, last accessed February 8, 2016,
<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19551029.D1J.html>
- "Nikkan Seikyuuken - Keizai Kyouryoku Kyoutei no Jisshi Shuuryou ni tsuiteno Kiji Shiryou (Document about the Completion of Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation)." Tokyo: University of Tokyo, last accessed February 8, 2016,
<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19751216.O1J.html>
- Levinson, David, and Karen Christensen, eds. *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia, Volume 3*. New York: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2002.
- Matsumoto, Hideki. "Nicchou Kokkou Seijouka Koushou no Keii to Chousen Hantou wo Meguru Saikin no Doukou (The Progress of Japan-North Korea Normalization Negotiation and Recent Movements around the Korean Peninsula)." No. 631. Tokyo: Research and Legislative Reference Bureau, National Diet Library, 2003.
http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/refer/200308_631/063102.pdf
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Republic of Korea. "Daehanmingukwa Ilbongukkane Kibonkwangyee Kwanhan Joyak (Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan)." 1965.
http://www.mofat.go.kr/incboard/faimsif/treaty_popup.jsp?ITEM_ID=0CD17E7E23A2E5BA4925664E002D778C&ITEM_PARENT_ID=5E56D27A0932DA2D492565FF0002D956
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration." 2002.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html
- "Japan-North Korea Relations." Last modified November, 2015.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html

- "Nipponkoku to Daikanminkoku tonō Aida no Kihon Kankei ni Kansuru Jouyaku (Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea)."
<http://www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdf/A-S40-237.pdf>
- "7. Nippon no Gutaiteki Sengo Shori (Baishou, Zaisan • Seikyuuken Mondai) (Japan's Concrete Post-War Process (Issues of Reparation, Properties and Claims))."
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/qa/shiryo/shiryo_06.html
- "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 'On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End' (15 August 1995)." 2014.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>
- Okonogi, Masao. "Japan's Policy toward North Korea: Diplomatic Normalization Talks and the Nuclear Inspection Issue." In *Foreign Relations of North Korea During Kim Il Sung's Last Days*, edited by Doug Joong Kim, 193-221. Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1994.
- Quinones, C. Kenneth. "Japan's Engagement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1990-2000." In *Korea in the 21st Century*, edited by Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak, 71-105. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001.
- The People's Korea. "Joint Declaration Issued by WPK, LDP & JSP." 1997.
<http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/>
- United Nations. "195 (III). The Problem of the Independence of Korea." Last accessed February 8, 2016,
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/195\(III\)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/195(III)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION)
- United Nations Treaty Collection. Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. No. 8473. Geneva, 1965.
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/v583.pdf>

Evaluation of the Role of Religion in the Process of Democratisation: The Case of Egypt

Theodora Ralli

The Arab Revolutions that began in 2011 have initiated a struggle for democracy in some countries in the region of the Middle East and North Africa. Two years later, instability and continuous turbulence are the main characteristics of the countries' political and social scene. The existence of the vast majority of Muslims in these countries has triggered discussions about the role of religion in the establishment of democratic systems. In this essay the case of the role of religion in the Egypt's transition to democracy will be examined, for a number of reasons. Firstly, Egypt is one of the countries in the region where the authoritarian regime has ended by overthrowing the ruler. Also, there have already been parliamentary and presidential elections where the population decided democratically to elect their government. This shows that some steps have already been taken towards democracy. Secondly, Islam is the religion of the vast majority of the people, as it is in most of the countries in the region.

In order to assess the role of religion in Egypt's transition to democracy, one has to decide which aspects of religion are going to take into account, and to indicate the processes and the situations that lead to the establishment of a democratic system. In this case, the aspects of religion or aspects connected to religion that seem to be of importance within the current context are the religious actors as well as the Islamic principles and their influence on the revolution and on the transitional process in general.

Islam is understood as a religion that has a strong historical connection with political history. Being a religion based on laws, it influences not only the individual's morality, but also the social and political organisation of some countries that have a majority of Muslims.¹ It has often been claimed however that Islam is incompatible with democracy. As John Anderson has stated, "with regard to Islam it was argued that reliance on a fixed religious text and quasi-legal ordinances, the emphasis on divine sovereignty, and the supposed lack of distinction between the religious and the political realm, all worked against democratic development"²

¹ Tessler, M., 'Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries', pp. 337-354 in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34, No3, April 2002

² As stated in John Anderson's article 'Does God Matter, and If So Whose God: Religion and Democratization', in *Democratization*, Vol. 11, Issue 4, August 2004

According to a survey, the Egyptian people believe that Islam is playing a major role in the public life and the majority of them believe rules of the state should strictly follow the Quran³. However, the revolutions did not start from religious groups nor because people were demonstrating driven by a specific ideology connected with Islamic values. They were frustrated because of the economic situation, the high rate of unemployment, especially among educated young people⁴, and the corruption and injustice of the government of Hosni Mubarak. The protesters were demanding economic and social changes, respect for their rights and dignity and democracy.⁵

Religious actors, however, played a significant role especially after Mubarak was overthrown. As in other Arab countries, the Muslim movements were marginalised by the government of the authoritarian regime in order to prevent them from gaining political power. Moreover, the rulers were concerned about the affect of their Islamic principles on the economic and socio-political situation and their own power.⁶ In fact, in the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, there was an article outlawing religious parties.⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood, which is a religious and social movement, gained power among the civilians through providing with a system of wide-ranging social programs. The members were engaged with social work mostly in the impoverished neighborhoods of Egyptian cities, especially in the sectors of health and education.⁸

³ According to survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2011 and 2012. After the Revolutions, 60% of Egyptians believe that the laws should follow strictly the Quran, whereas 32% believes that they should follow the values and principles of Islam.

www.pewglobal.org

⁴ Egypt's unemployment rate rose from 9 percent in 2010 to 12.4 percent in 2011. A whopping 77 percent of Egypt's unemployed are between the ages of 15 and 29. Over 80 percent of unemployed people have at least a high school diploma and a third have a university degree. These facts come from the Egyptian official statistics agency CAPMAS, as presented in the site of ahram online. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/69356.aspx>

⁵ For the 71% of Egyptians in 2011 and 67% in 2012, Democracy is preferable. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/>

⁶ Roger, O., *State, Power and Politics in the making of the modern Middle East, 2nd Edition*, London: Routledge, 2000

⁷ Article 5 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt as retrieved from <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208>

⁸ As read in the article EGYPT: Social Programmes bolster appeal of Muslim Brotherhood retrieved from <http://www.irinnews.org/report/26150/egypt-social-programmes-bolster-appeal-of-muslim-brotherhood>

As Heggy Tarek, a liberal Egyptian author and political thinker argues, "the Muslim Brotherhood, before the Revolution, is well regarded by the average Egyptian, who equates the government with autocracy, corruption and repression. The group is seen as less corrupt and more supporting for people, and serving them in the real arena of need -health and education." The people's support was obvious at the election of 2012, when the Freedom and Justice party that was created by the Muslim Brotherhood won with 51.73%.

Their electoral win, however, had little to do with their Islamic ideology and its significance for the people. As Olivier Roy states in his article "The Transformation of the Arab World," the voters' choice was not driven by religious reasons. The two first parties, the Freedom and Justice Party and the Al-Nour Party, won because of their deep roots in the society, the regaining of their legitimacy after decades of repression, the Islamic values that are shared by most of the populace, and because they were considered as less corruptive than the previous regime.⁹ Furthermore, it should be stated that the other option in the presidential election was voting for the retired Commander of the Egyptian Air Forces, Ahmed Shafiq, who had strong connections with the previous regime, and people associated him with a new era of authoritarian governance. Islamists were perceived as a viable option that could lead to positive changes, not only in economy and social welfare, but also in the transitional process towards democracy, by taking away powers from the military forces.

Looking at these two political parties' agendas, the Freedom And Justice Party and the Al-Nour Party, reveals their Islamic background and values, as well as the Islamic-related goals that they set. They both support a state with Islam as its religion and Islamic law as the source of legislation.¹⁰ The power that they achieved through the ballot-box caused fear for the establishment of an Islamic State to people coming from religious minorities like the Coptic Christians. According to Heggy Tarek, Islamists consider the Islamic model of governance, a state where the legal source is the sharia, which is the moral and religious code of Islam, as a viable alternative to the modern state system where Islamic values are not seen as that important.¹¹

Fears that Egypt would be converted to an Islamic State were not confirmed. The mere fact that Islamists rose to power through the election did not imply a transition

⁹ Olivier Roy, 'The Transformation of the Arab World', pp 5-18 in *Journal of Democracy*, volume 23, number 3, July 2012

¹⁰ The political agendas of the two Egyptian parties were found in the Guide to Egypt's Transition in <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/>

¹¹ From the text written by Heggy Tarek as read in 'Political Islam versus modernity.' <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1113/op4.htm>

to a system where Islam influences the government. The aftermath of Morsi's election proves that. Egyptian people were quickly disappointed because the prosperity that he promised through revitalizing the economy did not come. One of the reasons that sparked the revolutions in 2011 was the bad economic situation that a lot of Egyptians were experiencing, which had its roots in the bad economic policy of the regime. Strong economy is considered as important as achieving democracy by the Egyptian populace.¹² The failure of the Islamist government to change the economic decision-making process and boost the economy led to new protests, this time asking from Morsi to resign. The people of Egypt did not want to settle down with a government that, although elected through fair and democratic processes, failed to keep its pre-electoral promises and to implement effective policies to repair Egypt's shattered economy. Despite the Islam-orientated efforts of the Freedom and Justice Party¹³, the effectiveness of the government to provide solutions for significant issues of everyday life, is highly regarded by the Egyptians.

As mentioned in the article of Olivier Roy, "The transformation of the Arab world", the shifting of Egyptian people's political choices and the inactive support for a more Islamic state by the majority of the population, could be explained by the new perceptions of Islamic values, especially by the new generations of Muslims, which can be included in the term of Asef-Bayat, post-Islamism. Post-Islamism could explain the lack of devotion to Islamic parties by the population, as well as the policy of the same parties. The term post-Islamism has been used initially to describe the new social and intellectual trends and movements that began to appear in post-Khomeini Iran, which includes changes in the ideas, approaches and practices of Islamism. It expresses the attempt of Muslims to combine the values and teachings of Islamic religion with the values that are not traditionally connected with Islam, like democracy and individual rights. The goals and the wishes of Egyptian people could be characterized as examples and expression of post-Islamism.¹⁴ In Egypt, a strong desire for specific

¹² According to a survey conducted by the Pew research Centre, and presented in <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/>

¹³ President Morsi issued an Islamist-backed draft constitution and called for a referendum. The members of the Constitutional Assembly complained about large representation of Islamists and the others and about the formers wanting to impose their own views.

<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/feb/07/egypt-rule-brotherhood/?pagination=false>

¹⁴ The concept of Post-Islamism as explained by Asef Bayat in this extract text presenting a lecture of his at the University of Leiden

https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17030/ISIM_16_What_is_Post?sequence=1

democratic rights and institutions was expressed during the uprisings, such as competitive multi-party elections and freedom of speech.¹⁵ The Revolution was not guided by any specific political or social group with a concrete ideology, let alone an Islamic figurehead. The protesters came from diverse backgrounds and mobilized against power demanding respect for their fundamental rights as citizens. It seems that the uprisings were the ultimate expression of a new mindset that appeared in the whole Arab World and went beyond the aspect of religion. People seem to have started searching for answers to their political and social issues outside the frame of religion. This new development could be considered as reflected in a survey conducted by Gallup that began in 2001 and finished in 2008. The results indicate that the vast majority of Muslims around the world desire western democracy and freedoms. As one of the researchers pointed out, most Muslims admire some aspects of western democracies but they want self-determination and not a democracy imposed by external actors. They want neither secularism nor theocracy, but rather a democratic system with religious values.¹⁶

This change can be detected not only in the Egyptian civil society, but also in the policy, the ideology, and the action of the Islamic political actors in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest, most influential and organized Islamic opposition was not in the front lines of the Revolution. During the first days of the uprisings, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood did not participate. When they joined the protesters, they did not try to give to the Revolution a religious coloring. Instead, they joined the revolutions along with other groups of different political, ideological or social backgrounds, as Egyptian citizens who were demanding their rights and desired significant positive changes in the political system. After Mubarak was overthrown and the Muslim Brotherhood formed a political party in order to run for the elections, it was clear from their political agenda that they wanted to establish a democratic system, which would function within the framework of Islamic Law. They focused, however, on the difference between any Western democratic country and an Islamic democratic one. The model of "Islamic governance" that the Muslim Brothers implemente is the AKP in Turkey, which has governed that country since November

¹⁵ According to the same survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre, as presented in <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/>

¹⁶ From the Gallup poll as presented in <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7267100.stm>. The survey was the most important to that date at investigating perceptions, ideology and desires of more than 50.000 Muslims in 35 nations. One of the researchers is John Esposito, professor of Islamic Studies at Georgetown University in Washington.

2002. This Islamic party has, amid much and continuing political controversy, implemented important reforms that have had an overall democratizing effect.¹⁷

One should bear in mind, however that there are the several kinds of Islamists, Islamic ideologies and dogmas. These different ideologies were transformed into different political programs from several Egyptian Islamic parties and have triggered disputes between them, as in the case of the former allies of the Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Nour, the largest political group to emerge from the ultraconservative Salafist movement.¹⁸ It can be said that the disputes on the grounds of religious differences among the religious actors in Egypt hinder the transition to democracy by suspending decision-making processes or resulting in the implementation of retrogressive measures.

Concluding, it can be said that Islam's role in shaping the political scene in Egypt is important, judging by the strong presence of religious parties in social-political life as well as by their rising to power through democratic elections. However, apart from the religious actors, an obviously important position in the political arena, there are other equally important actors, such as the military forces and the civil society. It should be noted that people in Egypt, whether political actors or not, have no experience in the establishing of a democratic system. However, it is clear that they struggle for a democratic state with strong economy and respect for the individual rights of the citizens, which shows that individual and democratic values are highly regarded by the civil society. Egypt seems to have a long way to go concerning the establishment of a democratic system; however, it seems like the final word will not come from the side of political Islam.

Bibliography

- Anderson, J., 'Does God matter, and if so whose God? religion and democratization', pp 192-217 in *Democratization*, Vol. 11, Issue 4, August 2004
- Choueiri, Y., M., *Understanding the Contemporary Middle East, Revised Edition*, London: Pinter, 1997
- Olivier, R., 'The Transformation of the Arab World', pp 5-18 in *Journal of Democracy*, volume 23, number 3, July 2012

¹⁷ Speech by Farouk Musa during Tariq Ramadan's Event "Post-Islamist Revolutions" at the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) on 15 July 2012, as found in <http://www.bonology.com/2012/07/arab-awakening.html>

¹⁸ Definition provided by the author of the article 'A Deadly Gamble: Egypt's Salafists May Now Regret Support for the Military' <http://world.time.com/2013/08/20/after-crackdown-on-islamists-egypts-salafists-may-now-regret-support-for-the-military/#ixzz2lVi0zgAE>

Roger, O., *State, Power and Politics in the making of the modern Middle East*, 2nd Edition, London: Routledge, 2000

Stepan, A., Linz, J., J., 'Democratisation Theory and the 'Arab Spring'', pp 15-30 in *Journal of Democracy*, volume 24, Number 2, April 2013

Tessler, M., 'Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries', pp. 337-354 in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34, No3, April 2002

Evaluating the Causes of Palestinian Refugee Crisis 1948-1949

Natsumi Morita

Over the course of decades, there have been drastic changes in the purported causes for the Palestinian refugee issue among scholars. The emergence of the New Historians, along with the declassification of the Israeli archives in relation to the war of 1948 added a new paradigm to this argument.¹ Notwithstanding the opening of these documents, the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem are still greatly contested and debated among scholars, evidently between Israel and Palestinian sides.

The aim of this essay is to assess the causal factors of the Palestinian refugee crisis, which befell approximately half of the Palestinian population and which is, still today, one of the most problematic impediments to the peace process. The first part of this essay will scrutinise the repercussions of the Zionist movement to create a pure Jewish state in Palestine on the making of the refugee crisis. Next, it will go on to focus on the multitude of reasons for the flight of Palestinians from their homes and the magnitude of its impact on the refugee catastrophe. The last part of this essay will shed light on the role of the Israeli military and paramilitary organisations in facilitating the refugee catastrophe. In doing so, this essay will argue that the Palestinian refugee crisis was instigated by a mixture of the Zionist ambition to remove the native population, the flight of Palestinians due to a wide range of reasons, and the robust Israeli military and paramilitary operations fueling this crisis.

Throughout this essay, the definition of a Palestinian refugee will be those who fled their homes in Israel, not in the Mandate Palestine. Thus, this essay will be able to effectively examine the reasons which made Palestinians leave their hometowns and cities in the war of 1948.

The first part of this essay will evaluate to what extent the Zionist movement had an influence on the outcome of the Palestinian refugee crisis. The discussion of the involvement of the Zionism into the refugee catastrophe remains greatly disputed among scholars. While it is claimed by a number of scholars, including Morris, that there is no solid evidence found on the relationship between the Zionist policy and its plan of systematic expulsion of Palestinians, it seems that there are conspicuous ambitions among the Zionist leaders for the establishment of an ethnically pure Jewish

¹ Rafi Nets-Zehungut, 'Origins of the Palestinian refugee problem: Changes in the historical memory of Israel/Jews 1949-2004', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48, (2004), 235-248 (p.243).

state.² For example, Ben-Gurion's letter of 1937, to his son, reveals his aim: "The Arabs will have to go, but one needs an opportune moment for making it happen, such as a war."³ From his statement, it can be seen that the powerful leader of the Jewish community was contemplating such an idea. Concurrently, it is shown that the Jewish leaders, such as Chaim Weizmann, Menachem Ussishkin and Ze'ev Jabotinsky who supported the idea of transferring Palestinians.⁴ Throughout the pre-1948 war, the current of the Zionist movement was skewed towards the endorsement of the transfer idea. Furthermore, the enormous project called the Village Files of 1940-47, which was conducted by the Israeli intelligence activity, is filled with the information of the Palestinian villages and its inhabitants.⁵ This intelligence work, which played a critical role in the killing of the Palestinian people in the war of 1948 projects the preparedness of the Zionists to efficiently fight against and defeat the native population.

A counter-argument to the above is offered by Karsh who claims that if there was an obvious trend to support the expulsion of Palestinians among the Jewish leaders, the lack of political and operational planning of the Palestinian expulsion cannot be fully explained.⁶ It is also claimed that the Jewish leaders were aware of the difficulties to conduct the transfer of Palestinians when the proposition of transfer by the British Peel Royal Commission was abandoned in 1937.⁷ Thus, the Zionist ambitions to create a pure Jewish state were not transferred into actual operational policies by the Jewish leaders, as argued by Kadish and Sela in the case of the battle in Lydda.⁸ However, considering the circumspect nature of the Jewish leaders, who left little definite evidence of their remarks regarding the transfer of Palestinian people, the consensus of establishing a Jewish state by transferring the Palestinians was immersed within the community, which functioned as a core Jewish value and created the refugee crisis later in the future.⁹

² Benny Morris, 'For the record', *Guardian*, 14 January 2004. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/14/israel>>

³ Ilan Pappé, 'The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 36, (2006), 6-20 (p.9) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.6>> [accessed 11 November 2013]

⁴ Morris, 'For the record'.

⁵ Pappé, p.10.

⁶ Efraim Karsh, *Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians'* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p.38.

⁷ Karsh, p.39.

⁸ Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela, 'Myths and Historiography of the 1948 Palestine War Revisited: The Case of Lydda', *Middle East Journal*, 59, (2005), 617-634 (p.633) <<http://library.leeds.ac.uk/>> [accessed 17 November 2013]

⁹ Benny Morris, 'Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948', in *The War for Palestine*, ed. by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.37-56 (p.45).

In sum, the plan of removing the Palestinian population remains ambiguous on the refugee crisis with the scarce evidence of the actual Zionist policies to do so. However, the fact that it became commonplace among the Jewish leaders to hold the ambition to create a pure Jewish state cannot be undermined considering the resulting 700,000 Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the war of 1948. The refugee crisis cannot come to the fore solely due to the robust Zionist aim. In the following paragraphs, this essay will highlight the complexity of Palestinian societies which drove them to flee from their homes during the war.

The second part of this essay will assess, by focusing on the complexities of the Palestinian society, the flight of the Palestinians and the flight's magnitude which had a devastating outcome upon the Palestinian refugee catastrophe. The reasons for Palestinians to flee from their homes are diverse and cannot be related with one simple reason. For instance, in the case of Qatamon located on East Jerusalem, the fall of Qatamon and the exodus of Palestinians can partially stem from the considerable disagreement between the middle-class Christians and the rural and foreign fighters over the different views towards the war and national identity.¹⁰ The bourgeoisies in Qatamon who were dependent on the British for sustaining their lives became increasingly vulnerable due to the termination of the British Mandate in May of 1948, and the normalities of their lives began to collapse.¹¹ These two factors fuelled them to leave their homes along with the intensified bombardment.

Moreover, the narratives by Srouji offer a critical view of the refugee crisis. In his account, he mentions that there was a pervasive atmosphere among those who evacuated to Lebanon during the war that the Arab fighters would be able to defeat the Jews, and the war would be over soon so that they would be able to return to their homes.¹² This optimistic view among the Palestinians can be greatly contrasted with the Yishuv, which was ready to fight against the Palestinians by creating a national movement.¹³ Those who chose to evacuate and depend on the Arab forces rather than to remain in the Palestinian land and fight against the Jews added to the unexpected catastrophe on the Palestinian refugee issue.

¹⁰ Itamar Radai, 'The Collapse of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class in 1948: The Case of Qatamon', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43, (2007), 961-982 (p.979) <<http://library.leeds.ac.uk/>> [accessed 15 November 2013]

¹¹ Radai, p.74.

¹² Elias Srouji, 'The last days of "Free Galilee": Memories of 1948', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 33, no.1 (2003), 55-67 (p.61) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.6>> [accessed 14 November 2013]

¹³ Karsh, p. 26.

As a counter-argument to the exodus of Palestinians, some scholars claim that Palestinians left their homes due to orders from their Arab leaders during the war. However, this claim is refuted thoroughly by several scholars such as Morris and Dajani that there is no such evidence which testifies to the orders of evacuation.¹⁴ Instead, it reveals that the Arab leaders sent an order that women, children and the elderly should evacuate to the safe areas.¹⁵ In the case of Lydda, Kardish and Sela mentioned that this order developed as a momentum for men to flee in the end.¹⁶

Concludingly, the exodus of Palestinians occurred for a wide range of reasons. The internal disagreement within the Palestinian community and the passive posture towards the war compared to that of the Yishuv and rendered the refugee crisis more disastrous and untenable. However, the flight of Palestinians cannot be explained only by the faults of society's weaknesses, and the influence of increasing massacres and atrocities which drove them to flee their homes will be discussed in the following paragraph.

The third part of this essay will scrutinise the consequences of the Israeli military and paramilitary organisations in the causing of the Palestinian exodus. While a great number of operations conducted by military bodies such as the Haganah, the Palmach and the Stern Gangs were evident, the incident of Deir Yassin massacre by the Stern Gang exerted an enormously disastrous effect on the exodus of Palestinians. In the massacre, it is estimated that approximately 110 to 140 villagers were murdered in the mass killing and this news escalated the fear among the Palestinians, especially for those who were living in places where a large population of the Jews existed.¹⁷ After this massacre, a substantial amount of Palestinians determined to flee their towns and settle in a safer area out of fear of upcoming massacres and atrocities which might have befallen them. Not only in Deir Yassin, but also small yet disastrous attacks were also subsequently conducted by military organisation such as the Haganah. In Qatamon, the Haganah bombarded the Hotel Semiramis and left 18 innocent people dead and several people wounded.¹⁸ The inhabitants were spurred by the fear of being the next victim, and on the next day, the residents moved out of their houses and left the town. The massacres and indiscriminate attacks by the Jewish military and para-

¹⁴ Benny Morris, 'For the record'; Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi, 'Palestinian Refugees', in *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, ed. by Elizabeth G. Matthews (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 36-48 (p.41).

¹⁵ Morris, 'For the record'.

¹⁶ Kadish and Sela, p.620.

¹⁷ Matthew Hogan, 'The 1948 Massacre at Deir Yassin Revisited', *The Historian*, 63, (2001), pp.309-333, (p. 330).

¹⁸ Radai, p. 967.

military agencies caused the native populations to flee from their houses, which ushered the creation of the Palestinian refugee catastrophe.

Furthermore, the recurrent demolition of the villages by the military and paramilitary organisations was happening throughout Palestine after the flight of Palestinians. Although it is shown that there was a clear order in the case of Lydda to prohibit any action against destroying houses and towns of Arabs,¹⁹ the narratives offered by Souji in the northern part of Palestine demonstrates that there were such actions to avoid the returns of Palestinians.²⁰ Moreover, in Qatamon the looting of property, furniture and valuables was also widely conducted.²¹ This policy prevented the Palestinians from returning to their homes after the war, and Palestinians were determined to remain as refugees until now.

Therefore, the military and paramilitary bodies had a critical effect on escalating the fear among the Palestinians and urging them to flee from their homes and towns. In addition, demolishing Palestinian villages and towns together with looting of their property and valuables brought a definitive end to the possibility of returns for the Palestinians.

This essay has evaluated the causal factors of the Palestinian refugee crisis by focusing on three points. Firstly, the Zionist ambition to build a Jewish state in Palestine became a core Jewish value in the war of 1948. There is no clear evidence of systematic policies of the Zionists in the transfer idea; however, it is true that the Zionist movement created the basis and facilitated in effectively defeating the Palestinians in the war, which resulted in the catastrophe of Palestinian refugees.

Secondly, the reasons for Palestinians to flee greatly varied and each of them help to fuel the refugee crisis. During the war of 1948, the weaknesses of the Palestinian society became critical to the extent that half of the Palestinian population became refugees in the aftermath of the war.

Thirdly, there was a great influence of the military and paramilitary bodies on the flight of the Palestinians. Ranging from the massacre in Deir Yassin to the bombardment in Qatamon, these attacks intensified the fear among the Palestinians and caused a massive number of people to leave their hometown and houses. Even though they could have returned to their homes after the war, the demolition of their towns and houses together with the looting of their property that took place that it forced them to remain as refugees.

¹⁹ Kadish and Sela, p. 629.

²⁰ Srouji, p. 64.

²¹ Radai, p. 977.

In conclusion, the cases of the Palestinian refugee catastrophe cannot be explained in one simple reason. Rather, the three points mentioned above are greatly essential to offering a solid understanding of what caused the Palestinian refugee crisis.

Bibliography

- Dajani Daoudi, S. Mohammed, 'Palestinian Refugees', in *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, ed. by Elizabeth G. Matthews (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 36-48.
- Hogan, Matthew, 'The 1948 Massacre at Deir Yassin Revisited', *The Historian*, 63,(2001), pp. 309-333.
- Kadish, Alon, and Sela, Avraham, 'Myths and Historiography of the 1948 Palestine War Revisited: The Case of Lydda', *Middle East Journal*, 59, (2005), 617-634. <<http://library.leeds.ac.uk/>> [accessed 17 November 2013]
- Karsh, Efraim, *Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians'* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
- Morris, Benny, 'For the record', *Guardian*, 14 January 2004. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/14/israel>>
- Morris, Benny, 'Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948', in *The War for Palestine*, ed. by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 37-56.
- Nets-Zehungut, Rafi, 'Origins of the Palestinian refugee problem: Changes in the historical memory of Israel/Jews 1949-2004', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48, (2004), 235-248.
- Pappe, Ilan, 'The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 36, (2006), 6-20. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.6>> [accessed 11 November 2013]
- Radai, Itamar, 'The Collapse of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class in 1948: The Case of Qatamon', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43, (2007), 961-982. <<http://library.leeds.ac.uk/>> [accessed 15 November 2013]
- Srouji, Elias, 'The last days of "Free Galilee": Memories of 1948', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 33, (1) (2003), 55-67. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.6>> [accessed 14 November 2013]

Japanese Leadership Competency: Relationship Management Skills as Global Leaders-

Hidenori Matsuura

Introduction

Globalization is a worldwide phenomenon. Goods, technology, food, energy, and information move across national borders with historically unprecedented speed, even on the isolated island, Japan. Most importantly, the movement of the people is considered a significant factor in global change. Human resources (especially in the business world), considered significantly influential in leading this globe, guiding the world towards a better planet, are named as "Global Leaders." They are considered to be sensitive to the changes of the demands of this world, efficient at working within that context, and successful as supreme representatives of leadership. They are the power forces many of the companies, international and domestic, desire to add to their team so that they can survive under this rapid change and harsh competition. Without global leaders, not only do business people lose their confidence, but lack the speed to compete with rising companies and countries (Turpin, 2012, p. 6). The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan (MEXT) implemented a project for promoting such global human resources development for Japanese youth. This project, according to MEXT (2014), is:

the project that aims to overcome the Japanese younger generation's 'inward tendency' and to foster human resources who can positively meet the challenges and succeed in the global field, as the basis for improving Japan's global competitiveness and enhancing the ties between nations.

This project of MEXT indicates that the demand for global human resources is not simply a matter of self-interest of one company, but rather a nationally implemented movement. The importance is to clearly acknowledge what competencies are required for such a character and how to heighten those skills.

Literature Review: Defining "Global Leaders" and Japanese "Collectivism"

First of all, before delving further, the definition of a "Global Leader" must be made clear. Kuramoto (2012, p. 232), in her writing, defines this leadership by using three big categories, suggesting eight necessary skills in total:

- the competency to understand and welcome the differences:
 1. sensitivity toward differences
 2. understanding of different culture and values
 3. flexibility to adjust to various ways of outputs

- the competency to construct things in order and proceed forward:
 4. ownership within the context of the new environment
 5. structural ability from zero-basis
 6. problem-solving capacity
- the capacity to move people with appropriate communication skills:
 7. explanatory ability with passion and logic
 8. capacity to communicate perseveringly

Tsuji (2012), in his article, requires the global human resources to have a specialty in a certain area, fundamental competencies of any working person, communication skills in a foreign language (especially English), and an understanding of different cultures and the knowledge to use these competencies (pp. 37-38). Turpin (2012) explains with rather a vague idea that global leaders need to have an open mindset. He thinks that competent leaders go out in the world, develop curiosity and open their heart to others and to a/the different culture(s). He ends by advising the reader to nurture empathy and respect for others with sympathy (p. 10).

Despite some detailed explanations, the definition is not completely made clear. From this, there seems to be no perfect definition. Nevertheless, Tamaki (2012) claims that possessing a "global mindset" is a clear way to be competent in global business. A global mindset is defined by using three main assets: perceptive, mental and social assets (p. 197). The mindset Tamaki proposes is a competency similar to what The Kozai Group, an American consulting company, uses to evaluate their workers employed within the global context. The indicator they use is called the Global Competencies Inventory (GCI) and is composed of the following three factors: Perception Management¹, Relationship Management, and Self-Management². Given these three domains within which The Kozai Group (2008) works, they point out that "the ability to create and maintain relationships with individuals in cross-cultural/global settings was found to be a key competency domain" (p. 9). The Kozai Group explains:

Relationship Management assesses people's orientation toward the importance of relationships in general; how aware they are of others and their interaction styles, values, etc., and the level of awareness they have of themselves and their impact

¹ Perception Management examines how people cognitively approach cultural differences, consisted of *Nonjudgmentalness, Inquisitiveness, Tolerance of Ambiguity, Cosmopolitanism, and Category Inclusiveness*. (2008)

² Self Management takes into account people's strength of identity and their ability to effectively manage their emotions and stress, consisted of *Optimism, Self Confidence, Self-Identity, Emotional Resilience, Non-Stress Tendency, Stress Management, and Interest Flexibility*. (2008)

on others. This dimension complements the Perception Management dimension in that it looks at how mental structures shape behaviors, especially with respect to the development of intercultural, interpersonal relationships.

Relationship Management (RM) consists of *Relationship Interest* (RI), *Interpersonal Engagement* (IE), *Emotional Sensitivity* (ES), *Self-Awareness* (SA), and *Social Flexibility* (SF) skills³. In order to examine what characteristics the Japanese must overcome in the presence of intercultural communication, this RM is very important. First of all, globalization, often seen as "westernization" (Owolabi, 2001), is already a potential cultural gap between the global context and Japanese society; secondly, the Japanese exist within an "*uchi-soto*" (insider/outsider) culture, where there is the tendency to stay within a relationship in which they have a strong emotional bond (Nakane, 1972; Peltokorpi and Clausen, 2010). Hanna and Hoffer (1989) and Swierczek and Onishi (2003) also suggest that the Japanese live and work under the expectations of the members of the same groups or organizations to which they belong. Most interestingly, Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) developed the Individualism Index Values to evaluate the individualism dimension of a society, base on a scale of 100 points. The higher the score, the more individualistic the society, with a range from 67-91 for the top 20 individualistic countries. Compared to their scores, Japan scored much lower, at only 46 points⁴. From these findings, it is important to examine more closely how Japan, being rather a collectivistic nation, navigates in a global context.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

From the above definitions and necessary skills of a global leader and the characteristics of the Japanese, there seem to be potential controversies between them. Is there any possibility for them to be sufficiently compatible? What are the specific skills the Japanese exceed in? And finally, what can the Japanese do to heighten their skills?

³ *Relationship Interest*, referring to the extent to which people exhibit interest in, and awareness of, their social environment. *Interpersonal Engagement*, referring to the degree to which people have a desire and willingness to initiate and maintain relationship with people from other cultures. *Emotional Sensitivity*, referring to the extent to which people have an awareness of, and sensitivity to, the emotions and feelings of others. *Self Awareness*, referring to the degree to which people are aware of: 1) their strengths and weaknesses in interpersonal skills, 2) their own philosophies and values, 3) how past experiences have helped shape them into who they are as a person, and 4) the impact their values and behavior have on relationships with others. *Social Flexibility*, referring to the extent to which individuals present themselves to others in order to create favorable impressions and to facilitate relationship building.

⁴ For more detail, refer *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. (Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., and Minkov, M., (2010))

The necessity of this research is to clarify the potential drawbacks the Japanese may face when attempting to become competent global human resources. Additionally, this research will look further into discovering the capacity the Japanese have that they can use to make themselves eligible to become global leaders. Thus, the research questions for this study are as follows:

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese regarding RM?
2. What can the Japanese do, as a first step, to become a global leader?
3. Do Japanese people have the potential to become global leaders?

Hypothesis 1: The Japanese Score High in Social Flexibility and Low in all the Others

According to Novinger (2001), "persons of a collective culture, such as the Japanese, tend to focus most on their appropriately positive behavior in their in-group, in order to maintain group cohesion, cooperation, and harmony." Additionally, persons within "the group is expected to look out for and take care of its individual members" (Lustig & Koester, 2003). These pieces of evidence explain that the Japanese are potentially skilled in fostering sincere relationships "once a group is formed" which, as The Kozai Group indicates, contradicts the definition of IE, that "people have a desire and willingness to initiate and maintain relationships with people from other cultures." At the same time, these explanations indicate that the Japanese are, as well, weak in RI, because they are not interested in out-groups, or the social environment. Thus, the cultural identity of the Japanese does not underlie the ability of either IE or RI.

Despite these findings, the Japanese identity does not consist of just characteristics of in-group relationship management. Doi (1985) points out one of the unique characteristics the Japanese possess: *honne* and *tatemae*. He explains how the Japanese change their attitude towards an individual with whom they feel relaxed and to whom they feel the obligation to hide true feelings. According to Doi's term, this relaxed feeling (synonyms of sincerity and honesty, in this context), is called, "*amae*" and this *amae* can be expressed to those who are *uchi* (in-group), where one is able to exhibit *honne* (inner feelings). However, *amae* does not work with *soto* people (out-group) if not for *tatemae*. And *tatemae* is a strategic tool, in a way, to express *amae* to those in the out-group so that both self and the out-group will not have an awkward interaction. Thus, the Japanese are logically aware of their appearance, meaning their strength is in SF. However, this identity works as a deficit in terms of achieving ability in showing "appropriate respect to others," displaying "both interpersonal and cultural empathy," and showing "tolerance for difference in others," which are the skills required for ES.

Nisbett (2003) looks back in history, from another point of view, to discover psychological differences between Easterners and Westerners. Easterners, including

Japanese, were historically considered as a "benign social organism where clear mutual obligations served as a guide to ethical conduct. Carrying out prescribed roles - in an organized, hierarchical system - was the essence" of daily life. In contrast, for Westerners, individual rights were "license to do as one pleased" and a way to find one's identity within the relationship of one another. This explanation of Easterners depicts how they were less aware of controlling others, as Nisbett adds. The Japanese have, historically and culturally, little concern in knowing "how their behavioral tendencies affect other people, and are not very interested in trying to understand their experiences." For Japanese, these topics are not for pondering and wondering what to do within a relationship; it is rather an obligation that comes together with interpersonal communication. Therefore, Japanese are less competent in terms of actually being aware of and heightening the specific skill of SA. Thus, the Japanese tend to have their strength in SF, and are less skilled in all other competencies. It is these premises on which the first hypothesis is based.

Hypothesis 2: Friendships Heighten the Skill

Chocce, Johnson, and Yassatorn's (2015) study show statistically that students' intercultural sensitivity is influenced by international friendships. The research of Pritchard and Skinner (2002), and Tanaka et al. (1997) support their findings. According to Pritchard et al.,

the lack of host friends is a signal of failure in the process of adaptation and adjustment to the host culture. Data also showed that these cross-cultural activities created optimum conditions for an intercultural encounter.

In contrast, while traveling is possible to experience cultural differences, one can also stay within one's values and have no opportunities to open one's mind and heart to the world. Chocce et al. found that international travel did not have a significant influence on achieving intercultural sensitivity. Thus, the first step for achieving competencies as a global leader is not necessarily going abroad, rather making friends. This idea led to the second hypothesis of this study.

Hypothesis 3: Simple International Experiences Develop Competency for Japanese and Lead to the Potential of Becoming Competent Global Leaders

From the previous findings, there appears to be little possibility for the Japanese to become competent global leaders. The importance here is to recognize the limitations: the Japanese are not culturally "emotionally sensitive" or "self-aware" (Hypothesis 1), and have less opportunities to interact with foreigners compared to many other Western nations: 7.9% of population are foreigners in England (2014), 12.9% in the US (2010), 8.8% in France (2015), whereas that of Japan is only as high as 1.6% (2013). This data clearly indicate that the Japanese are brought up in an

environment with fewer cross-cultural opportunities in which to nurture their skills. However, with more international and intercultural acquaintances and interactions, the Japanese, too, can foster their worldwide perspective, leading to higher competencies in the global context (*Hypothesis 2*). Thus, the third hypothesis is that in the right environment with ample opportunities the Japanese can develop the same competencies as their Western counterparts.

To sum up, for each research question, below are the hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The Japanese score high in Social Flexibility and low in all the others.

Hypothesis 2: By making friends, Japanese can take their first step in becoming a Global Leader.

Hypothesis 3-1: Japanese who have opportunities to major in international affairs, travelled/lived abroad, or have relations internationally score higher.

Hypothesis 3-2: Japanese have potential in becoming a Global Leader (the scores of Relationship Management differ from the background experience of each person).

Method of Research

Twenty-nine close-ended and one open-ended questions were included inside the questionnaire: 18 questions concerning RM, 3 questions concerning individualistic rate, and 9 simple questions asking, for example, the sex, major (open-ended), and whether the respondent has had experience in an overseas residency. The questionnaire was created on a website (Mr.アンケート [*Mr. Questionnaire*]), which was distributed through SNS (mostly through Facebook). Some were sent directly to the author's friends, and some of the friends were kind enough to distribute the survey to their own friends. Questions were distributed in Japanese for those who declared to have Japanese nationality.

For the first 18 questions, participants were asked to assess five categories of RM respectively (RI, IE, ES, SA, and SF). The questions were developed according to the evaluation and the explanation of The Kozai Group's (2008) "Specification of the Content Domain of the Global Competencies Inventory (GCI)." The choices given for each question were assigned a score from zero to five and then totaled. The highest score possible for each skill (PI and IE out of 15 points and ES, SA, SF out of 20) were added and converted to the index of zero to 100. The same procedure was implemented for evaluating the degree of individualism.

Results and Graphs

The survey was distributed for 15 days and 255 validated responses were collected. Of the valid responses, 59 were male and 196 were female; 95 were students at the local university; 170 were categorized as "*bunkei*" (non-scientific major, such as International Relations, Language, Education, etc.), 81 as "*rikei*" (scientific major, such as Science, Medicine, etc.), and four did not indicate their major. Thirty-two

were aged between 10 and 19 years, 220 were 20-29, one from 31-39, and two from ages 50-59 (1 high school student, 55 freshmen and sophomores, 171 juniors and seniors, five super-seniors, three graduates, 14 adults, five responded "others", and one indicated nothing). Of the 255 respondents, 158 had the daily opportunity interacting with foreigners, 201 had friends from different cultural backgrounds, about half (130) had overseas residency experiences in their life, 208 had previously travelled, and 196 had the experience of explaining about Japanese culture to others.

Below is the chart of the overall average score of all the respondents (Figure 1). This figure indicates the average competency of all the Japanese. Accordingly, the Japanese are well skilled in Interpersonal Engagement, followed by Relationship Interest. Social Flexibility and Emotional Sensitivity are at almost the same level, about ten points fewer than IE, and Self-Awareness scoring the lowest.




Figure 1. Overall Average of Respondents

Other graphs and profound analysis will be indicated according to the relating discussion and hypothesis.

Discussion

Hypothesis 1: The Japanese Score High in Social Flexibility and Low in all Others

Surprisingly, the results did not match with the expected tendency. As seen in Figure 1, IE is indicated as the strongest competency for the Japanese. At the same time, SF did not seem to be the weakest skill for them. However, interestingly, comparing the results of different situations (skills are seen within and outside of Japan) happens to result in slight differences; Figure 2 shows that the Japanese are likely to have higher SF skills more often when situated abroad. At the same time, as expected, SA is very low when inside Japan, especially compared with experiences outside the country. These findings indicate that the Japanese feel a stronger obligation to stick to their assigned social roles and oppress their desire to search for their social position

and individual standing. By doing so, the Japanese can make a better impression on others and foster healthy relationships, the favorable *tatema*.




Figure 2. Differences of Acts Inside and Outside of Japan

In contrast, when outside of Japan, because the circumstance one is facing is not usual for him or her, the person will have trouble accepting the situation. In other words, being sensitive to the feelings of people from other countries is not as simple as doing so to those with the same cultural identity, resulting in lower score in ES.

However, from the questionnaire distributed and its analysis, the reason as to why the Japanese were highly competent in IE was not clearly identifiable. One possible way to explain the above tendency is that the Japanese answered the questions according to their *tatema*, or that there is a possibility that in the domain of IE, the Japanese are able to access their *tatema*, compared to other skills. To clearly discover the reason for this tendency, comparison with the skills of other nationalities is necessary. The focus of this research focused solely on Japanese nationality, hence further comparisons cannot be made without future data.

Hypothesis 2: Friendships Heighten the Skill

The frequencies in terms of the experience of travelling and overseas residency were not completely consistent with those who scored high, which was an expected outcome. Some respondents scored very high in a certain category in spite of the lack of experience outside of Japan. As shown in Figures 3 and 4⁵, the number of mid-ranged scores does not seem to correlate with the length of experience overseas.

⁵ In the Figures, "high" meaning respondents who had their average of all five competency scores higher than 75, "mid" scoring from 43 to 74, "low" scoring up to 42. The Allotment was made according to the average score of all the examinees, divided into three ranks.

Considering the experience of traveling, two thirds of the Japanese did not have high RM skills despite having traveled abroad once. Other factors seemed to contribute to these findings.




Figure 3. Ratios of Respondents of Traveling- Abroad Experience Accordance to the Total Average Score




Figure 4. Ratios of Respondents of Living-Abroad Experience Accordance to the Total Average Score

Those who had a higher average score all had friends (Figure 5) and the experience of explaining the Japanese culture to others. Figure 6 illustrates the difference of the effects the Japanese can get from the experience of travelling and having friends. It demonstrates a clear gap between those who have friends with no overseas experience (indicated by a red line) and those who have only traveled but have no friends

or interactions (blue line). One might glean from this data that with friends, Japanese are able, first, to exchange ideas and thoughts sincerely; second, to promote intercultural understanding that cannot be easily transferred and understood other than with friends; and third, to eventually stimulate intercultural competencies.




Figure 5. Ratios of Respondents of Having Friends




Figure 6 Respondents Those Who Only Have Friends and Those Who Only Traveled

Hypothesis 3

As Figure 7 indicates, those who have daily interaction with foreigners, compared to those who do not, have higher scores in every skill. The same can be said with those who have friends (see Figure 8), those who have travelled (see Figure 9), those who have lived abroad (see Figure 10), and those have had the experience of explaining Japanese culture (see Figure 11) compared with those who have not.




Figure 7. Respondents of Daily International Interaction




Figure 8. Respondents of Whether or not Having Friends




Figure 9. Respondents of Traveling Experience




Figure 10. Respondents of Living Experience




Figure 11. Respondents of Explanation Experience

These results can easily be interpreted as the richness of international experience heightens competency in RM. The result of this analysis clearly matches The Kozai Group's explanation, that "there was a significant overlap between... the competency domains of global leadership and the competencies that are important to living and working in a foreign country...". Figure 12⁶ shows an evident result that students (majoring in domains of international affairs) and respondents who majored in international relations and language scored much higher than those who took normal

⁶ AIU meaning Akita International Students, Int meaning those who major in International affairs, Lan in language, Edu in education, Bun in other non-mathematical majors (*bunkei*), Med in medical, and Scn in other mathematical majors (*rieki*).

bunkei courses and education-related courses. Respondents of *rikei* are the lowest group (the numbers given are scores of the local university students). These results support Hypothesis 3.




Figure 12. Respondents by Their Major

Defining whether Japanese are potentially skilled or not in becoming a global leader should not be based on the above results, given the lack of comparative data. In other words, comparison with the data of other nationalities is necessary to determine if there are differences between Japanese and others from differing cultures. Thus, the second part of Hypothesis 3 cannot be answered at this point. However, answering the last research question is possible. Despite the fact that there are wide gaps between those who scored low and those who scored high, the latter group had abundant experience in terms of intercultural interaction; having had daily interaction with foreigners, having travelled or lived overseas, having had non-Japanese friends, and having had explanation about Japanese culture were an important factor in achieving the skills. In other words, with interaction and training, Japanese can become a more competent human resource and be skilled as a global leader for leading world organizations.

Throughout history, anthropological and cultural researchers have found the Japanese to be a collectivistic ethnicity that sticks to their existing group. Nevertheless, the Japanese have the potential to overcome the once-regarded deficit identity for a more global perspective by exposure to the diversity of other cultures.

Limitations

In this study, the unbalanced rate of respondents might have slightly changed the results considering the competency of all the Japanese; there were twice more females than males; twice more respondents had the experience of travelling compared to

those who had not; two-thirds of the respondents were bunkei, and the ratio of local university students was high among all the respondents. Additionally, the survey was mostly distributed through Facebook, meaning respondents were obliged to have access to a certain type of SNS to be able to answer the survey. Moreover, this method of distribution of the survey made the collection of data difficult from those who were not the author's friends or colleagues. The webpage of the survey was shared by the respondents so as to reach a wide range of Japanese, but the fact that there is a limitation to potential respondents cannot be ignored. Choosing the choices perceived to be more socially desired was also possible when the respondents had to imagine the situation one would be in for the given questions (since they are Japanese, they might have answered according to their *tatemae*). Even though the scores to be given for each choice were hidden, estimating the desired answer for each situation was predictable, leading to the answers socially desired.

Conclusion

Despite the above limitations, the data analyzed from 255 respondents was sufficient to discover the tendency among the Japanese concerning Relationship Management. As described in Figure 1, the Japanese are especially and potentially strong in Interpersonal Engagement. Further analysis indicated that there were no Japanese who scored lower than 20 in IE, whereas, in all 4 other categories, at least several respondents scored below 15. Additionally, only in IE does data show there were more than 6 respondents who gained the full score (15 respondents in total).

Even though the overall score the Japanese obtained may not have been very high, this research indicated that there are possibilities for the Japanese to eventually gain a higher score, such as majors in international studies, those going abroad (traveling or living), having opportunities to interact with foreigners, and having international friends. Majoring in a certain field may not be easy for those who have already graduated from a certain educational environment. For such Japanese, the best advice achieved from this research was to make friends. Friendships give people opportunities to exchange thoughts and values cross-culturally, and heighten knowledge of intercultural communication. Of course, travelling gives the Japanese a chance to break the wall of one's values but Figure 6 clearly indicates the potential difference the Japanese could gain from the respective experience. Thus, for those who are having trouble taking the first step in becoming more competent from a global perspective, one could simply start having a conversation with a foreign colleague nearby and engage in deep discussions and even seek opportunities to explain the cultural values of the Japanese. It is also important to listen to what one's friends say. There is no need to spend a lot of money and time to go and visit another country to widen one's perspective. Going abroad is important, but it is not the only way to achieve such goals.

By making efficient choices and seeking sufficient training, the Japanese can become competent. Japanese should be proud of their identity and face the world with the skills they have now to be better prepared for the future.

References

- Chocce, J., Johnson, D. A., & Yossatorn, Y. (2015). Predictive factors of freshmen's intercultural sensitivity. *International Journal of Information and Education Technology*, 5(10).
- Doi, T. (1985). *Omote to ura* [Omote and Ura]. Tokyo: Kobundo.
- Hanna, N., & Hoffer, B. (Eds.). (1989). *An English Dictionary of Japanese ways of thinking*. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Kuramono, Y. (2012). *Guro-baru eli-tono jidai* [Era of global elites]. Tokyo: Kodansha.
- Lustig, M. W., & Koester, J. (2003). *Intercultural competence: Interpersonal communication across cultures*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Mendenhall, M. E., Stevens, M. J., Bird, A., & Oddou, G. R. (2008). Specification of the content domain of the global competencies inventory (GCI). *The Kozai Working Paper Series*, 1(1).
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). (2014). *Project for promotion of global human resource development*. Tokyo: Author. Retrieved from <http://www.mext.go.jp/english/highered/1326713.htm>
- Ministry of Justice. (2013). *Heisei 24nen matsugenzai ni okeru zairyu-gaokokujin-ninzu ni tsuite* [The number of foreigner living in Japan by end of 2012]. Retrieved from <http://www.moj.go.jp/>
- Nakane, C. (1972). *Japanese society*. Berkeley: University of California - Berkeley.
- Nisbett, R. E. (2003). *The geology of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently... and why*. New York: Free Press.
- Novinger, T. (2001). *Intercultural communication: A practical guide*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Owolabi, K. A. (2001). Globalization, Americanization, and western imperialism. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 16(2).
- Peltokorpi, V., & Clausen, L. (2011). Linguistic and cultural barriers to intercultural communication in foreign subsidiaries. *Asian Business & Management*, 10(4).
- Pritchard, R., & Skinner, B. (2002). Cross-cultural partnerships between home and international students. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 6(4), 323-53.
- Statistics Explained. (2015). *Migration and migrant population statistics* [Migration and migrant population statistics]. Retrieved from

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

- Swierczek, F. W., & Onishi, J. (2003). Culture and conflict: Japanese managers and Thai subordinates. *Personnel Review*, 32(2).
- Tamaki, T. (2012). *Guro-baru biznesu maindoto komyunike-shon [Global business mind and communication]*. In S. Honna, Y. Takeshita, H. Miyake, & Y. Mase (Eds.), *Kigyo/daigakuha guro-baru jinzaiwo dou sodateruka? [How will companies/universities foster global human resources?]*. (pp. 190-198). Tokyo: Asuku shuppan.
- Tanaka, T., Takai, J., Kohyama, T., Fujihara, T., & Minami, H. (1997). Effects of social networks on cross-cultural adjustment. *Japanese Psychological Research*, 39 (1), 12-24.
- The Migration Observatory. (2014). *Migrants in the UK: an overview [Migrants in the UK overview]*. Retrieved from <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/>
- The United States Census Bureau. (2012). *The foreign-born population in the United States [American community survey]*. Retrieved from <https://www.census.gov>
- Trandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism & collectivism*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Tsuji, M. (2012). Kigyonai eigo kyoikuto guro-baru jinzaino ikusei [English education inside companies and fostering global human resources]. In S. Honna, Y. Takeshita, H. Miyake, & Y. Mase (Eds.), *Kigyo/daigakuha guro-baru jinzaiwo dou sodateruka? [How will companies/universities foster global human resources?]* (pp. 34-45). Tokyo: Asuku shuppan.
- Turpin, D. (2012). *Naze nihonkigyouha "guro-baruka"de tsumaduku noka [Why Japanese companies fail in "globalization"?*]. Tokyo: Nihonkeizaishinbun shuppansha. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php>

Public Displays of Affection: A Comparison of Attitudes between Japanese Returnees and Non-Returnees

Tatsuki Suzuki

Japan is changing. "More and more Japanese young people are denying conventional morals," Fujiwara (2015) reported in a major newspaper. He mentioned that young people, especially teens, post self-shot videos kissing on online video-sharing websites to let people know how much they love each other. "Japanese people choose not to publicly display affection because of moral issues, he says..."; in particular, Japanese people do not approve of the displays of affection through body contact, and particularly they are sensitive to seeing people touch their partners. What is worse, kissing is seen as a shameful act for Japanese (Dresser, 2005). We can definitely say that the Japanese attitude toward showing affection in public is changing, especially among young generations because of a tendency to accept western standards, not Japanese morals.

Although opposite-sex couples' displays of affection tend to be accepted among young people more and more, it is still in doubt whether it is acceptable for same-sex couples do the very same thing as heterosexual couples in the eyes of Japanese people. According to statistics, however, 54% of Japanese answered yes to the question asking whether society should accept homosexuality? (Kohut et. al., 2013). What is more, 83% of those younger than 30 years old said homosexuality should be accepted. Though it seems more and more Japanese people are open to homosexuality, the empirical evidence is not enough to determine if attitudes are the same between same-sex and heterosexual couples. And given that more Japanese people are gaining international experiences, from spending a great deal of their childhood in other countries before coming back to Japan for high school and university (i.e., "returnees"), to studying abroad in high school or university, such experiences may have an influence on how such individuals view the world. Consequently, the research question here is whether there are any differences between attitudes of Japanese returnees and non-returnees toward different-sex or same-sex couples' displays of affection in public.

Based on the premise that returnees may have been exposed to more worldviews than those who have not spent any significant time outside of Japan, there are three hypothesis that frame this study: (1) Japanese non-returnees will tend to reject homosexual couple's affection in public since non-returnees lack an exposure to love diversity; (2) regardless of having experiences of living overseas, young Japanese will be

more tolerant of heterosexual couples' PDA (public display of affection); and (3) male participants will tend to reject gay couple's PDA more than lesbian couples' PDA while female participants will not, since men's attitudes toward gay couples are frequently more negative than lesbian couples because they tend to have the stereotypical belief of gay men as feminine and reject norms of gender roles (Whitley & Kite, 2010).

Comparing the attitudes of Japanese returnees and non-returnees regarding PDA is important in terms of describing Japanese people's recent attitudes toward the displays of affection in public and analyzing whether Japan is becoming more open to sexual diversity in. Needless to say, returnees have the experience of living in foreign countries while non-returnees do not; in this study, I will focus on returnees who have live in foreign countries for more than two years, where the participants were also students. In western countries, romance is an integral part of the culture, where PDA is natural and widely accepted (Sellars, 2006), and displays of affection by heterosexual couples are especially common (Bielski, 2013). In addition, public attitudes toward homosexuality are relatively positive; as for North America and Europe, over 70% of the people believe that society should accept homosexuality, and over 80% of people in EU developed countries, especially Spain and Germany, have a positive attitude toward homosexuality (Kohut et al., 2013). However, some people still verbally harass and physically attack same-sex couples for engaging in even simple displays of affection in public (Trebay, 2007). In this study, I will examine the influence of the current attitudes toward the PDA of same-sex couples on Japanese returnees' ways of thinking as well.

Method

The participants of this study were Japanese returnees (five males and five females) and non-returnees (five males and five females), all of whom were 19-21 year-old college students. Although the definition of the terms "returnee" and "non-returnee" are generally not easily defined, for the purpose of this research project, I defined Japanese returnees as people who have lived and participated in an experience of living and studying abroad for at least two years. Likewise, I define Japanese non-returnees as those who not have not had the experience of living overseas except for short-term trips (e.g., one semester or less). The participants were provided with a survey and participated in a following interview regarding public displays of affection of different-sex and same-sex couples. In the survey section, participants were firstly asked their gender and whether they are a returnee. After asking basic information, they were provided with nine pictures of three different types of couples in total, different-sex couples, gay couples and lesbian couples showing three different types of affection in public: holding hands, kissing and hugging. Lastly, they were asked whether displaying their relationship openly in public, such as on social network sites, is

acceptable or not. Participants were required to answer all of the survey questions about PDA by number; using a Likert scale, they were asked to choose one number to describe their reaction: 1) never acceptable; 2) not acceptable; 3) slightly acceptable; 4) acceptable; 5) very acceptable. In the interview section, all participants were asked to answer two questions: whether they agree with showing affection in public or not, and whether they think Japanese people are open to homosexual people or not. In addition to these questions, returnees were asked one more question to determine whether there were any differences about the attitudes toward PDA between in Japan and the country where they used to live. The whole survey was conducted one-on-one, so that the participant would not be influenced by others' opinions.

Results/Analysis

As a result of the survey, there were clear differences and interesting common points between the attitudes of Japanese returnees and non-returnees toward different-sex and same-sex couples' displays of affection in public. As for Japanese non-returnees, there was a clear gap between attitudes toward heterosexual couples and same-sex couples, and even between lesbians and gay men; specifically, Japanese non-returnees tend to accept heterosexual couples' PDA but reject homosexual couples' PDA, and there is a tendency for non-returnees to not accept gay couples but more likely to accept lesbian couples (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

Table 1. Japanese Non-Returnees

| Types of couples | Male | | | Female | | | All | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------|
| | <i>Straight</i> | <i>Lesbian</i> | <i>Gay</i> | <i>Straight</i> | <i>Lesbian</i> | <i>Gay</i> | <i>Straight</i> | <i>Lesbian</i> | <i>Gay</i> |
| Holding hands | 5.0 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 |
| Kissing | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 |
| Hugging | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.8 |
| Open relationship | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.6 |
| Average | 4.35 | 4.0 | 3.75 | 4.2 | 3.95 | 3.7 | 4.28 | 3.98 | 3.73 |




Figure 1. Japanese Non-Returnees

In addition, as hypothesized, male non-returnees are more tolerant of lesbian couples' affection in public, but tend to reject gay couples' affection. In fact, some participants answered that it is acceptable to see lesbian couples holding hands but not gay couples since it is rare and weird to see men holding hands. In case of returnees, there is no big difference between attitudes toward different-sex couple's PDA and same-sex couple's PDA, and there is no clear difference between their attitudes toward lesbian and gay people (see Table 2 and Figure 2).

Table 2. Japanese Returnees

| Types of couples | Male | | | Female | | | All | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------|
| | <i>Straight</i> | <i>Lesbian</i> | <i>Gay</i> | <i>Straight</i> | <i>Lesbian</i> | <i>Gay</i> | <i>Straight</i> | <i>Lesbian</i> | <i>Gay</i> |
| Holding hands | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Kissing | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Hugging | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.7 |
| Open relationship | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| Average | 4.75 | 4.65 | 4.6 | 4.35 | 4.35 | 4.35 | 4.55 | 4.5 | 4.48 |




Figure 2. Japanese Returnees

Most returnees answered that they do not have any prejudices or barriers toward same-sex couples regardless of gay or lesbian, and it is natural to treat them the same as heterosexual couples. Analyzing the collected data, there are common attitudes between returnees and non-returnees: couples' kissing in public is the least acceptable, and making their relationship openly known to their friends on social network sites is highly acceptable for Japanese, whether they are returnees or non-returnees. As the participants indicated, making the relationship open to the public is not a big issue since it is not directly related to the public; furthermore, it is commonly seen as acceptable for the couple to do what they wish, because it does not affect the public. On the other hand, Japanese non-returnees tend to accept seeing the couple only holding hands, while returnees are more open to hugging in public, rather than just holding hands. Interestingly, there is a cultural gap between these two findings; Kershaw (2009) mentions that for teenagers in the United States, hugging is becoming more casual and common, which can be related to the results of this research since most returnees who have been in western countries including the United States seemed to be tolerant of hugging. Also, in Japan, it is not common to see physical displays of affection in public, and Japanese people tend to bow to each other rather than hug in public (Rubel, 2013).

Reflecting on the first hypothesis that Japanese non-returnees will tend to reject homosexual couple's affection in public since non-returnees lack an exposure to love diversity, the participants confirmed this to be true. As most participants said, Japanese people who have never been to foreign countries are not exposed to seeing same-sex couples showing affection in public. The second hypothesis, which is that young Japanese will be more tolerant of heterosexual couples' PDA regardless of having an experiences of living overseas, was shown to be partly true. Overall, there is a tendency to reject same-sex couples' PDA compared with heterosexual couples'

displays of affection, but there is not much of a clear difference among the results by Japanese returnees; in particular, Japanese female returnees seem not to have any prejudices toward PDA of same-sex couples regardless of gender. Lastly, the third hypothesis, that male participants will tend to reject gay couples' PDA more than lesbian couples' PDA, while female participants will not, was found to be partly wrong. In fact, the results of Japanese male returnees did not show any difference between lesbian couples and gay couples, although Japanese male non-returnees tend to reject gay couples' PDA than lesbian couples' PDA. The results of this research are contrary to those found by Whitley and Kite (2010), that men's attitudes toward gay couples are more negative than lesbian couples because of stereotypes of gay men as feminine and rejecting norms of gender roles such as protecting females.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although the results of the survey contributed to making the hypothesis reliable, there is still a limitation for this research. First, Japanese returnees were defined in this study as people who have lived in western countries for more than two years, because of the belief that a western way of positive thinking toward PDA would strongly influence Japanese returnees. However, since there were not enough participants who had been in western countries to participate in the study, some returnees who participated had lived in Asian countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand, where showing affection in public is strictly banned regardless of the couple's sexual identity. But interestingly, Japanese returnees who have been in these countries did not show any resistance or prejudice toward the display of affection in public; that may be why there is a clear difference between Japanese returnees and non-returnees in terms of their attitude for PDA, as described in the result section. This difference was not the focus of this study, and would require further data collection to explore this topic further. All of the participants who have been in Asian countries revealed that although people tend to reject PDA and same-sex couples in the country where they used to live, they do not mind seeing couples displaying affection in public regardless of gender. Based on what these participants said, culture or norms may not have an effect on the way they think toward PDA or gender, but experiencing various culture or norms may greatly affect their way of thinking toward PDA regardless of gender. Further study of this topic is required in order to understand this phenomenon.

Japan, where there used to be strict norms toward PDA, is changing. In other words, Japanese people have become more open to seeing or showing affection in public. On the other hand, people still have a negative attitude toward same-sex couples and their displays of affection in public. As most of the participants mentioned, Japanese people are not exposed to the situation of seeing same-sex couples and they do not have a knowledge of what it means to be gay or lesbian, which has contributed

to their negative attitude toward these sexual minorities. In addition, some participants mentioned the role of the media, specifically, the appearance of more homosexual celebrities on TV. This might seem to indicate the acceptance of the existence of homosexual celebrities, but this is not the case. As Arai (2014) argues, media in Japan tends to treat homosexual celebrities as entertainers, rather than effectors of positive change towards, and educators about homosexual people. Although Shibuya's move to accept same-sex marriage is one small step in changing the attitude of Japanese people, without the role of media as an educator of homosexual people and citizens' efforts to change the public attitude, Japan will not be able to change the whole society as a place which is open to every person regardless of gender or sexual orientation.

References

- Arai, Y. (2014). Is Japan ready to legalize same-sex marriage? *Asian-Pacific Law and Journal*, 123-155.
- Bielski, Z. (2013, September 19). Is holding hands ok? How same-sex couples navigate public displays of affection. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/why-shouldnt-same-sex-couples-feel-comfortable-showing-their-love-in-public/article14407718/>
- Dresser, N. (2011, January 7). *Multicultural manners: Essential rules of etiquette for the 21st century*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Fujiwara, G. (2015, June 30). Online videos of kissing teenagers kick up a storm in Japan. *The Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201506300005
- Kershaw, S. (2009, May 27). For teenagers, hello means 'how about a hug?' *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/style/28hugs.html?pagewanted=all&r=1&>
- Kohut, A., Wike, R., Horowitz, J. M., Simmons, K., Poushter, J., Ponce, A., ... Gross, E. M. (2013, June 4). The global divide on homosexuality: Greater acceptance in more secular and affluent countries. *Pew Research Center*. 1-23. Retrieved from <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Homosexuality-Report-FINAL-JUNE-4-2013.pdf>
- Rubel, P. (2013, February 6). Hugging for chocolate in the land of bows. Saatchi and Saatchi. Retrieved from http://saatchi.com/en-us/news/hugging_for_chocolate_in_the_land_of_bows
- Sellers, S. (2006, August 23). Lust life: Public displays of affection. *Strausmedia*. Retrieved from <http://www.nypress.com/lust-life-public-displays-of-affection/>

- Trebay, G. (2007, February 18). A kiss too far? *The New York Times*. Retrieved from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/fashion/18affection.html?pagewanted=all>
- Whitley, B., & Kite, M. (2010). *The psychology of prejudice and discrimination*. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning.

[Book Review] Talking at Cross-Purposes: The Dynamics of Miscommunication

Kazuki Tokoro

Tzanne, A. (2000). *Talking at cross-purposes: The dynamics of miscommunication*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

In this review, the book *Talking at Cross-purposes: The Dynamics of Miscommunication*, which was written by Tzanne (2000) as a revision of her Ph.D. dissertation, is discussed. Based on her research with the diary method, she discusses how the dynamics of interactions cause miscommunication in terms of linguistic and situational contexts and facework. The target audience can be assumed to be those interested in the creation and influence of miscommunication. Also, researchers in the field of miscommunication may be another target audience, because she says, "it [this conclusion chapter] should by no means be seen as providing final conclusions to the study of misunderstandings in talk-in-interaction. ... [M]y findings are more meaningful when seen as starting points for future research" (p. 233). Although there are some limitations in this research, she has done a good job in exploring and describing the miscommunications.

Although cultural differences have a big impact in causing miscommunication, the difference of culture or ethnic identity is not the only variable that affects the creation of miscommunication, which people tend to overlook (p. 7). Instead, this book has done a significant job in focusing on other variables such as linguistic contexts and situations of an interaction. Also, she is a professor of language and linguistics with research interest in Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics (National and Kapodestrian University of Athens, 2011), which supports the credibility of this book.

After reviewing the previous works in Chapter 2, the author does a good job in exploring the linguistic context as the cause of misunderstandings in Chapter 3 (The Creation of Miscommunication: Linguistic Context). First, she noted that the origin of misunderstandings can be explored only through the examination of the conversation itself, not a specific turn or source (p. 48). Then, based on the previous works on utterance meaning (given by semantics) and force (the speaker's intention of doing something), she successfully introduced the possible misunderstanding options within these two levels of speaker meaning. Then, she pointed out that misunderstandings also occur when a speaker changes the topic while the hearer cannot follow the change, because she or he relies on the previous utterance when decoding the message. Finally, she concludes this chapter noting that miscommunication happens in relation

to the "dynamic way in which the context of production and interpretation of discourse is constructed in an exchange" (p. 84). This conclusion makes sense in terms of the idea of expectancy violations in communication studies.

In Chapter 4 (The Creation of Miscommunication: Situational Context), the author explains well about the social or physical side of miscommunication. First, she pointed out that the misunderstandings occur from the wrong perception of the frame of the hearer (addressee, auditor, bystander and audience). She also holds that people are likely to assume that the speaker talks while staying on his or her professional role although it is not always the case, which makes the misunderstanding. This is an authentic point, because, for example, what the Prime Minister of Japan says one time is regarded as what he said on that topic all the time. In addition, she emphasized that the physical context has a significant effect as the social context on the occurrence of misunderstanding. To prove this, she raised some examples from her research, one of which is the utterance "your tea's getting cold" (p. 118), which is used as the establishment of the topic "temperature change" but may be misinterpreted as the worry for the hearer's tea to become cold. Again, she finished this chapter with the conclusion that the occurrence of misunderstandings is related to the dynamics of situated activities and social roles. The author does a wonderful job in explaining her arguments with clear examples like this.

In Chapter 5 (The Development of Miscommunication in Situated Discourse), she made a significant point in this field about how misunderstanding is dealt with once it occurs, focusing on the what she calls "reparative steps", the steps which "can be involved in the development of miscommunication" (p. 127). Although the previous works on the development and repair of misunderstandings appear to assume that various reparative steps are followed for successful communication, she found out that to notice a misunderstanding is not necessarily followed by repair-attempts and that repair-attempts do not necessarily mean successful repair-outcomes. An example of these cases includes the repair-attempt causing another misunderstanding. Also, she pointed out that reparative steps are based on the dynamics of the interaction and there are no formatted steps. This is a big finding in communication studies, because people tend to first assume that communication is something linear, as shown in the evolution of communication models from a linear model to transactional model.

Chapter 6 (Miscommunication, Face-Threats and facework in Social Interaction) explains well about the categories and choices of face threats and facework (face-saving) strategies in miscommunication, although there is one possibility left out. As she points out, misunderstanding is face-threatening for both a speaker and a hearer. As for repair-attempt, she raised three categories: Direct repair-attempt, Repair by hinting and Repair-attempt avoidance (p. 200), and argued that the speaker's choice

from these options is based on the power balance between the speaker and hearer, social distance between them and the seriousness of threat by the misinterpreted item towards their faces. Then, she also talks about the repair-attempts by the third person (called "Other"), saying that Other attempts repair when there is only a minimal threat for him or her, and she or he can have a better relationship with the speaker or hearer through his or her repair-attempt and ultimately can enhance his or her own face. This is a good point, and it is true that they offer the support in interaction to enhance their faces. However, it is not necessarily for their own face; in other cases, they repair just because they feel uncomfortable or irritated with the misunderstanding situation. Also, she made another point about facework strategies by the hearer depending on the situation, which are (1) not acknowledging misunderstandings until they are accidentally resolved, (2) the criticism to the speaker, (3) apology for misunderstanding and (4) metacommunicative comments. Lastly, she discussed intentional misunderstandings made as a facework strategy to enhance their own faces and often their interlocutors as well and to avoid existing face-threats.

Overall, this research highlights that the dynamic nature of interaction has a big influence on the creation and development of miscommunication, and concludes, "research on miscommunication should free itself from preoccupation with participants' background features such as ethnicity or gender and take into consideration the dynamic nature of discourse" (p. 241). Although this research made a great point, there are some limitations regarding research methods employed. First of all, this is based on a diary method. Although she did her best in minimizing the weaknesses of this method by, for example, taking additional notes, there is a risk of missing the misunderstandings. Also, part of her data was collected from her friends (p. 222). This might have skewed the data; for example, her friends might have intentionally misunderstood her speaker's utterance so that they could get more examples of misunderstanding and help the author. The other limitation is that she used interactions described in plays and novels as well as the actual interactions between people. Although plays or novels often highlight the reality, they sometimes hide or exaggerate a part of the reality, which also might have skewed her data. However, this book deals with an interesting perspective, and further exploration is sought, as the author places her conclusion as a starting point for further research.

References

National and Kapodestrian University of Athens. (2011). RCeL - UoA - Angeliki Tzanne. Retrieved from <http://www.rcel.enl.uoa.gr/about-us/staff/angeliki-tzanne.html>

Call for Papers

Aims and Scope

The *Student Journal of International Liberal Arts* is the first academic journal to be published by the undergraduate students of Akita International University. The editors are all AIU undergraduate students and the journal showcases undergraduate and graduate student work -- from AIU and from the rest of the world. The goal of this journal is to give students the opportunity to publish their academic and creative writing and to exchange intellectual ideas with peers. As such, the *Student Journal* hereby invites you to submit your finest writing, written for a course or simply for your own intellectual purposes. Academic writing from both Japanese and international students is welcomed. Students are invited to submit a paper they would like to have considered for publication.

Submissions

Academic essay liberal arts topics include, for example, politics, history, education, environment, economics, anthropology, sociology, literature, etc. Creative writing includes poetry, short stories, etc. We also welcome other creative works such as photography, painting, and sculpture, but must be submitted in digital format.

Academic submissions should be:

1. written in English,
2. formatted following APA6th edition conventions
3. referenced with endnotes, not footnotes, and kept to a minimum.
4. double spaced, with 12-point font size, 1-inch (25mm) margins,
5. a minimum of 1,000 words (3 pages in length, excluding references, tables, etc.) in length, to a maximum of 20 pages, and,
6. submitted in MS Word

Creative writing should be:

1. written in English
2. double spaced, with 12-point font size, 1" margins, and,
3. submitted in MS Word

Submissions are reviewed year-round. Notification of acceptance is typically sent within 3 months of submission. Journal Editors will consult with authors regarding any revisions deemed necessary prior to final publication. All revisions will require the original author's approval. The *Student Journal* reserves the right to do minor editing for clarity. Please submit your paper with a title page containing full contact information (full name, mailing address and e-mail address) to: **studentjournal@aiu.ac.jp** and indicate "journal submission" as your subject.

Questions may be directed to the faculty advisor, Dr. Paul Chamness Miller, at the same e-mail address.

Use this opportunity to showcase your work to the rest of the academic world!

studentjournal@aiu.ac.jp

ISSN 2189-3780
© Copyright 2015
Akita International University

Publisher: SUZUKI Norihiko
Akita International University Press
Akita International University
193-2 Okutsubakidai, Yuwa; Tsubakigawa; Akita, 010-1211 Japan
TEL: 018-886-5900
FAX: 018-886-5910
URL: <http://web.aiu.ac.jp>
E-mail: aiupress@aiu.ac.jp

ISSN 2189—3780

 Akita International University